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Abstract 
 
The primary thesis that the chapters which follow are concerned to elaborate and to 
substantiate is to what extent legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion influence 
the administration, management and outcomes of Antisocial Behaviour Order 
(ASBO) use in Britain. A great deal of the existing academic literature on the use of 
ASBOs in Britain locates the strategic importance of the ‘relevant authorities’ (local 
authorities, housing associations, registered social landlords (RSLs), the police) 
involved in ASBO applications. While acknowledging the importance of existing 
scholarship which highlights the significance of the contribution of these applicant 
agencies in shaping ASBO outcomes, this thesis contends that the position of both 
legal procedure(s) and the court system in ASBO applications is also one of 
fundamental primacy, which necessitates further examination and analysis. 
Moreover, there are also no comparative studies in existence that analyse the 
substantive differences and/or similarities between ASBO administrative 
procedure(s) in Scotland, and in England and Wales. Hence this thesis will also 
provide a comparative account of relevant aspects of legal and administrative 
procedure(s) across these jurisdictions. 
The data production approach applied in this thesis is both quantitative and 
qualitative in its composition. An online survey questionnaire was used to obtain 
data on solicitors’ experiences of ASBO application and court procedure(s) (in 
Scotland, and in England and Wales), and semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Sheriffs in the lower courts in Scotland in order to obtain 
information on judicial discretion and decision-making in ASBO cases. The study 
found that legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion fundamentally impacted on the 
operation of antisocial behaviour legislation and the use of ASBOs in both 
Scotland, and in England and Wales. Specifically, legal procedure(s) and judicial 
discretion influenced the form of ASBO prohibitions and the type of behaviour 
made the subject of an order; the extent of the impact of mitigating factors; the 
evidentiary requirements necessary for an interim/ASBO application; the 
sentencing tariffs for breach; the frequency with which orders on conviction are 
issued; the frequency with which orders are granted to children and young people; 
and the ability of alleged antisocial behaviour perpetrators to defend or to appeal 
action against them.  
Building on existing theoretical frameworks on procedural justice (Galligan, 
1996a; 1996b; Halliday, 1998; 2004), and, moreover, on conceptual paradigms of 
‘fairness’ and consistency in judicial decision-making developed in other empirical 
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studies of procedure and judicial discretion in the lower courts (Anleu and Mack, 
2005; 2007; Cowan et al., 2006 Hunter et al., 2005; Lawrence, 1995), the thesis 
develops an account of the network of (procedural and juridical) factors that 
influence the use of ASBOs in Britain. The thesis concludes that, in order to ensure 
greater consistency, stringency and accuracy in approach to ASBO cases – in 
essence, in order for there to be more ‘fairness’ in ASBO processes - there must be 
a greater socio-legal focus upon the influence of both substantive practices and 
formal procedural rules. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
A great deal of the existing academic literature on the use of antisocial behaviour 
orders (ASBOs)1 in Britain locates the strategic importance of the ‘relevant 
authorities’ involved in ASBO applications (local authorities, housing associations, 
registered social landlords (RSLs), housing action trusts (HATs), the police); and 
the way(s) in which the wide-ranging discretion conferred on enforcement agencies 
by s. 1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has created ‘a new domain of 
professional power and knowledge’ (Brown, 2004: 203). While Burney (2002) and 
Cowan, Pantazis and Gilroy (2001), have observed the social housing sectors’ 
increased use of and reliance upon procedures synonymous with crime control; 
Brown (2004) and Hester (2000) have suggested that the control of antisocial 
behaviour through the use of ASBOs has become a means for the social control of 
marginalised groups by local authorities.  
Acknowledging the importance of existing scholarship which highlights the 
significance of the contribution of these applicant authorities, this thesis contends 
that the position of both legal procedure(s) and the court system in ASBO 
applications is also one of fundamental primacy, which necessitates further 
examination and analysis. I will argue2 that the role of legal procedure(s) in ASBO 
applications is highly influential in deciding ASBO outcomes3; and moreover, that 
judicial decision-making within ASBO cases (with regard to discretionary autonomy, 
and pivotal jurisprudential decisions) is a component of axiological importance. 
While academic research and literature has been correct to identify that it is 
applicant agencies that are instructive in determining ASBO applications, this thesis 
proposes that it is legal and court procedure(s), coupled with the discretionary 
autonomy of the judiciary that primarily defines the legal legitimacy of ASBOs, their 
                                               
1
 ASBOs are civil orders, designed to protect individuals from acts of antisocial behaviour 
‘that cause, or are likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress’ under s. 1(1)(a) of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. ASBOs are available for persons over the age of 10 years in 
England and Wales and for persons over the age of 12 years in Scotland. The orders 
prohibit a defendant from engaging in any behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress and have a minimum duration of 2 years (although in Scotland, duration is a matter 
for the presiding Sheriff). Breach of an order is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty 
of 5 years imprisonment. 
2
 As I have done elsewhere, see Donoghue (2007) 
3
 For the purposes of this study, ‘outcomes’ is defined as the result of an ASBO court 
application. That is to say, ‘outcomes’ spans a range of consequences: whether or not an 
application succeeds; to what extent an order is amended (in respect of prohibitions and 
duration) before being applied; and the court’s approach to an application for breach 
proceedings. ‘Outcomes’ does not, however, refer to the effectiveness or otherwise of an 
ASBO being served – it refers only to the result of the application process. 
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scope, and their function in law. The purpose of this research is a socio-legal 
analysis of the ways in which the dimensions of due process and legal primacy; 
and juridical power and discretion, intersect to shape the management and 
outcomes of ASBO use in Britain.  
 
Hence, the primary thesis that the chapters which follow are concerned to 
elaborate and to substantiate is to what extent legal procedure(s) and 
judicial discretion influence the administration, management and outcomes 
of ASBO use in Britain. 
  
 
A socio-legal approach 
It is the contention of this research study that ‘law’ (and legal procedure(s)), is an 
intrinsic, empirical component of the wider social structure on antisocial behaviour 
and the use of ASBOs in Britain. Indeed, it is the view of many socio-legal scholars 
that legal and court procedures ‘remain unintelligible when interpreted in a non-
contextual manner which excludes their social, political and policy dimension’ 
(Charlesworth, 2007: 35). Hence, this thesis develops a critical interdisciplinary 
analysis of law as a ‘social phenomenon’ within the augmented context of a 
sociological analysis of the administration and management of ASBO use in Britain 
(see Chapter 2). That is to say, in the course of this thesis, ‘law’ (to include legal 
and court procedures; and embedded concepts of administrative and procedural 
‘fairness’) will be considered not simply with regard to the presentation of new 
empirical findings borne out of my research study, but also as an instrument with 
which to realise ASBOs as an entity grounded in social structure(s). As Lobban 
succinctly concludes: ‘It is only with the aid of the “external” perspective that we 
can make sense of the “internal” developments’ (Lewis and Lobban, 2003: 26). 
I will argue that existing empirical socio-legal research has made the 
exercise of (aspects of) law more apparent, its consequences more evident, and its 
operation more foreseeable, logical and progressive (Cotterrell, 2002: 643). 
Furthermore, socio-legal work has also been highly efficacious in ‘revealing and 
explaining the practices and procedures of legal, regulatory, redress and dispute 
resolution systems and the impact of legal phenomena on a range of social 
institutions, on business and on citizens’ (Genn et al., 2006: 1). Thus, law’s role as 
a vital regulatory instrument, ‘a potential source of collective as well as individual 
empowerment’, makes it a primary vehicle of democracy (Sommerlad, 2004: 350). 
The benefits afforded by a socio-legal examination of ASBOs - as opposed to a 
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purely ‘sociological’ analysis – and, moreover, the importance to this study of the 
‘social’ character of law - will be considered in detail in the next chapter.  
The empirical data presented in the body of this thesis is consequently 
socio-legal in nature, and relates specifically to (1) legal procedure(s) in ASBO 
applications (including an examination of bureaucratic administrative and court 
practice(s) and an analysis of procedural justice) and, (2) judicial discretion (which 
will be considered both at a formal level of legal doctrine, but also in terms of the 
embedded ‘procedural’ discretion in ASBO cases). Let us begin by briefly 
considering each sub-topic in turn. 
 
Legal procedure 
Studies of the work and orientation of different branches of the professions that are 
involved in the legal process, or which are regulated by legislative provisions are 
common within socio-legal studies4. Halliday observes the impetus for the 
proliferation of such empirical research thus: 
 
‘[J]udicial mandates for bureaucratic behaviour have an authoritative and 
prescriptive quality which unavoidably invite social inquiry…[If the courts set 
out] guidance about how government should go about its business, it is 
difficult to resist the temptation to at least try to find out if and how the law 
matters – regardless of how difficult the task is, or how elusive the answers 
might be.’ (2004: 161) 
 
Moreover, empirical research on legal procedure(s) is - unavoidably given its legal 
status - highly relevant to issues of fairness and to the effective enforcement of 
rights. As Galligan (1996b) observes, research that demonstrates significant levels 
of ‘error in administration, or where public bodies fail to comply with judicial 
requirements of fair procedure or human rights standards, provides a “moral 
imperative for improving procedures” not to mention actual evidence that 
improvements are needed and what these might consist of’ (cited in Sunkin, 2006: 
120). Hence the study of legal procedure in ASBO cases is important not only from 
the perspective of understanding derivative practice outcomes, but also with regard 
to the (perhaps grander) themes of access to justice and procedural fairness, within 
                                               
4
 See for example, Abel-Smith, B. and Stevens, R. (1967) Lawyers and the Courts: A 
Sociological Study of the English Legal System 1750 -1965. Heinemann. 
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the context of civil (and criminal5) court process(es) which will be discussed in 
detail in the course of this thesis.  
 Yet, it is important that the sociological foundations of the research study 
are not overlooked, for it is the sociological analysis that enables a contextual 
understanding of the political, social and historical conditions that have come to 
bear on antisocial behaviour policy, and the use of ASBOs in Britain. After all, it is 
not enough ‘to attribute as a matter of course specific intentions to all acts or 
mechanisms of control without…an analysis of the complexity that causes their 
birth, survival and proliferation’ (Lianos, 2003: 414). Hence, this research study 
seeks to understand ‘law’ (and specifically legal procedure(s)) in ASBO actions as 
an element within a broader sociological sphere of analysis, with deference to 
political, social and policy dimensions. By way of illustration, the Attorney-General, 
Lord Goldsmith, recently argued in support of the courts (and in particular, the 
judiciary) being made more aware of specific policy contexts (including social and 
political elements) prior to their judicial decision-making: 
 
‘[W]e [government lawyers] must think about how best to present 
[cases]…It is here that the question of evidence – especially of policy 
background and considerations – becomes absolutely crucial. That 
evidence is essential to bring home to the court the complexity of the policy 
background’ (2002: 15). 
 
Moreover, it will also be considered to what extent legal procedure(s) in ASBO 
actions impacts upon individual outcome(s) in ASBO cases. For example, if we 
follow the argument of the procedural justice theorists (see for example, Solum, 
2004) that procedure(s) are just as influential as outcomes on individuals – then 
this provides an important grounding for analysis. Socio-legal scholars have long 
argued that ‘procedure’ strongly influences the perceived fairness of the 
substantive result of legal process(es). Indeed, Walker et al. (1979) reported 
seminally that legal procedure(s) can shape parties’ beliefs about the distributive 
(and not merely procedural) fairness of the outcome of a case. Hence, the 
construction and application of the substantive legal procedure(s) in ASBO 
applications will be critically examined in order to determine the derivative influence 
of legal procedure(s) versus legal outcome(s) on principles of justice and ‘fairness’ 
in ASBO process(es). 
                                               
5
 In respect of ASBOs obtained on conviction in the criminal courts 
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Judicial Discretion 
As we shall see in the review of existing literature (Chapter 3), the inherent 
ambiguity in the statutory definition of ‘antisocial behaviour’ has necessarily 
conferred a significant degree of discretionary autonomy on applicant authorities to 
decide the bounds of reasonable (or acceptable) behaviour within their own 
locales. Antisocial behaviour policy is thus fundamentally embodied within a 
‘renewed “local” ideology’ (Carr and Cowan, 2006: 65) that is at once diacritic from 
both neo-liberalism, and also, the historical limitations (and inflexibility) of local 
welfare bureaucracy (ibid). However, this level of discretionary power is not 
unusual or unique in law. On the contrary, in his discussion of the legal definition of 
the term ‘antisocial’, Macdonald (2003: 194) has argued the fundamental truism 
that ‘no legal system can operate without significant discretionary power’, while 
Bradley and Ewing (2003) have observed, ‘If it is contrary to the rule of law that 
discretionary authority should be given to government departments or public 
officers, then the rule of law applies to no modern constitution’ (citing Davis, 1971: 
33). 
 In respect of ASBO applications, discretionary autonomy naturally extends 
beyond the agencies involved in ASBO use to include (both the higher and lower) 
courts deciding on application outcomes. It is the contention of this thesis that while 
the higher courts have made pivotal jurisprudential decisions on the scope and 
legal legitimacy of ASBO actions, the lower courts decision making in ASBO cases 
has been ‘not…dramatic [but] local, personal, and incremental, and perhaps 
enduring’ (Anleu and Mack, 2007: 203). For example, taking first the higher 
judiciary, Lord Woolf recently discussed the importance of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in enabling Judges to make a ‘direct contribution’ to 
the international jurisprudence of human rights6 (2003: 19), and as we shall see in 
the course of this thesis, the higher courts have had to decide on human rights and 
civil liberties issues in the course of ASBO actions (for example, on the right to a 
private life in Stanley, Marshall and Kelly v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis and The Chief Executive of Brent Council [2004] EWHC 2229)7.  
However, the contribution of the lower courts must not subsequently be 
underestimated. Anleu and Mack (2007: 185) have argued that in the exercise of 
their judicial autonomy, the lower courts ‘can bring about social change on an 
                                               
6
 Previously, British judges could contribute to human rights jurisprudence in the Privy 
Council, but that provided only limited opportunities.  
7
 The influence of the higher judiciary in ASBO actions is discussed further in Donoghue, J., 
(2007) ‘The Judiciary as a Primary Definer on Antisocial Behaviour Orders’ in The Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice 46 (4): 417-30 
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individual, local or micro level…Magistrates have the capacity to be agents of 
social change.’ Indeed, as will be discussed in the forthcoming data analysis 
section of this thesis (Chapter 6), it became apparent in the course of interviews 
with the lower judiciary that many of the participants felt that their function in ASBO 
cases was as much about ‘social work’ as it was about deciding the law (Chapter 
6). Moreover, Douglas and Laster (1992) have recognized the enthusiasm of 
magistrates for the opportunities presented by the courts to improve communities 
and neighbourhoods, while Marchetti and Daly (2004: 2) have discerned that ‘there 
is a new breed of magistrates and judges…who are taking a more activist stance in 
criminal justice policy’. In a similar vein, Lord Woolf has argued: 
 
‘The judge’s responsibility for delivering justice is no longer largely confined 
to presiding over a trial and acting as arbiter between the conflicting 
positions of the claimant and the defendant or the prosecution and the 
defence. The role of the judiciary is to be proactive in the delivery of justice. 
To take on new responsibilities, so as to contribute to the quality of justice.’ 
(2003: 17) 
 
However, both jurists and academics have been highly critical of the breadth of 
discretion afforded to both agencies and the courts in ASBO applications. Indeed, 
Macdonald (2003:194) cites Davis’ conceptualisation of the ‘extravagant version of 
the rule of law’ (1971) as forming the basis for such objections. That is to say, 
Macdonald posits that opponents of the discretion afforded in law to agencies and 
the courts in ASBO proceedings (proponents of what he observes as the 
‘extravagant version of the rule of law’ theory) frequently begin from the premise 
that wide discretionary power should not be present in any legitimate system of law 
and/or government, and that it is necessary to seek to limit such discretionary 
decision-making as much as possible8. 
 However, the risks and difficulties inherent in discretionary decision-making 
(as Macdonald appreciates) evidently should not be overlooked. For example, in 
their research on District Judges and possession proceedings in England, Cowan 
et al. (2006: 552) found that ‘complaints made by practitioners about the exercise 
of discretion have tended to coalesce around the different treatment of similar 
cases by different District Judges operating in the same court, as well as by the 
                                               
8
 For example, Macdonald (2003: 194) cites Baroness Helena Kennedy’s opposition to the 
discretionary power in ASBO actions on the basis that this assumes that a governing power 
and/or agencies of the state are always benign - and will use such powers appropriately. 
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same District Judge’. Judicial discretion necessarily allows for inconsistency in 
decision-making - resulting in what Cowan et al. described as ‘a lottery, depending 
on location and individual District Judge’ (p. 570). Moreover, Macdonald has 
described the potential for poor decision-making based upon the use of ‘illegitimate 
criteria’, and ‘arrogant or careless decision-making’ (Macdonald, 2003: 195; see 
also Halliday, 2004). The potential for such difficulties similarly to arise in ASBO 
cases will thus be considered in the course of this thesis. 
 Yet, the dangers associated with judicial discretionary power need to be 
balanced carefully with an analysis of the potential for derivative positive outcomes. 
In fact, Macdonald (ibid.) argues persuasively that the ‘extravagant version of the 
rule of law’ advocated by those who seek to ‘eliminate’ discretionary autonomy 
from the rule of law, is fundamentally flawed in the respect that it assumes that 
there can be ‘a neat dichotomy between rules and discretion. Rules are 
erroneously contrasted with discretion “as if each were the antithesis of the other”’ 
(citing Galligan, 1996b:169). Within this paradigm, Macdonald argues that 
opponents of discretionary power necessarily ignore the opportunity for 
discretionary decision making to be ‘beneficial’, for instance with regard to efficacy 
in the operation of the rule of law, and in limiting the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
substantive rights in individual cases.  
 Hence, in the course of this thesis, we will examine in more detail the nature 
of judicial discretion, and its relevance to ASBO process(es) and outcomes. The 
consequences of judicial discretionary decision-making in ASBO cases will be 
investigated and then considered within a wider theoretical analysis of procedural 
justice and ‘fairness’ in ASBO procedures and application outcomes. The research 
study will also examine the social and legal complexity of judicial decision-making 
in ASBO cases which will form the ‘social science project of a detailed examination 
of discretion in particular contexts, informed by an appreciation of agents’ own 
understandings and experiences of clients and other participants’ (Lacey, 1992: 
372).  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis advances the argument that the study of ASBOs in Britain requires that 
attention be paid to the social factors underpinning their use, but equally, the legal 
and court process(es) that intersect to shape practices and outcomes. Hence, the 
primary thesis that the chapters which follow are concerned to elaborate and to 
substantiate is to what extent legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion influence 
 16 
the administration and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. The focus of this research 
study is a socio-legal analysis of the administration of ASBOs with an emphasis on 
due process and legal primacy; and juridical power and discretion. I am specifically 
interested in the ways in which these dimensions intersect to shape the 
management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain.  
The influence of legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion on the use of 
ASBOs will be explored in the following thesis, which is set out as follows: Chapter 
Two consists of a theoretical examination and analysis of concepts of law and 
sociology, and the point(s) at which the two disciplines converge for the purposes 
of this research study. Moreover, this chapter considers the social embeddedness 
of law, and provides a review of existing empirical socio-legal research on legal 
procedure and judicial discretion. Chapter Three reviews the relevant literature on 
antisocial behaviour policy and the use of ASBOs, which includes books, journal 
articles, case files and judgments (of both the higher and lower judiciary), and 
official policy documents. In Chapter Four, the research methodology will be 
discussed and justified. Chapter Five forms part one of the data analysis and 
presents findings from an online survey questionnaire with solicitors involved in 
ASBO applications in England and Wales, and in Scotland. Chapter Six forms part 
two of the data analysis and presents findings from semi-structured interviews with 
the lower judiciary in Scotland who have decided on ASBO applications. Chapter 
Seven consists of the Discussion section of thesis which draws together the 
empirical research findings from the qualitative and quantitative data and provides 
a structured, comprehensive and critical account of the research outcomes. Finally, 
Chapter Eight provides a conclusion on the research outcome(s) and discusses to 
what extent they have answered the research questions. The conclusion also 
suggests potential ways in which the research can be utilised and offers some 
suggestions for the advancement of future research in this area. 
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Chapter Two 
Sociology and Law – A Theoretical Consideration 
 
Introduction 
In general terms, the research embodied within this thesis is concerned with due 
process and bureaucratic aspects of the criminal justice system (including the 
sentencing behaviour of the judiciary). Thus, in order to better explain the 
relationship that exits between legal regulation and social context, this chapter will 
consider both scholarship and research evidence on the inter-relationship between 
power and the operation of law. However, as Low (1978) rightly warned nearly 
three decades ago, criminal justice research must be careful to guard against the 
treatment of juridical aspects of the criminal justice system as autonomous and 
distinct entities in isolation from the wider social context in which they are situated. 
Hence, in the first part of this chapter, I will examine law and social science 
alongside notions of causality and normativity and I will consider whether the 
theory-based foundations and research methodologies of the two disciplines are 
mutually compatible and thus whether it is possible to reconcile ‘sociological’ and 
‘legal’ for the purposes of constructing a theoretical context for this research study. 
In the next part of this chapter I will investigate law with respect to social structure 
and power. In particular, I will discuss law in relation to Foucault’s ‘analytics of 
power’ largely embodied within ‘Discipline and Punish’ (1975), ‘The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1’ (1976), ‘Power/Knowledge’ (1980) and ‘Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture’ (1988) and I will argue that Foucault developed ideas about - rather than a 
theory of - law. While I do not seek to develop a Foucaultian theory of law in this 
chapter, or indeed in this thesis, I will instead argue for the incorporation of those 
elements of Foucault’s thesis on the ‘analytics of power’ that I consider to be 
illuminating for our understanding of ‘the complex role of law in the constitution of 
modern society’ (Baxter, 1996: 465). The third part of this chapter examines 
existing socio-legal studies of decision-making and procedure in the lower courts in 
the context of my earlier theoretical discussion of law and its relationship to power 
and social structure. This chapter concludes by proposing that an integrated 
analytical approach be used in this study of ASBOs which incorporates both the 
legal and sociological dimensions of the research. 
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Causality and normativity 
The study of the administration and management of ASBOs would, I believe, be 
deeply impoverished by a neglect of, or a disregard for, the examination of the legal 
aspects of ASBO use within a socio-jurisprudential context of analysis. Indeed, it is 
the contention of this thesis that wider jurisprudential notions of legal procedure, 
and judicial discretion and decision-making, are cogent, robust normative social 
concerns (as much as they are legal concerns) that positively require consideration 
and representation in the empirical study of ASBOs as a sociological phenomenon. 
Yet, although most socio-legal theorists will argue – correctly - for the consideration 
of law as an entity embodied within the sphere of sociology9, to arrive at the 
conclusion that the disciplines of sociology and law are fundamentally distinct, is of 
course inescapable. 
Consider Korn’s analysis of the inherent differences between scientific 
knowledge(s) and law:  
 
‘Perhaps the most fundamental source of difficulty in technical fact 
determination is that the law and the scientific knowledge which it refers 
often serve different purposes. Concerned with ordering men’s conduct in 
accordance with certain standards, values, societal goals, the legal system 
is a prescriptive and normative one dealing with the “ought to be.” Much 
scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is purely descriptive; its “laws” seek 
not to control or judge the phenomena of the real world, but to describe or 
explain them in neutral terms.’ (1966: 1081) 
 
The sciences (social and natural) are thus concerned with the world as it 
substantively exists. Although Korn’s summation of scientific knowledge(s) and 
research infers that much of the work of the scientific disciplines is concerned with 
positivism and the reporting of fact(s), clearly the fundamental axioms of qualitative 
and quantitative research (methodologies), coupled with the inferred, or expressly 
stated, ‘policy relevance’ of many contemporary pieces of research, means that 
contemporary research ‘findings’ and ‘conclusions’ may necessarily also require to 
have regard for the way the world ought to be. But this does not negate the 
accuracy of Korn’s observation that the principle concern of scientific research is 
with the way the world is. Alternatively, law is, in some ways, an aspirational 
concept. For example, Kelsen described the normativity of the law thus: 
                                               
9
 The concept of law as a ‘social’ entity will be developed later in the course of this chapter 
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‘[A] law of nature is a statement to the effect that if there is A, there is B, 
whereas a rule of morality or a rule of law is a statement to the effect that if 
there is A, there ought to be B. It is the difference between the “is” and the 
“ought”, the difference between causality and normativity…’ (Kelsen, 1957: 
137). 
 
Hence, law, in contrast to the causal nature of social science research, is 
normative. Indeed, Walker and Monahan state succinctly, that the law ‘does not 
describe how people do behave, but rather prescribes how they should behave’ 
(1986: 489). In this respect, scientific research thus adduces to an empirical social 
reality that we ascertain from our conscious and discernable (sensory) responses, 
‘rather than to the value we impute to that reality’ (ibid.). Law, on the other hand, 
concerns our normative (social) values about cause and effect, linked to our wider 
aspirational (social) objective(s). 
 However, social science and law also share distinct similarities. Walker and 
Monahan, who have written extensively on, and argued persuasively for, social 
science as a means for improving legal procedure(s), describe the most 
fundamentally analogous dimension of law and social science research thus: 
 
‘The principle similarity between social science research and law is that 
both are general – both produce principles applicable beyond particular 
instances…Indeed, the purpose of most scientific research is to obtain 
knowledge that, while surely not immutable, holds true for many people 
over considerable time and in a variety of place.’ (1986: 490)  
 
Law and social science thus correspond in the respect that they both typically 
address prospective circumstances/happenings. However, the methodology of this 
research study (as we shall see in Chapter 4), uses a combination of positivist and 
phenomenological research paradigms, and employs heuristic methods of analysis 
as well as statistical modes of analysis. Hence, it is important here to briefly 
distinguish the two sociological research paradigms, within this wider theoretical 
discussion of law and social science research methods.  
While positivism assumes that the only authentic knowledge is scientific 
knowledge, and that such knowledge can only come from positive affirmation of 
theories through strict scientific method, phenomenological research paradigms 
have instead sought to understand (events and happenings in) the social world 
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through the heuristic investigation of (elements of) the social world as distinct from 
the natural world10. For example, values, norms, and rules are studied using 
qualitative and ethnographic methods which necessarily concentrate on the social 
and cultural nature of the phenomena being studied. A detailed explanation of and 
a justification for the use of a pluralist methodology, and the benefits afforded to 
this empirical study by the adoption of such an approach, is provided in Chapter 4. 
However, in our current consideration of law and social science, the 
distinctive difference between the disciplines, for the purposes of this discussion, is 
that phenomenological scientific findings are evaluated in part by their heuristic 
value – by their ability to organise and to make intelligible new phenomena. If we 
briefly consider the methodology of legal scholarship, for instance, we can see this 
difference borne out. For example, Hillyard (2007: 275) has observed that, while 
legal scholarship is most often concerned with detailed textual analysis, social 
science research is generally concerned with deductive or inductive methods to 
elucidate identified social phenomena. Indeed, Hillyard posits that: 
 
‘[T]he crucial characteristic of [social science] researchers is that they are 
trained to reflect on the extent to which their insider/outsider position affects 
their understanding of the phenomenon under study. In contrast, the aim of 
so much legal scholarship is to influence legal reasoning and produce 
clarity using a self-referential system. The aim is not to further the 
understanding of the phenomena of law, legal institutions or processes 
using a range of quantitative or qualitative research methodologies.’ (ibid) 
 
Walker and Monahan have proposed that sociological research should thus be 
treated by the courts as ‘a source of authority rather than as a source of facts…we 
propose that courts treat social science research as they would legal precedent 
under the common law’ (1986: 488). As Walker and Monahan do not seek 
specifically to differentiate between heuristic and positivist research paradigms,  the 
inference here must be that law, and (positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
of) social science – despite divergence methodologically and ontologically – can be 
reconciled, and are mutually compatible in terms of socio-legal analyses. Hence, in 
the chapters which follow, this thesis will seek to affirm of the primacy of the social 
within this socio-legal analysis of the ways in which the dimensions of due process 
                                               
10
 See for example, Rickert, H. [1962] Science and history: a critique of positivist 
epistemology / translated by G. Reisman; edited by A. Goddard. Princeton, N.J.: Van 
Nostrand. 
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and legal primacy; and juridical power and discretion, intersect to shape the 
management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. Let us now, then, consider the 
way(s) in which the social character of the law underpins my analysis of the 
research study questions.  
 
The sociology of law 
The sociologists Max Weber and Emile Durkheim are cited by many socio-legal 
scholars as being the most substantial and influential academic contributors to the 
advancement of the concept of the sociology of law. Both were fundamentally 
concerned to delimit the domain academic jurisdiction of sociology, and within this 
newly demarcated sociological territory, they sought to embody ‘law’ as a social 
phenomenon – which could then consequently be studied through sociological 
modes of analysis. While Weber’s concept of the sociology of law was of primary 
significance to his aggregate theory of sociology, Durkheim was, historically, the 
first sociologist to dedicate a significantly meaningful diligence and application to 
the law as a social phenomenon (Hunt, 1978). 
 Although Durkheim made empirically unjustifiable assertions about moral 
cohesion in modern plural societies (Cotterrell, 2002: 640) – for example, he 
posited that so long as one section of society is not favoured unduly over others, 
(legal) standards can be accepted by all and so will contribute to the integration of 
that society (its ‘organic solidarity’) – Durkheim succeeded in making law a central 
concern for sociology (Hunt, 1978). Accentuating the significance of moral 
mellifluousness and euphony within law, Durkheim continually stressed law as an 
example of the concretisation of social norms and values in society - that is to say, 
law as a ‘social fact’. Without an appreciation of the moral (and therefore the 
‘social’) character of the law, any analysis would thus necessarily be hollow and, in 
practical terms, nonsensical (Cotterrell, 2002: 640). As Hunt succinctly concludes: 
‘For Durkheim, law is a visible symbol for all that is essentially social’ (1978: 65). 
 Following on from Weber and Durkheim’ s proposed delimiting of sociology 
as a discipline, Cotterrell (2002: 633), among other contemporary socio-legal 
scholars, has argued that the application of sociological principles to law does not 
require a de facto devotion to sociology as a separate and distinct discipline. 
Alternatively, a sociological consideration of the law is about ‘rejecting the 
boundary claims’ of law and sociology, and in this respect, requires that attention 
be paid to the empirical, rigorous study of the field of social activities and 
experience. However, Cotterrell has also observed the somewhat bleak 
characterisation of law, reductively, as disorder control and dispute resolution. 
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Within this paradigm, law is servile, and subordinate to social dysfunction and 
breakdown (2002: 638). Thus, in defence of law as a concept that exceeds the 
limits of ‘disorder control’, Cotterrell advances the proposition that socio-legal 
analyses can serve to propagate an alternative perspective on law: 
 
‘Much socio-legal scholarship, operating in research settings far removed 
from courts…tells a different story: of law used (with varying degrees of 
success and failure) to guide and structure social relations, engineer deals 
and understandings, define lines of authority, make provision for future 
contingencies, facilitate projects, distribute resources, promote security, 
limit risks, and encourage trust…Socio-legal scholarship gives a more 
balanced view through studies of law’s contributions to the routine 
structuring of social relations, as well as its responses to social breakdown.’ 
(p. 639) 
 
Indeed, Cotterrell’s contention that it is necessary, no less essential, that the 
concept of law as subservient to social pathology is rejected, forms the cornerstone 
of the central tenet of this thesis – that law is not ‘socially marginal’ (ibid.). Instead, 
this thesis progresses from the perspective that law is of axial importance to the 
study of social phenomenon. Furthermore, in general terms, and on grounds of 
pragmatic exigency, the requirement for the advancement of socio-legal research is 
compelling. Citing the exponential growth in statute law in recent years, Hillyard 
(2007: 274) argues that ‘[m]ore and more aspects of our lives are being subject to 
legal regulation or restraint. The need for high quality and rigorous empirical 
research to investigate the form, substance, and operation of the law in modern 
society could not be greater.’ 
 An emphasis upon the social character of law thus requires the employment 
of sociological methodologies and perspectives to jurisprudential concepts and 
ideas that, in turn, bestow the principal utility of the social sciences in researching, 
and coming to understand, the operation of law as a social construct. Roscoe 
Pound (2002 [1931]), amongst other Realist jurists, specifically advocated 
harnessing sociological methods in order to study jurisprudence – in direct contrast 
to the historically dominant influences of philosophy and political theory (Hunt, 
1978). Moreover, Pound railed against legal individualism, a concept which was in 
its ascendancy during the nineteenth century, and which envisaged law as the 
archetype of the individual as paramount. As Hunt explains: ‘The dogma of the 
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maximisation of individual free will steeped into every facet of legal thought and 
activity’ (Hunt, 1978: 32). 
 However, we must not forget that law is notably concerned to protect the 
individual against the excesses of power. An analysis of the work of the seminal 
sociologist Thomas Hobbes, for example, demonstrates the parallels that exist in 
his sociological writing, and the contemporary (legal) preoccupation with individual 
rights. Kriegel, by way of illustration, goes so far as to call Hobbes ‘the true founder 
of the modern doctrine of subjective rights’, whereby ‘at the heart of natural 
security’ lies the ‘preservation of individual life’ (Kreigel, 1995 [1979] cited in 
Wickham, 2006: 609). Thus, Hunt is correct when he asserts that ‘[q]uestions about 
law involve major questions that confront contemporary society. As such law 
presents itself as an important area of inquiry for social theory and sociology in 
general’ (1978: 151). It is this notion of power - and its connection to law and to 
rights - that I now wish to consider further in the section below by reference to 
Foucault’s seminal work on the ‘analytics of power’. 
 
Foucault’s separation of sovereignty/law and discipline/norm 
Law’s connection to power is particularly apparent in Foucault’s use of terminology 
to describe sovereign power as ‘juridical’. Indeed, although Foucault rightly 
ascertains that ‘law does not describe power’ (1988: 110) his analysis of power is 
directly linked to law - although Foucault sees this form of power as essentially 
pejorative in its nature and ‘incapable of doing anything, except to render what it 
dominates incapable of doing anything either’ (1976: 85). Foucault identifies this 
type of juridical ‘power to say no’ (ibid.) as something of a juridical mandate for the 
legal regulation of citizens through and by sovereign power - that is to say ‘for 
Foucault, “power-law” is “power-sovereignty”’ (Baxter, 1996: 462). Crucially, 
however, this form of power is fundamentally homogenous and presents itself 
indistinguishably and analogously at all levels of the social order (Foucault, 1976: 
84-85). Hence Foucault’s ‘analytics of power’ finds that while the juridical model of 
power is negative in form, modern power within society is entirely pervasive and is 
not limited to those power relations that exist between sovereign and subject - and 
thus can be both potentially positive and constructive in form and outcome. 
 Indeed, this form of modern power – disciplinary power – is for Foucault, the 
‘antithesis’ of power-sovereignty (1980: 104) and as such it is antithetical to power-
law. As Foucault argues, the juridical model is: 
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‘…utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is 
not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization…We 
have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is 
increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of 
representation.’ (1976: 89) 
 
Hence, Foucault contends that disciplinary power should act diametrically to 
juridical power and in so doing it may provide some ‘sort of counter law’ (1975: 
222). Although, however, a measure of trepidation is required in attempting any 
definitive analysis of Foucault’s concept of modern law – as Hunt and Wickham 
(1994), Baxter (1996), and Smith (2000), amongst others, have observed, the 
progression of Foucault’s arguments on law are far from concise and can be 
ambiguous, meandering and inconclusive. Walby has suggested that although 
there is evidence of a shift in Foucault’s perspective on law in his writings 
immediately prior to his death, much of Foucault’s earlier work on the ‘analytics of 
power’ is characterized by a ‘knotty’ analysis of law (2007: 554). For example, in 
‘Discipline and Punish’, Foucault posits that the system of rights established in the 
eighteenth century was: 
 
‘…egalitarian in principle [and] was supported by these tiny, everyday 
physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are 
essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines… 
[and it is t]he real, corporal disciplines [that] constitute the foundation of the 
formal, juridical liberties’ (222).  
 
In this way, Foucault appears perhaps to offer some retraction of his view that law-
power and disciplinary-power are fundamentally incompatible. However, as Hunt 
and Wickham (1994) warn, we should be careful not to overstate the importance of 
such statements (which are conclusively outweighed by the many arguments that 
Foucault makes determining that law-power and discipline-power are diametrically 
opposed) since Foucault appears to treat the principles of constitutional 
government as no more than an ideological form, designed as a means to conceal 
‘real’ and ‘corporal’ power in the form of ‘juridical’ liberties (61-62). Moreover, 
Baxter (1996), in agreement with Hunt and Wickham, contends that Foucault’s 
analogy of disciplinary power as underlying a modern juridical framework is 
unsatisfactory because such a model presupposes that disciplinary power 
embodies ‘a whole set of legal categories and rules concerning who may exercise 
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such power and how they may exercise it’ which is fundamentally misleading 
because law is not simply a component of disciplinary power but in part 
‘constitutes’ disciplinary power (463 – original emphasis). Baxter cites an 
interesting example illustrated in an essay by Mark Barenberg (1994), where 
Barenberg directly connects law to disciplinary power in his discussion of the 
impact of the National Labor Relations Act on company unions. Barenberg does 
not see law and disciplinary power as incompatible, rather, he contends that law 
fundamentally impacts upon the ambit of the employer’s disciplinary power - not to 
mention the sphere of potential ‘worker resistance’ (773, cited in Baxter, 1996: 
473). 
Following on from this argument, Baxter concludes that while Foucault is 
correct in distinguishing modern forms of power from sovereign command, he ties 
law too closely to the notion of pejorative, overbearing sovereign command. The 
obvious solution, Baxter proposes, is to ’weaken the link between law and 
sovereign command’ (463). However, it is important to note that Tadros (and others 
– see for example, Ewald, 1991; Rose and Valverde, 1998) has argued that this 
type of critique is flawed in its understanding of the contradistinction Foucault 
makes between the term ‘juridical’ and the term ‘law’ (1998: 76). In essence, 
Tadros contends that it is not Foucault’s intention to equate juridical power with 
legal power – and that such a reading of Foucault’s work undermines the potential 
for Foucault’s conceptualization of the inter-relationship(s) between law and power 
to inform socio/legal analyses of the position of modern law. Alternatively, Tadros 
posits an analysis of Foucault’s work based upon an understanding of the term 
‘juridical’ to mean ‘any form of power which attempts to prevent a certain type of 
action through the threat of legal or social sanctions’ (78). While there is merit in 
this approach (and in particular, in Tadros’s attempts to distinguish juridical power 
as exercised upon acts, and his contention that the redefined aim of modern law is 
about intervention ‘into the relationships between particular groups of people 
according to information carefully collected and analysed in the form of the 
economy’ (93)), I do not consider that a failure to explicitly make clear this 
distinction invalidates the reasoned critiques of Foucault’s conceptualization of law 
that Tadros takes issue with (primarily those of Hunt and Wickham (1994) and 
Santos (1995)). This is because, in my view, the main difficulty with Foucault’s 
treatment of law in his ‘analytics of power’ (although I think that his analyses of 
power and social structure is extremely useful) is that it simply does ‘not reflect our 
everyday experience of the means through which power and government are 
exercised’. And, moreover, as Smith persuasively argues, ‘the role played by 
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expert knowledge and discursive power relations…does not accord with the world 
of mundane practice’ (Smith, 2000: 291). 
To begin to consider this point in more detail, let us examine several 
paragraphs from ‘Two Lectures’ (1980), where we can see further how Foucault 
conceptualizes the fundamental heterogeneity between legal power and 
disciplinary power: 
 
‘[I]n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have the production of an 
important phenomenon, the emergence, or rather the invention, of a new 
mechanism of power possessed of highly specific procedural techniques, 
completely novel instruments, quite different apparatuses, and which is 
also, I believe, absolutely incompatible with the relations of 
sovereignty…This type of power is in every respect the antithesis of that 
mechanism of [legal power] which the theory of sovereignty described or 
sought to transcribe…The discourse of discipline has nothing in common 
with that of law, rule, or sovereign will…[They are] two absolutely 
heterogeneous types of discourse’ (106-107). 
 
The result being that: 
 
‘[T]he theory of sovereignty, and the organisation of a legal code centred 
upon it, have allowed a system of law to be superimposed upon the 
mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, 
the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to 
everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his 
proper sovereign rights’ (105). 
 
As Baxter (1994) contends, Foucault views law very much as a ‘sanction-backed 
command of the sovereign’ (464). Yet I think it is particularly important to note that 
Foucault is implicit when he argues that we must not be over-preoccupied with the 
notion of sovereignty as the decisive element in societal ordering: 
 
‘It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate…and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose 
general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state 
apparatus, in the foundation of law, in the various social hegemonies. 
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Power’s conditions of possibility…must not be sought in a central point, in a 
unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms 
would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations…It is in this 
sphere of force relations that we must try to analyse the mechanisms of 
power. In this way we will escape from the system of Law-and-Sovereign 
which has captivated political thought for such a long time (1978: 92-97). 
 
According to Kennedy (1991: 358), Foucault’s ‘fetishizing of sovereignty’ in this 
way, has resulted in the creation of a disjointed conceptualisation of law, which 
defines law reductively as the ‘”crystallization” of processes of power’ which take 
place separately from legal institutions. Drawing upon Hale (1952), Kennedy 
argues that Foucault’s analysis also ignores a crucial element: that the interplay of 
factors that are ‘crystallized’ in lawmaking processes are themselves determined 
through an established legal context (Kennedy, 1991: 358). Moreover, Kennedy 
objects to Foucault’s characterisation of legal settlements as the “crystallization” of 
processes of power because, he contends, it assumes that these processes are at 
once contrary to those other processes of power in society but also detached from 
them. Alternatively, drawing upon Klare (1979: 123), Kennedy posits that 
lawmaking should be seen as a “praxis” (or routine practice) ‘in its own right’ which 
involves the exercise of power (1991: 359). In order for us to better assess the 
merits of this notion of law as a site of power, rather than the terminus for 
processes of power, we must now consider the functionary processes of modern 
law, that is to say, we must ‘bring Foucault’s methodology into the courthouse’ 
(ibid.). 
 
Law as a site of power or an instrument of domination? 
There is much that can be drawn from Foucault’s work to demonstrate that his 
perspective on law was bound up with concepts of mastery, suppression and 
ultimately, domination. For example, in Power/Knowledge (1980), Foucault 
ascertains that: 
 
‘…the essential function of the discourse and techniques of law has been to 
efface the domination intrinsic to power…law is the instrument of 
domination – which scarcely needs saying’ (95).  
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Moreover, Foucault makes clear his intention to demonstrate how the construction 
and components of law lend themselves to affect the domination of sovereign 
subjects. Subsequently, he considers the: 
 
‘…extent to which, and the forms in which, law (not simply the rules but the 
whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for 
their application) transmits and puts into motion relations that are not 
relations of sovereignty, but of domination’ (96).  
 
What I intend to consider here – and what, for the purposes of this chapter, seems 
to be of most pertinent concern – is to what extent Foucault is correct when he 
identifies law as an instrument of domination rather than as a site of power. And, 
perhaps most crucially, if law is not simply a tool for subjugation, what aspects of 
Foucault’s paradigm (if any) are useful for appropriation into my explanation of the 
complex role of law and power in the constitution of modern society?  
While Kennedy argues that Foucault’s normative ‘formulation of the role of 
legal rules in domination effaces legal institutions as loci of power/knowledge in 
their own right’ (1991: 357), Smith concludes that Foucault’s treatment of law 
‘renders it vulnerable to colonisation by expert knowledge’ (2000: 284), and 
subsequently, she posits that ‘far from acting, as Foucault suggests, to provide a 
legitimating gloss on the subversive operations of power, law turns the tables and 
itself operates as a form of surveillance over the norm-governed exercise of expert 
knowledge’ (283, emphasis added). Foucault’s ‘analytics of power’ identifies law’s 
predisposition towards the regulation and legal sanctioning of an ever expanding 
sphere of social life – which Foucault observed as existing as a means to control 
expert knowledge(s) and to ‘recode them in the form of law’ (Foucault, 1978: 109). 
In short, Foucault identified a ‘dense web’ of social inter-relations, within which 
(expert) knowledge(s) impacts significantly upon the ways in which power is 
established, composed, transcribed and challenged (1990: 96). Drawing upon 
Smart (1996), Smith posits that Foucault’s notion of ‘recoding’ in fact assimilates 
both private and discretionary decision-making into law so that the way(s) in which 
both are governed becomes contingent upon rights, that is to say – ‘law retains its 
old power, namely the ability to extend rights’ (428, original emphasis, cited in 
Smith, 2000: 288). Yet, Foucault’s view of law, and his perspective on law’s ability 
to ‘colonise’ other disciplines in this process, continues to be one which 
predetermines law as subordinate within the sphere of other constitutive modes of 
regulation (Smith, 2000: 288). Indeed, Hunt and Wickham (1998) note that 
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Foucault’s tendency is to treat the operation of law ‘as a norm’ - and the judicial 
institution itself as a largely regulatory body (Foucault, 1978: 144). As Smith 
astutely notes, within this paradigm, the law is itself colonised, and Foucault’s 
‘steadfast insistence that the law must be distinguished from other forms of 
disciplinary power’ (289) can be seen as forming the continuing basis for his 
argument that law power and disciplinary power are ‘absolutely incompatible’ 
(Foucault, 1980: 104). 
 Indeed, Foucault describes the: 
 
‘…growth of disciplinary networks, the multiplication of their exchanges with 
the penal apparatus, the ever more important powers that are given them, 
the ever more massive transference to them of judicial functions; now as 
medicine, psychology, education, public assurance, social work assume an 
ever greater share of powers of supervision and assessment, the penal 
apparatus will be able, in turn, to become medicalized, psychologised, 
educationalized…’ (1991: 304) 
 
In this way, Foucault supposes that law becomes functionally extricated from 
juridical power as a consequence of its over-reliance upon expert knowledge(s) – 
and subsequently, it transpires that the juridical domain cannot rightly be the sole 
province of judgement since ‘the judges of normality’ appear omnipresent 
(Foucault, 1991: 304). Thus it appears to me that Foucault advocates a 
consideration of law whereby law is effectively usurped as an origin of power by the 
disciplinary sciences, and is thereby rendered parasitic upon expert-knowledge in 
pursuance of its expanding normative-based functions. However, as Smith (2000: 
292) proposes, an examination of the modern operation of the law is an effective 
means to challenge Foucault’s paradigm. Let us now critically consider the 
argument that law – rather than functioning as an instrument of domination – can in 
fact occupy a site of ‘pre-eminent’ power. 
 Smith’s exposition of law as a site of power is chiefly underpinned by four 
principle contentions. First, she asserts that juridical decision-making is based upon 
particular established ‘law-made principles’ which are universal in their application. 
These legal rules are ‘functional’ in their composition (as opposed to ‘outcome’ 
oriented) and so autonomy is not subverted by norm-based judgements in the way 
in which Foucault suggests. Second, legal rules also constrain the limits of expert 
knowledge(s). Citing several important legal precedents on the presumption of 
capacity in cases involving medical/surgical interventions, Smith argues that: 
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‘…any Foucauldian suggestion of expert incursion into, or colonisation of 
law and the juridical field, seems to have the boot on the wrong foot. 
Experts must subject their discretionary and norm governed judgements to 
juridical scrutiny and law retains its power to determine the form, content 
and outcome of its investigative function’ (298).  
 
The third contention is linked to the second, and constitutes Smith’s observation 
that, by autonomously choosing to reject or to rely upon expert knowledge, law 
asserts and re-asserts its own functionary framework. Thus, judgements are made 
according to law and in isolation from normative discretion and moral exigencies. 
Finally, Smith contends that law is a powerful form of surveillance over expert 
knowledge(s) in that it not only provides (criminal and/or civil) redress for negligent 
or criminal action carried out by experts but also, said experts are unable to 
determine when and if they may be held to account for their actions, lending law a 
‘normalizing gaze’ and a pronounced authority (299). Crucially, Smith also argues 
in favour of law as a ‘potentially liberating’ force of power, which I think is a highly 
relevant inclusion in her discussion. Drawing upon Habermas, she posits that 
Foucault’s construction of law as subservient to disciplinary power ignores a crucial 
problem inherent in institutional power – that institutional power acts as the ‘legal 
means for securing freedom that themselves endanger the freedom of their 
presumptive beneficiaries’ (1987: 291) and so she concludes that law is a means 
by which autonomy is protected from attempts (originating from disciplinary forces) 
to constrain it. (This concept of law as a potentially positive force within society 
which may be used to protect and to guarantee individual and/or collective liberties 
is one which I will return to later in this thesis and which I will consider critically in 
light of my research study findings, see Chapter 7.)   
Other scholars (in particular, Smart, 1996; Tadros, 1998) have also 
constructed detailed and well-argued proposals for the treatment of law as more 
than a mechanism for express/implied domination. Smart, for example, advocates 
the increasing value, contribution and power of law within the framework of modern 
social structures: 
 
‘…law is…well able to make the same claims to truth as the sciences and in 
so doing exercises a power which is not under threat. Indeed, it may be 
argued that law is extending its dominion in this respect as western 
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societies become increasingly litigious and channel more and more social 
and economic policy through the mechanism of legal statutes’ (1996: 426). 
 
Alternatively, Tadros proposes a perspective on law that concentrates on ‘what the 
law is doing, as process, as verb, instead of as a fixed set of rules…[which forms] 
the progressive backdrop for a new paradigm of sociologically-informed thought 
about the carrying out of law in the everyday’ (1998: 568). However, it is, I think, 
Smith’s integration of case law into her discussion of modern law that is most 
effective. Although her discussion of juridical decision-making centres on 
judgements in medical cases involving patient autonomy, her proposition that law 
should be seen as a site of power - which can act to protect individuals from the 
coercive influence of disciplinary power - is one which I think has significant 
resonance as a socio-legal theory of law more generally. The evidence that she 
presents, in the form of case judgements and legal precedent, highlight the value of 
law in protecting the supremacy of the individual autonomy of the sovereign subject 
from challenges made to it by the state or by norm-governed disciplinary 
processes. As Smith notes (302), the principle of the supremacy of individual 
freedom is concisely illustrated by Lord Donaldson in Re T (An Adult) (Consent to 
Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 FLR 458 where he surmises the matters to be 
considered thus: 
 
‘This situation gives rise to a conflict between two interests, that of the 
[individual] and that of the society in which he lives. The [individual’s] 
interest consists of his right to self-determination – his right to live his own 
life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is 
sacred and that it should be preserved if at all possible. It is well established 
that in the ultimate, the right of the individual is paramount.’ 
 
Smith fundamentally rejects the Foucaultian suggestion that law is undermined by 
expert knowledge and instead she concludes that expert discourses are used or 
discarded at the discretion of a judiciary which is ultimately concerned to protect 
the parameters of this ‘”social space”’ (285). Drawing upon Smith’s 
conceptualisation of sovereign law and disciplinary power, and her critique of the 
Foucaultian view that law has essentially abdicated its power to the disciplinary 
sciences, it is my intention to develop an analysis of the research findings obtained 
in the study upon which this thesis is based, which critically considers the extent to 
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which law acts as a means of curtailing the incursion of disciplinary power into the 
sphere of rights-based considerations and the primacy of individual autonomy. That 
is to say, the potentially ‘empowering’ elements of law will be assessed alongside 
other relevant juridical aspects, namely, inequity in judicial decision-making and the 
use of discretion (discussed further below). However, although I am largely 
persuaded by Smith’s theory of sovereign law, her analysis does unfortunately 
suffer from an under-discussion of law in relation to power and social structure11. 
Indeed, in her conclusion she accepts that ‘law constrains just as much as 
technologies of power constrain’ (303) but little attention is paid to assess the 
diffusion of power through social structures or the genealogy of power relations. 
Subsequently, although (in contra-distinction to Foucault) I am advocating law as a 
site of power, there are aspects of Foucault’s work on law that I think are also of 
value here and that I think can be imported into this current discussion of the role of 
modern law in society.  
In particular, I would contend that Foucault’s work does have consequences 
for the status of law especially in respect of his descriptions of modern power12. His 
continual emphasis upon the productivity and ubiquity of power is a lens through 
which we can contextualise and conceptualise the creation and administration of 
modern phenomena – both social and legal. In this way I think that Foucault’s 
genealogies of power can be used within this research study to understand and to 
explain the use of ASBOs as embodying elements of choice, coercion, domination 
and social structure in contemporary Britain. Cotterrell (1995: 300) for example, has 
argued in favour of a broad theory-based approach to socio-legal research which 
understands the position of law as a regulator of social life – the principle function 
of which centres upon the regulation of specific ‘social fields’. Rejecting ‘narrow’ 
                                               
11
 Within the discipline of sociology, there is not a definitive, accepted definition of the term 
‘social structure’ (Lopez and Scott, 2000). For the purposes of this discussion, ‘social 
structure’ is defined, as per Outhwaite (2000: 2), as embodying ‘social facts’ such as spatial 
distribution, classes, strata and demographic variables but also ‘social representations’ – 
that is, the inter-relationship(s) between what is real, and the ways in which what is real is 
identified, through media, popular and political discourse et cetera. By way of illustration, 
within this interpretation social structure underpins the social systems of law, politics, 
economics, culture et cetera. 
12
 It is important to be aware, I think, that while the socio/legal critiques of Foucault’s 
understanding of law that are detailed within this chapter are, at times, relatively robust – 
those socio/legal scholars who have sought to identify the weaknesses in Foucault’s 
treatment of law within his ‘analytics of power’ are at the same time largely insistent that 
Foucault’s arguments also have inherent value. For example, Hunt states that, despite 
Foucault’s arguments about law being (in his view) deficient, this ‘does not undermine the 
strengths of Foucault’s contributions to our understanding of modern mechanisms of rule’ 
(2004: 608). Similarly, I would suggest that criminal justice research, and more widely, 
socio-legal research, can ultimately benefit from the strategic appropriation of Foucault’s 
work. 
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policy-based interpretations of law (and its regulatory role in social life), Cotterrell 
advocates a socio-legal analysis of law which characterises social structure as 
existing independently of social actors’ subjective constructions and/or value-based 
perceptions of what that ‘structure’ is. Indeed as Henham - in his highly persuasive 
account of theorising sentencing research - summarises:  
 
‘The implication is…that phenomenology does not account for the values 
existing in society which have become embodied in social institutions and 
internalised by social actors themselves…If phenomenology cannot allow 
for the existence of structure except on the level of individual 
consciousness, it cannot logically make any progress towards delineating 
their relationship’ (2000: 17). 
 
Rejecting ‘rights-based’ approaches to sentencing theory - popularised by amongst 
others, Andrew Ashworth (see, for example, Ashworth, 1986; 1998; 2005) - as 
unable to legitimately account for the ‘empirical reality’ of the correlation between 
law, social life and social structure, Henham posits the adoption of Giddens’s 
functional theory of structuration into socio-legal works on sentencing and, more 
widely, into criminal justice research (see Henham, 1998; 2000).  
 Giddens’s theory of structuration is important because it attempts to link 
social structure to system and agency as follows: 
  
‘The structured properties of society, the study of which is basic to 
explaining the long-term development of institutions, ‘exist’ only in their 
instantiation in the structuration of social systems, and in the memory traces 
(reinforced or altered in the continuity of daily social life) that constitute the 
knowledgeability of social actors. But institutionalised practices ‘happen’ 
and are ‘made to happen’ through the application of resources in the 
continuity of daily life. Resources are structured properties of social systems 
that ‘exists’ only in the capability of actors, in their capacity to ‘act 
otherwise’. This brings me to an essential feature of the theory of 
structuration, the thesis that the organisation of social practices is 
fundamentally recursive. Structure is both the medium and the outcome of 
the practices it recursively organises’ (1982: 9-10, original emphasis). 
 
Thus, for Giddens, all social actors have a role in developing power structures 
since ‘neither subject (human agent) nor object (‘society’ or social institutions) 
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should be regarded as having primacy’ (1982: 8). In opposition to ‘time-geography’ 
based notions of structure - which conceive of ‘the individual’ as located outside 
‘structure’, Giddens theorises structuration as the simultaneous emergence of 
structure as human agency and agency as the constitution of structure (1984: 117). 
As such, Giddens’s notion of the ‘duality of structure’ means that ‘[s]ocial 
institutions are regarded as the medium through which structural properties are 
applied in the continuity of daily life’ (Henham, 2000: 18). Crucially, however, 
Giddens's concept of power also reflects Foucault's notion of power - and in 
particular we can see that Giddens is especially influenced by Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power as ubiquitous and all-pervasive (1984:145-158).  
 So, returning once again to Foucault, we must now ask what use is 
Foucault’s concept of power and (to a lesser extent) Giddens’s theory of 
structuration to our examination of law, power and social structure in the context of 
this research study? The answer is that the theories discussed above contribute, 
on a theoretical level, to our understanding of ‘justice’, and to how it is pursued in 
modern society through the operation of power and legal processes. In essence, I 
am arguing that the concept of law as a social structure (an idea which forms the 
basis of this chapter) intersects with socially constructed notions of justice, fairness 
and truth which are all underpinned by the exertion of (forms of) power in society. 
More specifically, for the purposes of my discussion of the study findings later in 
this thesis, I think that it is extremely important that substantive practices and 
formal legal rules are not examined in isolation and then related to other social 
variables such as power. As social actors influence the development of power 
structures (and thus legal processes), this thesis contends that both legal and 
sociological aspects of the research must be integrated into the study analysis and 
not separated for the purposes of evaluation. Hence, in the discussion of the 
research study findings (Chapter 7), I will reflect upon and consider critically the 
ways in which law (and its relationship to power) has veritably featured within this 
socio-legal study of ASBOs in Britain. In the next section of this chapter (below), 
existing socio-legal studies of decision-making and procedure in the lower courts 
are examined and some observations are made about the role of legal processes 
in protecting the individual from arbitrarily enacted (state or social) control. 
 
Socio-legal studies of legal procedure and judicial discretion 
Let us now turn to an examination of existing empirical socio-legal scholarship that 
is specifically pertinent to this research study: namely, socio-legal studies of legal 
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procedure, and judicial discretion and decision-making. It will now be considered to 
what extent existing work in this area can be of use in providing a starting point with 
which to explore the research aims of this thesis. However, it must first be 
acknowledged that while a substantial body of (largely theory-based) literature on 
legal procedure and judicial discretion has evolved over the years (for example, 
see Adler, 2003; 2006; Davis, 1971; Galligan, 1996a; Halliday, 1998; Lacey, 1992), 
empirical socio-legal work on legal procedure and judicial discretion in the lower 
courts (which is the subject of this thesis) has been somewhat limited. Indeed, 
Cowan et al. (2006: 548) have observed that empirical studies of lower court 
decision-making has, historically, been neglected by socio-legal scholarship 
because obtaining access to the lower judiciary can be very difficult and time-
consuming, and moreover, because of general, pervasive beliefs that the work of 
the lower courts was, for the most part, ‘commonplace’ and ‘dull’. Nevertheless, 
there do exist several older studies of the courts which are of particular significance 
(Hood, 1972; Lawrence, 1995; Parker et al., 1989; Rumgay, 1995) not to mention 
that, in recent years, there have been a number of socio-legal studies that have 
been concerned specifically with researching procedure and decision-making in the 
lower courts (see, for example, Anleu and Mack, 2005; 2007; Baldwin, 1997; 
Cowan et al., 2006;  Hunter et al., 2005; Marchetti and Daly, 2004; Millie et al., 
2007; Pawson et al, 2005).   
  Hood’s seminal work on sentencing in the Magistrates’ Courts in England 
and Wales found substantial variation in sentencing practices (1962; 1972), while 
Parker et al. (1989) similarly found divergence in sentencing outcomes. Both Hood 
and Parker et al. identified local Magistrates’ bench traditions as a possible 
explanation for sentencing disparity. Other studies in the higher courts (for 
example, Ashworth et al., 1984) found that a wide range of factors impacted upon 
judicial decision-making. In a similar vein, Lawrence (1995) (in her early work on 
sentencing process and judicial decision-making) developed a detailed 
methodological framework as a base line for understanding the multi-faceted, 
complex nature of judicial decision-making. This framework also appears to have 
been successfully (expressly and/or impliedly) inculcated into later socio-legal 
work(s) on judicial decision-making in the lower courts (compare with the studies 
of, for example, Hunter et al, 2005; Cowan et al., 2006). Lawrence’s observation - 
that decision-making is influenced by the inter-play of both micro and macro factors 
- produced a research methodology which recognised the contribution and the 
influence of the individual circumstances of a case (micro factors), together with 
social and cultural values, and bureaucratic, administrative and legal factors (macro 
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factors). Indeed, social values are afforded as much primacy as legal factors in 
Lawrence’s model of judicial decision-making. Crucially, Lawrence does not 
assume any rigid formula or causal link to account for, or to rationalise, decision-
making outcomes. Rather, Lawrence’s model for judicial decision-making allows for 
the discussion and analysis of a plethora of factors involved in individual decision-
making by judges who: 
 
‘construct meanings for cases, apply their own objectives and beliefs, and 
respond to contextual factors with varying biases and varying levels of self-
awareness’ (Lawrence, 1995: 70, cited in Hunter et al, 2005: 104). 
 
The recent work of Hunter et al. (2005) and Cowan et al. (2006) again demonstrate 
the multi-faceted nature of judicial discretion. However, both studies attempt a 
typology of decision-making as a way of organising data, and making findings more 
intelligible. Hunter et al. reported a manifold and diverse range of factors 
influencing judicial discretion in rent arrears cases. The variation between individual 
judges’ decisions was analysed in respect of three specific factors (length of 
experience, type of legal practice before appointment13, and attitudes to training 
and updating). However, no distinct patterns of decision-making emerged, and so 
the construction of a clear typology was not possible. Alternatively, Cowan et al. 
observed a ‘liberal’, a ‘patrician’, and a ‘formalist’ approach to judicial decision-
making in possession proceedings, although they also noted that a certain ‘type’ of 
decision-making could additionally incorporate characteristics of other type(s) of 
decision-making: for example, a ‘liberal’ style of judicial decision-making might 
necessarily adopt a ‘formalist’ position, if an individual case requires it, and in order 
to obtain the ‘right’ outcome. Cowan et al. also observe the potential for other 
‘types’ of judicial decision-making in possession proceedings, and conclude that 
their typology is ‘by no means complete’ (2006: 549). Similarly, in Millie et al.’s 
research on borderline sentencing (2007), sentencers were asked to identify how 
they approached sentencing – as ‘primarily structured, intuitive or based on 
experience’ (248). The study considered judicial decision-making and sentencing 
rationale, and provided a comparison of sentencing in England and Wales, and 
Scotland. In the same way as both Hunter et al. and Cowan et al, it was reported 
that judicial decision-making was influenced by a range of factors. However, Millie 
et al. concluded that both the offending history of the defendant and personal 
                                               
13
 Similarly, Anleu and Mack (2007: 186) observe that the responses of the lower judiciary 
‘might depend on their past judicial and non-judicial work and other experiences’ 
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mitigation were ‘at least [as] influential’ as the category of offence in deciding the 
outcome of borderline cases (260).  
In respect of procedure in the lower courts more generally, the recent work 
of Marchetti and Daly (2004) and Anleu and Mack (2005; 2007) is of particular 
relevance to this study. In the same way that Cowan et al. observed something of a 
deficit in socio-legal work on the lower courts, Anleu and Mack (2007) recognise 
that much of socio-legal literature has tended to focus on the procedures and 
decisions of the higher courts (as an illustration of this point, at page 183, they cite 
the work of Anleu, 2000; Barnett, 1993; Bringham, 1996; Hamby and Goldring, 
1976; Rosenberg, 1993; Solomon, 1992; and Vago, 2003). This, they argue, is 
unfortunate, given that: 
 
‘magistrates courts are closer to [and] are more able to recognise 
economic, political and social change than higher courts that do not deal 
with the same volume and mix of cases and participants. The higher courts 
are more likely to be dealing with refined legal issues and not matters where 
the offending behaviour, social inequalities, and human emotion are directly 
apparent and remain fused.’ (p.196) 
 
Moreover, Lempert (1989) has observed that wide discretionary juridical power 
does not necessarily mean that legal procedure is, or becomes, ‘ruleless’ in the 
lower courts. In fact, he argues that judicial discretion can precipitate the 
construction of informal ‘rules’. Subsequently, Lempert posits that:  
 
‘practical experience may give rise to procedural routines that are honoured 
at least as regularly as the procedures specified in those formal rules that in 
theory order behaviour in ordinary courts’ (1989: 348) 
 
Indeed, of particular interest to this research study and thesis on ASBOs, is the 
existence of socio-legal research which has shown that formal and informal legal 
procedure(s) adopted by the lower courts can serve specific substantive legal (and 
sometimes, social) ‘goals’. For example, in Lempert’s study of informal procedure 
in eviction proceedings, he describes the historical legacy of the relaxation of 
(formal) procedural rules so that there would be greater access to justice for ‘plain 
folk’ who did not have the benefit of substantial knowledge of the law or its 
procedural workings (p. 348).  
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Equally, however, there is evidence that legal procedures can serve to 
extend existing mechanisms of (social and state) control over particular groups 
and/or individuals (349). As such, the impact and consequences of administrative 
processes and judicial decision-making on fairness in legal contexts is well 
established as a contemporary concern of socio-legal scholars in Britain, and is 
reflected in a substantial body of literature (see for example Adler, 2003; Ashworth, 
1994; Galligan, 1996a; Harlow and Rawlings, 1997; Hood, 1992; McCubbins et al., 
1989). If we consider, for example, racial disparity in sentencing, then this provides 
a good illustration of the potential for criminal justice process(es) to be targeted 
disproportionately at specific groups. A substantial body of research exists to show 
that in various countries across the world - including the United States, Canada, 
France and the United Kingdom – black and ethnic minorities are over-represented 
in prison populations (see for example, Hood, 1992; Tonry, 1994; Tonry and Hood, 
1996; von Hirsch, 1993). In particular, existing research has been concerned to 
examine the sentencing process and to what extent black and ethnic minorities are 
afforded different treatment in criminal justice processes and outcomes (von Hirsch 
and Roberts, 1997).  
For example, Hood’s rudimentary work on racial disparity in sentencing in 
England (1992) found that black defendants were 5% more likely to receive a 
custodial sentence and there was also considerable comparative variation in the 
duration of sentences imposed (122). Similarly, Parenti’s work on policing and 
incarceration in the United States found (1999) punitive and corrupt practices and 
the overt targeting of ‘problem populations’, specifically Black and Hispanic 
communities. Research has also found that other marginalised and/or vulnerable 
groups (such as – in particular - drug users, prostitutes and individuals with mental 
health problems) can be the subjects of inequity in the criminal justice process by 
virtue of ‘differential policing and punishment’ (Scraton and Chadwick 1987:213). 
Such groups have been excluded from mainstream society through de facto spatial 
processes of regulation or indeed through a more ideological process of exclusion 
and/or criminalisation which ‘is influenced by contemporary politics, economic 
conditions and dominant ideologies’ which are both emulating and responding to 
‘the determining contexts of social class, gender, sexuality, race and age’ 
(Chadwick and Scraton 2001: 69). 
Moreover, research has demonstrated evidence of the associations 
between socio-economic and environmental factors that are linked with deprivation 
and levels of certain types of crime. As such, Tonry (1995) has suggested that 
wider discretion should be available to sentencers to enable them to consider the 
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personal circumstances of defendants ‘who have, to some degree, overcome 
dismal life chances’ (170). In order to constitute a mitigating factor, however, 
defendants would need to evidence that they had enacted a positive response to 
their social adversity, such as, for example, gaining employment. Rejecting this 
model as inadequate as a framework for improving inequity in sentencing, von 
Hirsch and Roberts (1997) conclude that ‘not many offenders are likely to benefit, 
so long as one clings to notions of the deserving poor’ (232). Correspondingly 
Ashworth (1994) has observed that (within the desert model) it would be easier to 
reconcile ‘social deprivation’ - independently of positive responses - as a 
foundation for mitigation. As von Hirsch and Roberts notes, this is because social 
deprivation can, subjectively speaking, influence a defendant’s culpability in the 
respect that: 
 
‘social deprivation…may reduce the person’s options for leading a law-
abiding life; and such increased difficulty of compliance, at least arguably, 
may make violations less blameworthy’ (von Hirsch and Roberts, 1997: 235, 
note 14).  
 
While I am not at all persuaded that sentencing mitigation based upon a ‘criteria for 
social deprivation’ (232) would be a positive step towards addressing disparity in 
sentencing (as a result not least of the fundamental subjectivity that would be 
required in law to determine such a criteria), the wider issue of equality before the 
law is central to the concerns of the research study embodied within this thesis. 
The evidence of the existence of disparity in sentencing (particularly in respect of 
evidence on marginalised groups, discussed above) is of particular interest, and 
links in to this chapter’s previous discussion of law, and the operation of power. 
The rights of individuals in society to have access to a system of criminal justice 
that is non-discriminatory in how it applies the principles and processes of law is 
fundamental to our understandings and interpretation of fairness and equity before 
the law14. Subsequently, I would argue that questions about criminal justice 
processes being applied arbitrarily, or discriminatorily, necessarily intersect with 
wider questions about power, domination and exclusion in society. Hence, the 
research study findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis will be 
considered in Chapter 7 in light of existing literature on sentencing and legal 
procedure in order to determine how ASBO processes are being applied and how 
                                               
14
 What is understood by the term ‘fairness’ in law will be considered in detail in my 
discussion of the research study findings (Chapter 7) 
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the administration of legal procedure and judicial discretion in ASBO cases fits 
within the framework of our democratic justice principles and in particular, notions 
of ‘fairness’ in sentencing. 
Hence, the existence of the empirical socio-legal research on legal 
procedure and judicial discretion highlighted above elucidates several rudimentary 
(but non-exhaustive) areas of interest to this research study. In particular, and of 
specific research interest, are the empirical studies of the uses and outcomes of 
lower court discretionary adjudication (Anleu and Mack,  2005; 2007;  Baldwin, 
1997; Cowan et al., 2006; Hood, 1962; 1972; Hunter et al., 2005; Lawrence, 1995; 
Marchetti and Daly, 2004; Parker et al., 1989; Pawson et al, 2005), and also the 
studies which have sought to understand and to evaluate the impact of procedure 
within the lower level courts on wider issues of fairness, justice and sentencing 
(Anleu and Mack, 2005; 2007; Galligan, 1996; Halliday, 1998; Hood, 1992; 
Lempert, 1989; Marchetti and Daly, 2004). This literature will be drawn on again 
later in the thesis (Chapter 7), when it will be used to inform a discussion of the 
research findings of this empirical study, and the significance of the research 
findings for existing knowledge(s) in the socio-legal discipline. 
 
Conclusion 
A recent report on the substantive capacity of empirical socio-legal research, 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation, found that socio-legal work had been highly 
efficacious in ‘revealing and explaining the practices and procedures of legal, 
regulatory, redress and dispute resolution systems and the impact of legal 
phenomena on a range of social institutions, on business and on citizens’ (Genn et 
al., 2006: 1). Crucially, however, the report acknowledged that socio-legal research 
has played a pivotal role in elucidating the theoretical perception of law as a social 
phenomenon. Moreover, socio-legal research is important - and influential - 
because it involves analyses of the power of law. Hence it is argued that law (as an 
internal and embedded social concept) can both organise and channel power - as 
opposed to simply controlling it (Cotterrell, 2002: 643). As a result, socio-legal 
research has made the exercise of law/power more apparent, its consequences 
more evident, and its operation more foreseeable, logical and progressive (ibid.). In 
a similar vein, this thesis also seeks to consider the limits of legal procedure(s) and 
judicial decision-making in shaping the management and outcomes of ASBO use in 
Britain. The potential for juridical power both to (positively) impact upon the 
protection of rights, as well as to (negatively) affect the risk of erroneous 
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deprivation of substantive rights in ASBO cases will be investigated and considered 
in detail. Hence, it is advocated within this thesis, that ‘law’ is a critical matter of 
social structure - and power - which requires to be considered as a central element 
in the construction of ‘society’. The wider jurisprudential notions that are embodied 
within this research study (legal procedure and procedural justice; juridical power 
and discretion) are, it is argued, cogent, robust normative social concerns (as much 
as they are legal concerns) that positively require consideration and representation 
in the empirical study of antisocial behaviour orders as a sociological phenomena. 
Thus the primary overarching socio-legal concepts of legal procedure(s), and 
judicial discretion, will be considered in the course of this thesis – both with regard 
to the empirical research findings (Chapters 5 and 6), but also in respect of the 
wider discussion of salient issues arising from the socio-legal study of ASBOs in 
Britain (Chapter 7).  
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Although antisocial behaviour orders (ASBOs) are a relatively recent development 
in social policy in Britain, they have nonetheless been an extremely topical area of 
law for some years. Despite an enthusiastic (and annually increasing) uptake of the 
orders by police and local authorities, the contemporary nature of antisocial 
behaviour legislation has meant that there exists only a limited amount of empirical 
research data on the application, administration, management and ‘effectiveness’ 
of the ASBO. There are, however, a not insignificant amount of academic papers 
and journal articles on the subject, many of which are highly critical of antisocial 
behaviour policy and the use of ASBOs. 
Essentially, there are three broad strands of criticism levelled at the use of 
antisocial behaviour orders: firstly, ASBO interventions are frequently inconsistently 
applied and disproportionately intrusive (Burney, 2002: 2005); secondly, the use of 
ASBOs does nothing to tackle the underlying causes of antisocial behaviour and 
fails to rehabilitate those who are given ASBO interventions (Scraton, 2004; Carr 
and Cowan, 2006); and thirdly, ASBOs do not pay enough attention to due process 
and are unfairly targeted (primarily) at ‘marginalised groups’ such as young people 
and social housing tenants (Hester, 2000; Brown, 2004). Hence, the aim of this 
chapter is to provide, through reference to the existing literature, a comprehensive 
but concise review of perspectives on, and current debates about, the 
administration of ASBOs in Britain. 
However, as I have previously discussed, existing empirical research on 
ASBOs does not specifically examine ASBO legal and court process(es), or the 
ways in which these dimensions intersect to shape the management and outcomes 
of ASBO use in Britain. Moreover, there are also no comparative studies in 
existence that analyse the differences/similarities between ASBO legal and court 
procedure(s) in England and Wales, and North of the border. With this in mind, it is 
thus also the purpose of this chapter to identify the limitations of existing 
scholarship on ASBOs, and to clearly indicate – and provide justification for – the 
research aims of this thesis. The importance of the study of law (and legislative 
provisions) as a sociological phenomenon has already been argued for (Chapter 
2), hence this literature review seeks, additionally, to understand the existing 
research evidence on ASBOs within a socio-legal sphere of analysis. It is proposed 
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that the literature review embodied within this chapter will provide a rigorous 
framework for this research investigation which, it is hoped, will in turn contribute 
new empirical research evidence to an under researched area within a growing 
body of literature in the sociological research of antisocial behaviour policy and the 
use of ASBOs in Britain. 
This chapter is set out as follows: antisocial behaviour will first be placed in 
a historical context, which, it is hoped, will serve to provide a basis for current 
discussions and analyses of antisocial behaviour – and the use of ASBOs - in 
Britain. The next part of the chapter will consider contemporary experiences of 
antisocial behaviour (with regard to the reported incidence of antisocial behaviour 
in late modern society), and the legal definition of the term within the relevant 
legislation. The antisocial behaviour order (ASBO) will then be discussed, 
alongside the interim ASBO, and the antisocial behaviour order on conviction 
(CRASBO). Very little empirical research evidence exists on legal and court 
procedure(s) in ASBO cases so, for the most part, the review of the literature with 
regard to the relevant legal process(es) (in particular: civil procedure, evidentiary 
requirements and the burden of proof) will refer to statutory provisions and case 
law. The final section of this chapter will review the existing empirical research 
evidence on ASBOs in practice - specifically, the number of orders granted, the 
reported data on the characteristics of antisocial behaviour perpetrators, breach 
rate, and the numbers of orders appealed. 
 
Antisocial behaviour in a historical context 
Given the prominence of the term ‘antisocial behaviour’ in contemporary 
discourse(s), one could be forgiven the assumption that antisocial behaviour is 
solely a concern of late-modern society. Of course, ‘antisocial behaviour’ is in fact a 
perennial and recurring expression in social life. Academics and commentators 
have long identified disorder, criminal and sub-criminal behaviour (particularly 
relating to the young within society) as featuring as an inherent vestige of social 
concern for previous generations (Pearson, 1983; Shaw, 1931; Whitehead, 2004). 
In terms of aetiology, however, antisocial behaviour is far from perspicuous 
(Squires, 2006: 158) as ‘antisocial behaviour’ is a generic term, and does not 
necessarily relate to criminal or sub-criminal behaviour - ‘antisocial’ can of course 
mean one who is disinclined to mix in society and/or one who is either without, or in 
possession of poor, social instincts. Taking the modern, capacious interpretation of 
the term ‘antisocial’, and applying it to a historical analytic consideration of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, for example, would suggest that 
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‘antisocial behaviour’ (in all its manifold genera) was rife. Urban areas had played 
host to a creeping propagation of criminal gangs, on-street sex workers and 
pickpockets/cutpurses; and in the rural dwellings there is evidence of smugglers 
and rustlers, tavern brawlers, and itinerant beggars. The nineteenth century also 
saw the origins of new forms of ‘antisocial behaviour’ such as grave robbers, child 
pickpockets, and ‘hooligans’ (Pearson, 1983). 
Hence, ‘antisocial behaviour’ is not, culturally or socially, a ‘new’ 
phenomenon. How, then, do we account for its protracted – some commentators 
would argue, exaggerated – political and media profile in recent years? While 
urban nuisance and petty incivility have veritably featured as longstanding historical 
social milieu, the twentieth (and early twenty-first) century appears to have 
accommodated a proselytism of sorts: whereby public concerns about antisocial 
behaviour and moral decay - for the two appear inherently bound together in media 
and public discourses15 - transgressed ‘acts’ to become about forms of culture, 
such as the ‘sex and drugs’ culture of the 1960s; football hooliganism; punk music; 
TV/film/video game inspired violence; and latterly;  ‘chav’ culture16. Antisocial 
behaviour has become a reversed proposition; whereby individuals have instead 
now become concerned (at these specific generational intervals) by cultural threats 
to social stability.   
Contemporary concerns about antisocial behaviour have found a 
commonality centred on traditional forms of antisocial acts such as drunkenness, 
young people ‘hanging around’, street assaults and binge drinking (Burney, 2005). 
However, these modern concerns are now paired with a more aberrant cultural 
anxiety, diverging on forms of community related troubles. Indeed, the language of 
both antisocial behaviour policy and government discourse focuses upon the need 
to protect ‘communities’ from antisocial behaviour. Steventon (2006), amongst 
other commentators, has argued that the emergence of antisocial behaviour as a 
central strand in political discourse has facilitated increasing political intervention in 
community issues. In any case, however, antisocial behaviour is not a new social 
phenomenon. Hence, it would be propitious for us now to briefly map the 
circumstances that subsequently lead to the creation and introduction of the 
antisocial behaviour order (ASBO). If we consider a short biography of antisocial 
                                               
15
 For example, Millie et al. found that neighbourhood residents frequently regarded 
antisocial behaviour ‘as a symptom of social and moral decline’ (2005: 7), while Sennett 
(1996) and Innes (2004), amongst others, have observed the contribution of media 
discourse to current perceptions about the nature and incidence of antisocial behaviour. 
16
 For an interesting discussion of the evolution of ‘chav’ culture in late-modern society, see 
Hayward , K. J., and Yar, M., (2006) 'The 'Chav' phenomenon: consumption, media and the 
construction of a new underclass', Crime, Media, Culture, 2 (1) 9-28 
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behaviour in late-modernity, for example, we can observe the factors contributing to 
the current construction and classification of antisocial behaviour within social 
policy.  
From the mid-1990s, the attention of both politicians and the media had 
been captured by particular communities in Britain that appeared to be wrought 
with problems associated with urban deprivation, social exclusion (Hills, Le Grand 
and Piachaud, 2002) and poverty (Gordon and Pantazis, 1997). Residents and 
communities cited not only problems related to serious crime, but also the 
pernicious cumulative effects of antisocial behaviour and petty offending. However, 
as a result of the apparent impotence of civil law remedy in addressing 
neighbour(hood) nuisance, several councils became increasingly pro-active in 
seeking greater powers to use against perpetrators of antisocial behaviour who 
were ‘beyond the reach of both criminal and housing sanctions’ (Burney, 2005: 20). 
For example, nuisance law had proved to be entirely ineffectual in Hussain v 
Lancaster City Council [2000] QBD 1, whereby a family had been severely and 
persistently racially harassed over a protracted period of time. The victim’s claim 
against the local authority that they had failed to take action against the (tenant) 
perpetrators of said antisocial behaviour was struck out as disclosing no 
reasonable cause of action because the alleged antisocial acts were not committed 
from the perpetrators’ land. It was held by Hirst L.J. at paragraph 23, that: 
 
‘the acts complained of unquestionably interfered persistently and 
intolerably with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ land, but they did 
not involve the tenants’ use of the tenants’ land and therefore fell outside 
the scope of tort.’  
 
Indeed, case law had shown there to exist intrinsic and fundamental problems for 
those seeking remedies as tenants. Where the antisocial act complained of was 
perpetrated by a fellow tenant of a common landlord, it had been established in 
Hussain that such a landlord would only be liable if he had authorised the acts of 
nuisance; this seemed to require that a let ‘necessarily involved a nuisance’ as per 
Malzy v Eicholz [1916] 2 KB 308. Moreover, the case of Smith v Scott [1973] Ch. 
314 321 not only indicated that this would be difficult to prove even if the landlord 
was aware of the troublesome nature of the tenants when housing them, but it also 
determined that there was no duty of care to existing tenants in the selection of 
new tenants. 
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Accordingly, Burney (2002: 469) has observed that ‘local authority pressure 
lay behind the introduction of the ASBO’. Moreover, Brown has argued that 
previously, people had escaped conviction for antisocial acts ‘for two 
reasons…witness intimidation and…the possibility that the police do not treat 
antisocial behaviour as ‘real’ crime’ (2004: 208). Similarly, Hunter, Nixon and Parr 
(2004) have further identified the long-standing lack of support available to 
witnesses in civil cases. However, while the introduction of the ASBO was 
undoubtedly precipitated by the perceived ineffective and deficient response of 
local authorities and landlords to resolve neighbour complaints17 - which was 
coupled with the evident difficulties in obtaining civil law remedy for acts of 
neighbour(hood) nuisance - the precise nature of the behaviour that ASBOs were 
introduced to proscribe is not manifestly clear. As we shall see in the course of this 
thesis, whether ASBOs should be used to prohibit non-criminal, sub-criminal, 
and/or criminal behaviour goes to the heart of contemporary debates about the use 
of ASBOs - and their place within the summary justice system.  
Campbell (2002a) has observed that the ASBO model was designed to 
address persistent yet non-criminal behaviour that was, essentially, ‘trivial’. 
Alternatively, Brown’s research on the use of ASBOs in Scotland had demonstrated 
that ‘in at least half of all cases, there was a long history of criminal convictions’ 
and moreover, that behaviour subject to restriction by an order was ‘not a trivial or 
sub-criminal form of behaviour’ (2004:208). Hence, in its investigation of the 
administration and management of ASBOs, this research study will further examine 
decision-making in respect of the level and type of antisocial/nuisance behaviour(s) 
that are made the subject of ASBO applications. The data will be obtained from 
solicitors involved in the ASBO application process in England and Wales, and in 
Scotland. Moreover, this investigation will also seek to illuminate, and to gain an 
insight into, judicial attitudes and decision-making on ASBO applications in respect 
of criminal and non-criminal behaviour(s) which are contained within ASBO 
prohibitions.  
 
Incidence and nature of antisocial behaviour 
It is important to acknowledge, when considering the administration and 
management of ASBOs that, despite a number of research projects having been 
                                               
17
 Which led to the formation of the Social Landlords’ Crime and Nuisance Group (SLCNG) 
in the late 1990s - the group came into existence as an amalgamation of a local 
government lobby group and several large housing associations; its purpose was (and 
remains) to promote effective resolution of neighbour disputes through civil legal action 
(Burney, 2005: 21). 
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conducted into the incidence of antisocial behaviour, there is a lack of consensus 
as to the proportion, extent and situs of antisocial behaviour in Britain. Moreover, 
attention should also be paid to the salience of geographical, gender, age, housing 
tenure, and ethnic variation(s) in experience(s) of antisocial behaviour.  
 
Scotland 
Although overall crime (including serious violent crime) fell in the ten years to 2002, 
recorded offences of an ‘antisocial’ nature in Scotland increased (Scottish 
Executive, 2003). According to the Scottish Executive, these findings in fact 
understate the extent of the problem as much of antisocial behaviour is not within 
the criminal law, and goes unreported. Moreover, reports of vandalism in Scotland 
have increased by almost 50% in less than a decade: there were nearly 330 
incidents a day reported on average in 2005-2006, an increase from around 220 in 
1996-97 (Scottish Parliamentary Written Answer, 2 March 2007). In total, there 
were 120,342 cases of vandalism, reckless damage and malicious mischief 
recorded in 2005-2006, compared with 81,587 in 1996-1997.  
However, the extent to which an increase in reported antisocial incidents is 
equivalent to an increase in de facto antisocial behaviour is not comprehensively 
evidenced. Recent research has found that individuals in Scotland are now more 
likely to report incidents of antisocial behaviour to the authorities (Scottish 
Executive, 2005b). Pawson et al. (2005) suggest that a greater willingness on the 
part of victims to report antisocial behaviour has come about as a direct result of 
increased media attention and the belief that authorities will now act positively to 
resolve the problem. Commentators have further observed that the increased (and 
increasing) attention and time devoted to reporting incidents deemed ‘antisocial’ 
within the media, has also consequently served to encourage public perception of 
the overall incidence of that type of behaviour in Britain18. 
 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales, despite a 39% drop in the incidence of crime since 1995, 
antisocial behaviour continues to remain an issue of public concern with around 
66,000 reports of antisocial behaviour made to authorities each day (Home Office, 
2003b). Moreover, the Home Office estimates that around 17% of the total 
population (approximately 7 million people) perceive there to be ‘high levels’ of 
antisocial behaviour in their area (Home Office, 2006a). However, the number of 
                                               
18
 An interesting comparison can be made here with Innes’ influential work on ‘signal 
crimes’ (2004); see also Sennett, 1996; 2003; Pawson et al., 2005. 
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people who think antisocial behaviour is a ‘big’ or ‘fairly big’ problem has reduced 
from 20.7% in 2002/03 to 16.7% at the end of 2004 (Home Office, 2004b).  
Burney (2005: 60) has argued, however, that because people living in 
different locales identify different types of behaviour as being more problematic 
than others19, that these variations in fact negate the effectiveness of having a wide 
definition of antisocial behaviour by virtue of its illogical categorisation of such 
widely varied phenomena within one annotation20. Research evidence also shows 
that specific groups of people are more likely to be affected by antisocial behaviour 
than others. For example, 30% of those living in social housing and 32% of those 
living in ‘hard pressed’ areas - who are least able to move away or bear the cost of 
antisocial behaviour – perceived high levels of antisocial behaviour in their area. 
Similarly, findings show that those individuals from an ethnic minority (26%) and 
females aged between 16 and 24 (28%) found antisocial behaviour to be a ‘big 
problem’ for their area (NAO, 2006: 9). (In Scotland, similar findings have been 
reported: Scottish Executive Guidance on Antisocial Behaviour Strategies (2004a) 
notes that, in particular, vulnerable groups such as older people, women and 
disabled people, including children/adults with mental health or learning difficulties, 
are likely to be more affected by antisocial behaviour and the fear of crime.) 
 
Housing tenure 
While Hester (2000: 172) predicted that ASBOs would be used primarily in ‘poor 
communities’ and ‘by definition they will thus be disproportionately deployed’, 
Brown has also argued that ‘although crime is ubiquitous, antisocial behaviour is 
deemed to occur principally in social housing areas…[which is] part of the broader 
social control of marginalised populations who can be ‘managed’ in social housing’ 
(2004:204). Similarly, Scott and Parkey (1998) contend that antisocial behaviour 
should be seen as a problem affecting all housing tenures. 
It was observed by Chadwick L.J. in Northampton BC v Lovat [1997] 96 
LGR, 548 that: 
 
‘reasonably or irreasonably…those who live or work on a council estate and 
are affected by the conduct of council tenants on that estate will expect the 
                                               
19
 For instance, drug use/dealing is more frequently cited in social housing areas, while litter 
and graffiti are identified more often in affluent urban areas. 
20
 Whether it is desirable to have more serious forms of criminal behaviour (such as drug 
dealing) forming the basis of ASBO prohibitions will be considered in the course of this 
research study. Data will be presented in respect of the opinions of both solicitors, and 
sentencers. 
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council to do something about it. The housing department will receive 
complaints which will have to be addressed...’ 
 
Hence, somewhat unsurprisingly, the majority of ASBO interventions continue to be 
issued in social housing areas (Home Office, 2006a; Scottish Executive, 2005b). 
While Burney (2002) and Cowan, Pantazis and Gilroy (2001) have observed the 
social housing sectors’ increased use of and reliance upon procedures 
synonymous with crime control; Brown (2004) has commented that ‘antisocial 
behaviour is found largely in social housing areas because the physical presence 
of “investigatory” people and technology ensure that it will be found’ (2004: 210).  
Yet, recent nationwide research on the incidence of antisocial behaviour 
has found that: ‘antisocial behaviour has a significant impact on the lives of a 
minority of people in Britain, particularly in areas of social deprivation and inner 
cities. However, it has little or no effect on the lives of the majority of the population’ 
(Millie et al., 2005: 1).  Furthermore, 61% of the respondents in the British Crime 
Survey (BCS) 2003/04 reported no negative effects from any of 16 types of 
antisocial behaviour (Home Office, 2004a). Both pieces of research were 
conducted nationally, so in these instances, antisocial behaviour was not found 
primarily in deprived urban areas simply because these were the only areas being 
studied. Both studies found antisocial behaviour to be present in other areas, 
however, Millie et al. found that antisocial acts affected the quality of life of 
residents to a lesser degree.   
Similarly, mirroring the findings of the Home Office study of Crime in 
England & Wales 2005-06, research on behalf of the National Audit Office (2006) 
also demonstrates that, although all research participants agreed that antisocial 
behaviour was a problem to some degree where they lived, participants from less 
affluent areas perceived antisocial behaviour to be a greater problem than those 
from more affluent areas (NAO, 2006: 9). Correspondingly, in Scotland, nine per 
cent of Scottish Household Survey 2001/02 respondents reported some experience 
of ‘neighbour disputes’, a proportion of which was fairly consistent from authority to 
authority (although highest in Midlothian (13% of respondents), Edinburgh (11%), 
Glasgow (11%) and Dundee (11%)). Nationally, the incidence of such disputes was 
highest in local authority housing (13%) and lowest in housing owned outright (5%). 
Similarly, such disputes were reported by 14% of respondents occupying flats as 
compared with five per cent of those living in detached houses (Scottish Executive, 
2002). Hence, The Scottish Household Survey 2001/02 indicates that the incidence 
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of antisocial behaviour is higher in social housing than in other areas, but it also 
nevertheless confirms that antisocial behaviour extends out with social housing. 
 
Young people 
Another important factor in determining the incidence of antisocial behaviour is the 
age breakdown in relevant areas. In Scotland, the findings of the Scottish Crime 
Survey 2000 (Scottish Executive, 2001) and the Scottish Household Survey 
2001/02 (Scottish Executive, 2002) demonstrated that the most commonly cited 
‘neighbourhood problem’ was ‘groups of young people [hanging around]’. Nearly a 
third of all respondents cited this as ‘fairly or very common in my area’. Similarly, 
evidence from research in England and Wales also shows that youth disorder is a 
primary concern of individuals within the typology of antisocial behaviour(s) (Home 
Office, 2006a). Hence, if ‘groups of young people [hanging around]’ is the primary 
concern of residents then this could be a factor in determining a perceived higher 
incidence of antisocial behaviour, especially if an authority has in the past been 
guilty of re-housing ‘problem families’ in certain estates21. Evidence has shown that 
there can often be a larger proportion of young people living in social housing areas 
than in other tenures, perhaps increasing pressure on local facilities and leading to 
a perception by residents and agencies of increased antisocial behaviour (see, for 
example, SEU, 2000a).   
In England and Wales, the use of ASBOs against young people is 
widespread. Research has shown that approximately half of all ASBOs are served 
on young people (Home Office, 2007), and while antisocial behaviour is 
perpetrated by individuals from a range of ages, recent research has demonstrated 
that men are much more likely to engage in antisocial behaviour then women 
(NAO, 2006: 10). Figure 3.1 provides a breakdown by gender and age of those 
who received antisocial behaviour interventions in the National Audit Office 
research study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21
 This is an issue that has generated problems between, for example, London boroughs 
and other authorities over accommodating tenants, (Taylor, G. [of the Local Government 
Association], The Guardian, ‘Home and Away’, 23 May 2001). 
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Figure 3.1 Gender and age of people who received interventions  
 
 Female Male Total 
18 or under 55 199 254 
19-24 27 114 141 
25 and over 50 125 175 
Total 132 438 570 
 
* The study sampled 893 case files of ASBOs, warning letters, and ABCs 
(Source: NAO, 2006: 11) 
 
Cost of antisocial behaviour 
A variety of ‘costs’ have been associated with antisocial behaviour, which, it is 
suggested, can be condensed into a typology of three principal costs resulting from 
the perpetration of antisocial behaviour(s). These are financial costs; community 
costs; and, costs to the individual. 
    
Financial costs 
The financial costs of antisocial behaviour can be quite considerable. Based on a 
‘one day count’22 study of antisocial behaviour incidents in 2003, for example, the 
Home Office estimates that the 66,107 reports of antisocial behaviour recorded 
equate to £3.4 billion a year in associated financial costs (Home Office, 2006a: 28). 
This estimate does not, however, include the costs assumed by individuals. If costs 
attributed to others were included, the base line estimate for the cost of antisocial 
behaviour would raise substantially (NAO, 2006: 8). For example, the estimated 
annual cost to the victims of criminal damage is £1.2 billion (ibid.). 
Moreover, the Social Exclusion Unit reported in 2000 that, the worst cases 
of antisocial behaviour can precipitate the demolition of recently built property and 
can result in the zero value of assets. It was estimated that the cost of demolition 
was approximately £5,000 per dwelling. However, this figure did not include the 
                                               
22
 It should be noted, however, that the findings of the ‘one day count’ study are not 
unanimously accepted. Burney (2005: 81), for example, has argued that because there was 
no recognition of the potential for ‘double-counting’ by different authorities, and furthermore 
that measurements were not incorporated into the study which could ascertain the differing 
degrees of upset/harm caused by the behaviours to individual complainants – particularly in 
view of the likelihood that some individuals are more likely to complain more frequently than 
others, who may do so rarely or never – that ‘it cannot be held that either quantitatively or 
qualitatively this was a meaningful exercise.’ However, in view of the substantial amount of 
research data on the economic cost of antisocial behaviour, one could, nonetheless, 
certainly arrive at the legitimate conclusion that antisocial behaviour is very costly, both in 
terms of costs to the community, and costs to the individual. 
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cost of re-landscaping the site and compensating previous tenants or owners 
(SEU, 2000a). Similarly, the associated cost(s) of vandalism to buildings is 
considerable: a study of the costs of vandalism in schools in Scotland, for example, 
estimated that the cost for insuring against vandalism and damage was higher than 
the amount spent on books each year (Accounts Commission, 1997). 
In a study of social landlord’s responses to antisocial behaviour, Nixon et al. 
(1999) reported that incidents of antisocial behaviour also have very high costs in 
terms of housing management time. The study estimated that 20 per cent of social 
landlords’ housing management time was spent on dealing with complaints about 
neighbours’ behaviour (Nixon et al., 1999). Landlords stated that tackling antisocial 
behaviour was a resource-intensive process which considerably impacted on 
housing management budgets. Research for the Scottish Office (1999) described 
these type of housing management costs as ‘direct costs’, that included the time 
spent dealing with neighbour complaints by housing officers, area managers, 
senior officers, and caretakers; the costs of implementing initiatives and associated 
on-going costs; legal costs for advice and court action; the associated costs of 
repairs for vandalism and graffiti; and the time given by homeless and allocation 
staff in dealing with requests for transfer (para 3.30). 
A detailed breakdown of the estimated financial costs of antisocial 
behaviour, as categorised by the Home Office, is provided below at Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Estimated costs of antisocial behaviour and disorder  
 
Behaviour Daily reports Estimated cost to 
agencies per day 
(000s)  
Estimated 
cost to 
agencies 
per year 
(millions) 
Litter/rubbish 10,686 £1,866 £466 
Criminal 
damage/vandalism 
7,855 £2,667 £667 
Vehicle-related 
nuisance 
7,782 £1,361 £340 
Nuisance behaviour 7,660 £1,420 £355 
Intimidation/harassment 5,415 £1,983 £496 
Noise 5,374 £994 £249 
Rowdy behaviour 5,339 £995 £249 
Abandoned vehicles 4,994 £360 £90 
Street drinking & 
begging 
3,239 £504 £126 
Drug/substance misuse 
& drug dealing 
2,920 £527 £132 
Animal-related 
problems 
2,546 £458 £114 
Hoax calls 1,286 £198 £49 
Prostitutions, kerb 
crawling, sexual acts 
1,011 £167 £42 
Total reports 66,107 £13,500 £3,375 
 
(Source: Home Office, 2006a: 28) 
 
Community costs 
There are less likely to be amenities, services and shops in areas of high antisocial 
behaviour, primarily because of the associated costs of maintenance and repair 
(Brand and Price, 2000; Home Office, 2006a: 28). Research conducted by the 
Housing Corporation (1998) has also demonstrated that high levels of crime and 
antisocial behaviour in areas make housing difficult to let, reducing community 
participation, which subsequently leads to the rapid deterioration of these 
neighbourhoods. Communities with high levels of vandalism or graffiti can also 
discourage individuals from making use of community and neighbourhood areas as 
gathering places, which can subsequently have an affect on local business(es) as a 
result of reduced ‘passing trade’ (SEU, 2000a; Home Office, 2006a: 28). Moreover, 
Power and Mumford (1999) have found that low demand for housing in these 
communities subsequently generates falling school rolls, loss of confidence in the 
area, a vacuum in social control, increased antisocial behaviour and intense fear of 
crime.   
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Costs to the individual 
The emotional costs to the victims of antisocial behaviour have been reported for 
some considerable time. In 1999, for example, the National Housing Federation 
(NHF) found that tenants of social housing frequently suffered from ‘high levels of 
stress as a result of crime and antisocial behaviour in the area in which they live’ 
(1999: 1). Moreover, Upson (2006) found that 96% of those suffering from noisy 
neighbours reported a resulting emotional consequence, which included 
annoyance, frustration, anger and worry. Of these respondents, 32% detailed more 
serious emotional impact and disclosed having experienced one more of the 
following: shock, fear, stress, depression, anxiety, panic attacks and crying. 
Furthermore, antisocial behaviour adversely impacts on people’s quality of life 
(NAO, 2006: 8) and victims may also suffer continued and prospective emotional 
distress caused by their experiences, such as depression and anxiety (Hunter et 
al., 2004). 
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Legal definition of ‘antisocial behaviour’ 
Thus, as we have seen from an examination of existing research, there is a lack of 
consensus as to the proportion, extent and situs of antisocial behaviour in Britain. 
Moreover, the incidence – and perception - of antisocial behaviour is subject to 
variation as a result of differences in geographical area and housing tenure, and by 
virtue of the gender, age, and ethnicity of antisocial behaviour perpetrators/victims.  
For the purposes of this study, we must now turn to consider in detail the legal 
definition of the term ‘antisocial behaviour’ embodied within the relevant 
legislation23.  
It is generally accepted by (socio-) legal scholars that the law customarily 
aims for an unambiguous accuracy when defining behaviour proscribed by 
legislation; the purpose of which is to ensure that there is little uncertainty of what 
the law expects of those bound by it. Although this principle is not absolute, 
‘generally the main function of the law is to provide an exact as well as a binding 
relationship’ (James, 1973: 67). Yet, the legal definition of antisocial behaviour that 
applies in relation to ASBOs, as conduct that: ‘causes or is likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same 
household’24, inevitably and frequently results in a very broad range of behaviour 
falling within its scope. Although it is not an exhaustive list, the Home Office has, 
however, produced a typology of specific behaviours categorised as antisocial from 
a ‘one day count’ of antisocial behaviour carried out in 2003 (see below, Figure 
3.3).  
As we have observed, antisocial behaviour spans both criminal and non-
criminal behaviour. Subsequently, this has meant that behaviour complained of 
need not necessarily be of itself unlawful. The key feature of the statutory definition 
of antisocial behaviour is that its primary focus is the effect of the behaviour 
complained of: it is not necessary for the applicant authority to prove intention on 
the part of the defendant to cause harassment, alarm or distress. While the 
relevant legislation defines antisocial behaviour broadly, and in terms of the 
affective consequences of the conduct, local authorities, Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs), Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and police 
services possess their own lists of behaviours defined as antisocial for the 
purposes of the antisocial behaviour strategies within their locales. Relevant 
                                               
23
 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter, ‘the 1998 Act’); The Antisocial Behaviour 
Act 2003 (hereafter, ‘the 2003 Act’); The Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 
(hereafter, ‘the 2004 Act’) 
24
 Section 1(1)(a) of the 1998 Act. In Scotland, antisocial behaviour is defined as ‘behaviour 
which causes or is likely to cause alarm or distress’, under s.143 of the 2004 Act.  
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authorities have discretion over the creation of their own strategies to tackle 
antisocial behaviour25 and these definitions display a variance in the type(s) of 
behaviour(s) recognised as antisocial as a result of the differing cultural 
compositions and social conditions of specific locales26. As a result, there is 
disparity and variational spread in the strategies employed to address antisocial 
behaviour(s) across Britain: antisocial behaviour legislation is thus underpinned by 
an emphasis upon local level autonomy. 
The consequence(s) of such a generalised and subjective description of 
antisocial behaviour has meant that the definition is both flexible, and capable of 
diverse interpretation. Certain organisations have also commented that it has made 
antisocial behaviour more relevant and practical at a local level: The Local 
Government Association has argued that the ‘antisocial behaviour focus from 
central government has led to an increase in focus within many localities’ (House of 
Commons, 2004a: Ev. 81). Furthermore, Sergeant Paul Dunn of the Metropolitan 
Police has added that: ‘the legal definition helps if enforcement is necessary, and it 
has to be looked at from that point of view’ (House of Commons, 2004b: Q.96). 
The Home Affairs Committee, reporting on antisocial behaviour in April 
2005, made three main points relating to its wide definition:   
 
‘first, the definitions work well from an enforcement point of view and no 
significant practical problems appear to have been encountered; second, 
exhaustive lists of behaviour considered antisocial by central government 
would be unworkable and anomalous; third, antisocial behaviour is 
inherently a local problem and falls to be defined at a local level. It is a 
major strength of the current statutory definitions of antisocial behaviour that 
they are flexible enough to accommodate this.’ (House of Commons, 
2005a: 21) 
                                               
25
 Part 1, s.1 (1) of the 2004 Act, requires that ‘each local authority…shall…prepare a 
strategy for dealing with antisocial behaviour.’ Section 17 of the 1998 Act places a statutory 
duty on chief police officers and local authorities in England and Wales to work together to 
develop and implement a strategy for reducing crime and disorder. 
26
 For example, Edinburgh city council has issued fewer ASBOs than other similar sized 
cities. One of the reasons for this is the success of ABCs, which include many of the same 
restrictions as ASBOs, such as curfews, bans from areas, etc. Although it should be noted 
that research has found that ‘usage of ABCs is not widespread’ in Scotland generally 
(Scottish Executive, 2005b: 2). Furthermore, while the most common basis for orders to be 
granted in Scotland is excessive noise, in Glasgow for example, the most common 
perpetrators of antisocial behaviour are males aged 30-40 years old for aggressive 
behaviour: so again, this will be a local variable which will be a factor in determining local 
authority/RSL strategy on antisocial behaviour.  
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Alternatively, however, there exists a significant degree of opposition to such a 
subjective definition in law. For example, Hull City Council has argued that ‘a lack 
of clarity around the definition of antisocial behaviour does not help’ in producing an 
effective response to it, and Salford City Council has also highlighted this area as 
problematic (House of Commons, 2004a: Ev. 67 and 128, respectively). Moreover, 
the EU Commissioner for Human Rights, having examined the use of ASBOs in 
Britain in 2005, commented in his report that ‘the determination of what constitutes 
antisocial behaviour becomes conditional upon the subjective views of any given 
collective’ (Gil-Robles, 2005: 34). 
 
Figure 3.3 Typology of antisocial behaviours 
 
Misuse of public space                                                                  
                                                                                                    
 Drug/substance misuse                                                    
o Taking drugs 
o Sniffing volatile substances 
o Discarding needles/drug paraphernalia 
 
 Drug dealing 
o Crack houses 
o Presence of dealers/users 
 
 Street drinking 
 
 Aggressive begging 
 
 Prostitution 
o Soliciting 
o Cards in phone boxes 
o Discarded condoms 
 
 Kerb crawling 
o Loitering 
o Pestering residents 
 
 Illegal campsites 
 
 Vehicle related nuisance 
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o Inconvenient/illegal parking 
o Car repairs on the street/in gardens 
o Abandoning cars 
 
 Sexual acts 
o Inappropriate sexual conduct 
o Indecent exposure 
 
Disregard for community/personal wellbeing 
 
 Noise 
o Noisy neighbours 
o Noisy cars/motorbikes 
o Loud music 
o Alarms 
o Noise from pubs/clubs 
o Noise from business/industry 
 
 Rowdy behaviour 
o Shouting and swearing 
o Fighting 
o Drunken behaviour 
o Hooliganism/loutish behaviour 
 
 Nuisance behaviour 
o Urinating in public 
o Setting fires  
o Inappropriate use of fireworks 
o Throwing missiles 
o Climbing on buildings 
o Impeding access to communal areas 
o Games in restricted/inappropriate areas 
o Misuse of airguns 
o Letting down tyres 
 
 Hoax calls 
o False calls to emergency services 
 
 Inappropriate vehicle use 
o Joyriding 
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o Racing cars 
o Off-road motorcycling 
o Cycling/skateboarding in pedestrian areas/footpaths 
 
 Animal related problems 
o Uncontrolled animals 
o Dog fouling 
 
Acts directed at people 
 
 Intimidation/harassment 
o Groups of individuals making threats 
o Verbal abuse 
o Bullying 
o Following people 
o Pestering people 
o Voyeurism 
o Sending nasty/offensive letters 
o Obscene/nuisance phone calls 
o Menacing gestures 
 
 Can be on the grounds of: 
o Race 
o Sexual orientation 
o Gender 
o Religion 
o Disability 
o Age 
 
Environmental damage 
 
 Criminal damage/vandalism 
o Graffiti 
o Damage to bus shelters 
o Damage to phone kiosks 
o Damage to street furniture 
o Damage to buildings 
o Damage to trees/plants/hedges 
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 Litter/rubbish 
o Dropping litter/chewing gum 
o Dumping rubbish (including in own garden) 
o Fly-tipping 
o Fly-posting 
(Source: NAO, 2006: 39) 
 
While Scott and Parkey (1998) have suggested a three-fold classification of 
antisocial behaviour to include: (a) neighbour nuisance, (b) neighbourhood 
nuisance and (c) crime; as ASBOs have become more widespread, it has been 
argued that the courts have become bolder and more inventive about how to frame 
such orders. One solicitor recently suggested that the definition of antisocial 
behaviour ‘is only limited by one person’s imagination’ (Black, 2005). Since 
antisocial behaviour relates to both criminal and non-criminal behaviour, a further 
consequence of the generalised nature of antisocial behaviour as behaviour that ‘is 
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ has been that there is a clear 
diversity in the types of act that ASBOs can be granted to prohibit. As the EU 
Commissioner for Human Rights noted; ‘such orders [ASBOs] look rather like 
personalised penal codes, where non-criminal behaviour becomes criminal for 
individuals who have incurred the wrath of the community’ (Gil-Robles, 2005: 34, 
para.110). 
  As such an expansive scope of behaviour is necessarily open to ‘social 
judgement’, it has been suggested that this has not only given free reign to the 
endorsement of prejudice and suspicions, but has also meant that ‘some local 
authorities are using the powers to drive off the streets anybody whose behaviour 
is eccentric, undesirable or a nuisance’27. By way of example, since their 
introduction in April 1999, ASBOs have been used in certain circumstances, 
against the mentally ill, children with learning difficulties, the homeless, peaceful 
protesters and prostitutes. This has met with criticism from a wide range of 
charitable and civil liberties organisations. For instance, The Children’s Society has 
argued that ‘many children and young people are telling us that they do not 
understand the term [antisocial behaviour], but they feel it is directed towards them’ 
(House of Commons, 2004a: Ev. 25). Crisis has also objected to the equating of 
begging as antisocial, arguing that, ‘although the act of begging may be deemed 
antisocial, it is a problem that is best understood and dealt with as a manifestation 
of social exclusion’ (House of Commons, 2004a: Ev. 37). 
                                               
27
 Harry Fletcher, General Secretary, Napo. The Guardian, 30 June 2005 
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Hence, it is clear that there exists a disparity among commentators, policy 
makers and practitioners as to the effectiveness and value of having such a flexible 
statutory definition of antisocial behaviour that applies in relation to ASBO cases. 
Macdonald (2003) has observed that criticisms relating to the broad definition of the 
term ‘antisocial behaviour’ possess a commonality centred on wider concerns 
about the place of discretionary autonomy within the legal system28. Thus, 
discretionary autonomy is a particularly important aspect of the administration and 
management of ASBOs. As Macdonald correctly identifies, the nature of the 
‘umbrella’ term antisocial behaviour, necessarily precludes a concise, narrow 
definition. Hence, local level governance/autonomy and judicial decision-making 
assume highly significant roles in deciding ASBO application outcomes (and the 
breadth and terms of ASBO prohibitions). Although studies on ASBOs to date have 
largely been concerned with investigating the administration and application of the 
orders, there have not been any studies which have sought specifically to examine 
judicial discretion in ASBO cases. As such, this study will provide additional insight 
into the decision-making of the judiciary in ASBO applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28
 Given that proposals for a clearer definition of antisocial behaviour are ‘beset by the 
hopelessness of trying to define an umbrella term like “antisocial behaviour” precisely’ 
(2003: 206), Macdonald has subsequently proposed two new clauses to section 1(1) of the 
1998 Act with the objective, not of defining ‘antisocial behaviour’, but of expressly detailing 
the principles underpinning the ASBO, in order to provide clarity and consistency in 
application. Specifically, he suggests that section 1(1) (a) be qualified to require that the 
behaviour complained of was persistent, that it caused a serious level of harassment, alarm 
or distress, and that the perpetrator intentionally committed the antisocial acts.  
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The Antisocial Behaviour Order (ASBO) 
This next section of the review will consider more fully the statutory nature of the 
ASBO, and, in particular, the legal and court process(es) involved in their 
application and administration. Specifically, I will discuss relevant legislative 
provisions, case law and legal precedent in the context of civil procedure, 
evidentiary requirements, and the burden of proof with regard to interim orders, 
orders on conviction and section 1 stand alone orders (full ASBOs). 
 
‘Stand alone’ orders 
ASBOs are civil orders, which were designed as a preventative – and not a 
criminally punitive – intervention. Introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
the orders have been available since 1 April 1999. In England and Wales, an order 
can be made against anyone 10 years or over, although in Scotland, ASBOs were 
only available for persons aged 16 or over until a subsequent amendment in the 
2004 Act extended ASBOs to 12-15 year olds. An order contains conditions 
(‘prohibitions’) prohibiting the offender from specific antisocial acts or entering 
defined areas and is effective for a minimum of 2 years, although in Scotland, 
ASBO duration is a matter for the discretion and evaluation of the Sheriff. The 
applicant agency must show that the defendant has behaved in an antisocial 
manner and that the order is necessary for the protection of persons from further 
antisocial behaviour by the defendant - this is sometimes referred to as the 2 stage 
test.  
 
The application process 
The agencies that are able to apply for orders are defined as ‘relevant authorities’ 
for the purposes of the legislation. In England and Wales, these are local 
authorities, police forces (including the British Transport Police), Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs) and Housing Action Trusts (HATs). In Scotland, a relevant 
authority is a local authority, RSLs and housing associations. It is important to note 
that the police cannot apply for orders in Scotland, which makes ASBOs appear 
largely as a housing issue and goes some way to explaining the lack of private 
sector and owner occupation ASBOs in Scotland. 
 As set out in the relevant legislation, applicant authorities have a duty to 
consult other agencies before an application for an antisocial behaviour order is 
made: table 3.5 (below) sets out the relevant statutory consultation requirements 
for applicant agencies. Additionally, in Scotland, subsection 11 of the 2004 Act 
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requires a relevant authority to consult, where the application relates to someone 
under 16, the Principal Reporter.  
 
Table 3.5 Statutory consultation requirements  
 
Relevant authority Must also consult 
Local Authority  Police 
Police (not Scotland) Local Authority 
Registered Social Landlords 
(RSLs)/Housing Action Trusts 
(HATs) 
Police & Local Authority 
British Transport Police (not 
Scotland) 
Police & Local Authority 
 
 
ASBO proceedings can be conducted in the magistrates’ court (a stand-alone order 
can be obtained from the Magistrates' Court acting in its civil capacity); the Crown, 
Magistrates’ or Youth Court (on conviction in criminal proceedings); or in the 
County Courts (orders can be made by a County Court where the principal 
proceedings involve the antisocial behaviour of someone who is a party to those 
proceedings, although the court cannot make a stand-alone order as there must 
always be principal proceedings to which the application for an ASBO can be 
attached). In Scotland, application proceedings are heard in the Sheriff Court sitting 
in its civil capacity, or the Court of Session (appeal hearing), or the District Court or 
Sheriff Court on conviction in criminal proceedings. 
 
Interim ASBOs 
Interim orders are available under s.1D of the 1998 Act (as amended by s.65 of the 
Police Reform Act 2002) and s.7 of the 2004 Act in Scotland (as amended by s. 44 
of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003). This temporary order can impose the 
same prohibitions and has the same penalties as breach of a full ASBO29. An 
interim order can be made at an initial court hearing held in advance of the full 
hearing if the court is satisfied that the specified person has engaged in antisocial 
behaviour and that an interim order is necessary for the purpose of protecting the 
                                               
29
 Although, in Scotland, the granting of an interim ASBO does not allow a local 
authority/RSL to convert a Scottish Secure Tenancy (SST) to a Short Scottish Secure 
Tenancy (SSST) - such a right only exists in relation to the granting of a full ASBO. 
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public from further antisocial behaviour.  In Scotland, if the initial writ has been 
served (for an interim order), the Sheriff may dispense with intimation of the motion 
for the interim ASBO and grant it without hearing the defender30, although the Court 
can consider any such representations as it sees fit31. The Sheriff may grant an 
interim order provided the individual named on the application has received 
intimation of the initial writ and the sheriff is satisfied that the antisocial conduct 
complained of would be established when a full hearing takes place.   
In England and Wales, however, an interim order can, with leave of the 
Justices’ Clerk, be made ex parte. In Kenny v Leeds Magistrates’ Court [2004] 
EWCA Civ 312, the Court of Appeal held that an interim order made without notice 
to the defendant did not contravene Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Statutory guidance on interim ASBOs suggests that applications will 
be appropriate, for example, where the applicant authority believes that persons 
need to be protected from the threat of further antisocial acts which might occur 
before the main application can be determined. In England and Wales, where an 
interim order is made ex parte, good practice guidance states that the court should 
arrange an early return date. An individual who is subject to an interim order then 
has the opportunity to respond to the case at the hearing for the full order, and may 
also apply to the court to have the interim order varied or discharged.  
The administration of interim orders - and the statutory provisions governing 
their use - raises several important questions specifically in respect of procedural 
fairness. Firstly, because there is no legal requirement that evidence should be led 
at the interim stage, this necessarily means that interim orders can be issued 
without the lodging of any productions, or the hearing of any witness statements. 
As a result, interim order breaches can be prosecuted in court when the validity of 
the original order had never been tested by evidence at the initial hearing. As such, 
this research study investigates the grounds on which interim orders are obtained, 
and also judicial attitudes to the prosecution of interim order breaches. Moreover, 
the extent to which interim orders have become a means to avoid traditionally 
encountered difficulties - and safeguards - in the legal process is investigated and 
assessed through analysis of the responses of solicitors, and sentencers. Both of 
these research questions are necessarily embedded within the central research 
theme of procedural fairness in ASBO applications. 
 
 
                                               
30
 As per s.115 of the Statutory Guidance on Antisocial Behaviour Orders (2004) 
31
 As per s.86 of the Statutory Guidance on Antisocial Behaviour Orders (2004) 
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Orders on conviction (CRASBOs) 
Following legislative changes made in s.64 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and 
s.234AA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, criminal courts may now 
also make orders against individuals convicted of a criminal offence (sometimes 
referred to as a ‘CRASBO’). In a similar way to ASBOs imposed in the civil courts, 
ASBOs on conviction are intended to prevent further antisocial behaviour, but 
specifically in relation to incidents that the police have reported (and where criminal 
proceedings have subsequently been taken). An order on conviction is granted on 
the basis of the evidence presented to the court during the criminal proceedings 
and any additional evidence provided to the court after the verdict. Contrary to 
reports by Madge (2004), that CRASBOs are often regarded as a component of a 
sentence, the order on conviction is not part of the sentence and can only be made 
in addition to a sentence or a conditional discharge.  
While the ASBO on conviction was never intended as a replacement for 
orders on application, they were intended as a means of expediting a lethargic and 
resource-intensive court process. In England and Wales, the amount of orders now 
obtained on conviction has begun to exceed the volume of orders obtained by 
section 1 stand-alone applications. For the period between April 1999 and 
September 2004, of those ASBOs issued in England and Wales, 59% were on 
application and 41% were on conviction (House of Commons, 2005b). Yet, orders 
on conviction only became available to persons in England and Wales who had 
been convicted of a relevant offence committed on or after 2 December 2002, while 
ASBOs had been available since 1 April 1999. Statistics for England and Wales 
from November 2002 to September 2004, for example, show that the number of 
orders granted on conviction accounted for 71% of all ASBOs issued in England 
and Wales during this period (Burney, 2005: 94). The Court of Appeal has, 
however, reinforced the principle that an order should not be made simply for the 
purposes of extending the penalty for committing an offence32 and it was further 
established in R v P [2004] EWCA Crim 287, that orders on conviction should not 
be made where custody has been imposed if the offender is not persistent and a 
period on supervision will follow. 
However, despite the extensive use of orders on conviction in England and 
Wales, only 65 ASBOs have been made on conviction in Scotland since they 
became available on 28 October 2004. In contrast to England and Wales, where a 
court can make an order on conviction on its own initiative (and an application for 
                                               
32
 R v Kirby [2005] EWCA Crim 1228, see also R v Adam Lawson [2006] 1 Cr App. R (S) 
323 and R v Williams [2006] 1 Cr. App. R (S) 305 
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an order is not required) or the order can be requested by the police or local 
authority (who may make representations to the court in support of the request), in 
Scotland ASBOs on conviction are not applied for by any authority, or the 
procurator fiscal. Instead, it is a matter for the court based on the evidence given at 
trial or the Crown narration in court.  
 No research evidence exists on the use of orders on conviction in Scotland. 
The most recent research study on ASBOs conducted by the Scottish Executive 
only considered the use of interim orders and full ASBOs and did not provide any 
data on the use of orders on conviction in Scotland. Given the enthusiastic uptake 
of orders on conviction in England and Wales, it would be propitious, for the 
purposes of extending knowledge(s) about the use of ASBOs and ASBO 
procedure(s), to examine the reasons behind the limited use of orders on 
conviction in Scotland, and moreover, the attitudes (and preferences) of solicitors in 
England and Wales to the use of orders on conviction, compared with the use of 
stand alone orders. As such, the use of orders on conviction is explored in this 
study with a view to providing an account of the reasons for the jurisdictional 
disparity in their uptake. 
 
Civil procedure  
As previously stipulated, the nature of the ASBO is such that it is designed to be a 
preventative remedy and not a punitive sanction. Thus, the civil law status of the 
orders has implications for the type of court proceedings at which applications are 
heard. In considering the classification of the orders in the landmark House of 
Lords case R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2003] 1 AC 787, their 
lordships held that, if, for the purposes of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, or for the purposes of domestic law, ASBO proceedings were to be 
classified as criminal in nature, ‘it would inevitably follow that the procedure for 
obtaining antisocial behaviour orders is completely or virtually unworkable and 
useless’ (as per Lord Steyn at [18]). In this respect, the central argument that the 
(potentially) onerous conditions that could be contained within the prohibitions of an 
order necessitated that the proceedings be regarded as criminal were rejected. In 
support of this decision, Lord Steyn described the draconian nature of many civil 
law injunctions such as Mareva injunctions33 and Anton Piller orders34, and cited his 
                                               
33
 This is a special form of injunction stopping a party from disposing of assets or removing 
them from the jurisdiction (out of the country). 
34
 An Anton Pillar Order directs a defendant to disclose or to deliver up documents 
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‘scepticism of an outcome which would deprive communities of their fundamental 
rights’ (original emphasis, at [18]). 
Further, in Clingham v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2003] HLR 17, 
whereby the imposition of an ASBO was challenged as being contrary to the 
Human Rights Act 1998, Lord Steyn described the balancing of rights in ASBO 
cases thus: 
 
‘The view was taken that the proceedings for an antisocial behaviour order 
would be civil and would not attract the rigour of the inflexible and 
sometimes absurdly technical hearsay rule which applies in criminal cases. 
If this supposition was wrong, in the sense that Parliament did not 
objectively achieve its aim, it would inevitably follow that the procedure for 
obtaining antisocial behaviour orders is completely unworkable and useless. 
If that is what the law decrees, so be it. My starting point is, however, an 
initial scepticism of an outcome which could deprive communities of their 
fundamental rights…’ (at para 18; original emphasis) 
 
Carr and Cowan (2006: 68), drawing upon Valverde (2003: 47), suggest that Lord 
Steyn is guilty of judicially ‘ventriloquiz[ing] the “national” community’. Using Lord 
Steyn’s (above) statement in Clingham, and his opinion in the case of Manchester 
City Council v Lee [2004] HLR 11 161 - that antisocial behaviour constitutes a 
‘social problem’ - Carr and Cowan assert that ‘what Lord Steyn is doing…is quite 
different from the normal legislative function of judges’ (p.68), and they argue that 
such ‘discursive strategies…have a kind of negative encoding in which important 
elements are hidden away in what is left unsaid’ (p.69).  
Moreover, the civil classification of the ASBO process means that civil rules 
of evidence apply, including the use of hearsay and professional witness evidence. 
Expressing their deep concern over the use of civil rules of evidence in ASBO 
cases, Carr and Cowan note that: 
 
‘the dismantling of traditional restrictions on the use of anonymous evidence 
becomes inevitable and unchallenged. This operates to exclude the 
antisocial from the normal and oratorically universal protections of the law. 
Common sense therefore justifies the death of the social existence of the 
“other” because of the need to enhance protections of the “innocent” and 
“the law-abiding”’ (p. 69).  
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Similarly, in his discussion of the human rights element in antisocial behaviour 
legislation, Andrew Ashworth (2004: 268) posits that the creation of ASBOs as a 
preventative remedy in civil law has been ‘an attempt to take maximum advantage 
of legal forms’, which essentially enables relatively oppressive conditions to be 
attached to the orders by virtue of their civil law status. 
In contrast, in a consideration of the use of hearsay evidence in ASBO 
applications, and the need to balance the rights of the defendant and the rights of 
the victim, Lord Hutton argued thus:  
 
‘I consider that the striking of a fair balance between the demands of the 
general interest of the community (the community in this case being 
represented by weak and vulnerable people who claim that they are the 
victims of antisocial behaviour which violates their rights) and the 
requirements of the protection of the defendants’ rights requires the scales 
to come down in favour of the protection of the community and of permitting 
the use of hearsay evidence in applications for antisocial behaviour orders.’ 
(at [113]) 
 
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that, although the application for an ASBO is 
a civil process, the consequences of the breach of an order are criminal. It was 
argued by the defendants in McCann that, when considering the appropriate legal 
status of an ASBO, the courts should have regard to the proceedings leading to the 
imposition of an order, but also that the court should acknowledge that criminal 
proceedings may be brought if the order is subsequently breached. Lord Steyn set 
aside this argument:  
 
‘These are separate and independent procedures. The making of the order 
will presumably sometimes serve its purpose and there will be no 
proceedings for breach. It is in principle necessary to consider the two 
stages separately’ (at [23]). 
 
In a consideration of the House of Lords’ decision in McCann, Macdonald (2003: 
633) has been unable to reconcile Lord Steyn’s view that proceedings under s.1(1) 
of the 1998 Act should be ‘separate and independent’ from potential criminal 
proceedings under s.1(10). Alternatively, he contends that evidence presented at 
the initial proceedings for the granting of an order may then subsequently be used 
in criminal proceedings to form the basis of the sentence for breach. The nature of 
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ASBO proceedings as a hybrid of civil and criminal law has meant that ‘findings of 
fact from the civil proceedings [are] relevant to the criminal penalty that is ultimately 
imposed’ (ibid.). He further notes, antithetically to the view of Lord Steyn, that there 
is no existing legal principle that creates an obligation/duty for the two stages to be 
considered separately (ibid.). 
In his analysis of McCann, Macdonald (2003: 639) has also suggested that 
New Labour failed to recognise, from the outset, the potential for ‘a principled 
application of the hearsay rule’ to be applied in cases involving intimidated 
witnesses, similar to the approach taken in the Strasbourg Court to balancing the 
tensions betweens the rights of the defendant and the rights of the victim. He 
argues that even if ASBO proceedings were classified as criminal, this would not 
consequently eliminate the ability of agencies to conduct ‘an effective campaign 
against antisocial behaviour’ (ibid.). 
  Hence, the discussion above (and in particular the observations of 
Ashworth (2004), Carr and Cowan (2006), and Macdonald (2003; 2006)), highlights 
the fundamental relevance of judicial decision-making in ASBO applications. 
Moreover, as juridical power and discretion is a central theme of this thesis, the 
primacy of judicial autonomy with regard to substantive decision-making will 
accordingly be examined in respect of the extent to which the judiciary have 
approbated a shift from criminal law to civil remedy. Furthermore, the research 
study will consider to what degree the courts have, in essence, defined a new form 
of preventative order, and the civil classification of the ASBO will be examined in 
terms of substantive legal procedures and outcomes.  
Although existing discussions on ASBOs have examined judicial decision-
making (see above, Ashworth, 2004; Carr and Cowan 2006, Macdonald, 2003; 
2006), there has not been a study conducted which has obtained information 
directly from members of the judiciary deciding on ASBO cases. As such, this study 
will attempt to provide additional insight into the study of ASBOs through interviews 
conducted with the judiciary. The interviews seek to better understand the influence 
of judicial decision-making in ASBO applications, and the attitudes of the judiciary 
towards the interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions. As I have stipulated 
in this Chapter and previous Chapters, judicial discretionary decision-making will, 
furthermore, be analysed within a wider theoretical framework which specifically 
analyses the place of discretion within the legal system, and the derivative effect on 
fairness and procedural justice outcomes.    
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Burden of Proof 
Civil court applications 
As we have already seen, in McCann, their lordships made ASBO applications an 
exception from the normal standard of proof in civil proceedings (on the balance of 
probabilities) and they ruled that the heightened civil standard, equivalent to the 
criminal standard, was to apply, and as such, ASBO proceedings are subsequently 
regarded as quasi-criminal in nature. The Court held that an individual must be 
shown to have perpetrated behaviour that is antisocial, and that such an order must 
be ‘necessary’ to protect persons from harassment, alarm or distress. The question 
of ‘necessity’ is, however, one for the exercise of the judge’s individual evaluation 
and discretion - without a standard of proof as such. In considering the burden of 
proof in interim order applications Kennedy LJ explained in R (Manchester City 
Council) v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court [2005] EWHC 253 (Admin), that: 
‘The test to be adopted by a magistrates’ court when deciding whether or not to 
make an interim order must be the statutory test: whether it is just to make the 
order.’ Similarly, in the leading case of R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395, it was 
held that no prohibition may be imposed in the order unless it was necessary for 
the purpose of protecting persons from further acts of antisocial behaviour by the 
defendant. 
Yet, although the House of Lords had previously set out the law on the 
standard or proof in respect of ASBO applications in McCann, the position was not 
binding in Scotland. Therefore, Scottish courts were not obligated to follow the 
House of Lords judgement. Subsequently, the standard of proof applied in Scottish 
cases is, in contrast to cases in England and Wales, the civil standard of proof – 
and not the heightened civil standard (equivalent to the criminal standard) that is 
applied South of the border. In effect, this appears to have created an amount of 
uncertainty and confusion among the legal profession (in Scotland) as to the 
appropriate standard of proof required in ASBO cases. Existing case law on the 
burden of proof in interim/ASBO cases in Scotland is limited to essentially three 
principal cases: Glasgow Housing Association Ltd v O’Donnell (2004) GWD 29-
604; Glasgow Housing Association Ltd v Sharkey (2004) HousLR 130; and 
Aberdeen City Council v Fergus (2006) GWD 36-727. 
In O’Donnell, Sheriff Holligan considered the criteria to be satisfied before 
an interim ASBO could be granted. It was held that the court had to be satisfied 
that the interim order was ‘necessary’ to protect relevant persons from further 
antisocial acts or conduct. However, in Sharkey, Sheriff Principal Bowen 
commented on the judgement of Sheriff Holligan in O’Donnell, and concluded that 
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Sheriff Holligan’s observation that the necessity test was a ‘high’ one went too far. 
Sheriff Principal Bowen decided that ‘necessity’ was a matter of fact to be decided 
on a case by case basis, which was an exercise of judgment for the presiding 
Sheriff in an individual case. Sheriff Principal Bowen’s judgement was confirmed in 
Fergus, whereby Sheriff Principal Young confirmed that in considering whether an 
interim order should be made, the court undertook a two stage test. The court 
requires to be satisfied, first, that the person was engaged in antisocial behaviour, 
and secondly, that an interim order should be made. In looking at this matter, no 
particular standard of proof is applicable. The second stage requires the Sheriff to 
consider all relevant matters, ignore irrelevant matters, correctly apply the law and 
come to a decision which is reasonable35. 
However, it is apparent that there exits inconsistency in the courts with 
regard to the standards that are required by Sheriffs for successful interim/ASBO 
applications. In Fife, for example, interim orders can be sought and are granted in 
Chambers without the need for a court hearing. Yet, in Glasgow, it has been 
reported that interim order applications have been rejected until a full proof 
submission is made. Moreover, in some areas, the evidential requirements laid 
down by Sheriffs for interim orders are ‘little different from what was deemed 
necessary to justify applications for full ASBOs’ (2005a, s.2.21). Thus, given the 
implications for fairness in procedural outcomes in ASBO cases, it is important that 
the evidentiary requirements sought by Sheriffs - and also solicitors’ experiences of 
the burden of proof to be met – are studied in more detail. As such, I address the 
issue of variation in the evidentiary requirements for interim/ASBO applications 
through an examination of judicial decision-making, and an analysis of information 
from solicitors on their knowledge and experience(s) of evidentiary requirements in 
ASBO applications. In order to provide a comparison with evidentiary practice(s) 
and knowledge(s) in England and Wales, data derived from solicitors from South of 
the border is also included in this part of the investigation. 
 
Criminal court applications 
It is important to note that the proceedings in which an ASBO on conviction is 
issued are civil, even though they are conducted by a criminal court36. Importantly, 
there are no procedural rules in existence for orders on conviction. The Court of 
                                               
35
 It was subsequently settled in Edinburgh City Council v Donald Gibson (2006) that a 
court could make an interim antisocial behaviour order even where an interim interdict is 
already in place. 
36
 As per R (W) v Acton Youth Court [2005] EWCH 954 (Admin) 
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Appeal has, however, provided some instruction in this area in the case of R v W 
and F [2006] EWCA Crim 686. Having noted the paucity of court rules setting out 
the procedure to be followed in such cases, the Court of Appeal gave the following 
general guidance: 
 
• The prosecution should identify specific facts said to constitute antisocial 
behaviour; 
• If the defendant accepts those facts, then they should be put in writing; 
• If the defendant does not accept them, they must then be proved to the 
criminal standard of proof; 
• The defendant should have sufficient time to consider the prosecution’s 
evidence against him/her – particularly with regard to evidence that is 
beyond the scope of the offence that the defendant has been convicted of; 
• Hearsay evidence is admissible; 
• Procedure as per the Magistrates’ Court (Hearsay Evidence in Civil 
Proceedings) Rules 1999 should be followed; 
• Findings of the court should be recorded in writing as rule 50.4 of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2005. 
 
In Scotland, there are certain specific differences in procedure for orders on 
conviction. Proceedings are criminal and subsequently, hearsay evidence cannot 
be considered. The court will, however, take into account previous convictions 
tendered by the Crown at the point of sentencing. There is also no definitive 
guidance on whether a civil ASBO should still be pursued if a criminal case is 
pending. The statutory guidance on antisocial behaviour orders (Scottish 
Executive, 2004a) states at paragraph 16 that: 
 
‘An ASBO is not intended to be a substitute for criminal proceedings where 
these are appropriate, and is intended to be complementary to other civil 
procedures such as interdict (where use of these is appropriate). Joint 
working and effective information sharing locally is important to ensure the 
most appropriate action is taken in the circumstances.’ 
 
The previous section (‘Orders on conviction’) considers the salient questions that 
have been raised with regard to the use of orders on conviction and, for the 
purposes of this thesis, how they will be answered. This next section examines the 
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available evidence on the use of ASBOs with regard to data on the numbers 
granted, cost, breach, and appeal. 
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ASBOs in practice 
Scotland 
In Scotland, between April 1999 and March 2005, 559 ASBOs had been granted 
(this includes those initially granted on an interim basis) (Scottish Executive, 2005b: 
1). In the most recent study year (2004/05), a total of 205 ASBOs were granted by 
the Scottish courts, representing a rate of 9.2 Orders per 100,000 households, and 
represents a decrease in the rate of growth in ASBO activity in Scotland, which had 
been continuously increasing since 1999/00. The rate of ASBOs in England and 
Wales has also been continually increasing and now stands at a rate of 12.3 
Orders per 100,000 households (ibid.). Research on behalf of the Scottish 
Executive notes that the incidence of ASBO applications in Scotland ‘is not only 
highly diverse, but is also quite inconsistent with what might be anticipated in terms 
of the expected pattern of antisocial behaviour’ (2005a: s. 2.25). Moreover, ASBO 
activity is ‘only slightly associated with survey evidence on the incidence of 
antisocial behaviour’ in Scotland (2005b: 1). The reasons for this geographical 
variation in ASBO use are subsequently described as four-fold (Scottish Executive, 
2005b: 2) and include the differing speeds at which local authorities/RSLs have 
been ‘gearing up’ to make full use of ASBO powers; the variation in attitudes of the 
legal profession/courts regarding ASBO applications; the organisational 
responsibility for tackling antisocial behaviour within individual local authorities; and 
the extent of local authority/RSL commitment to resolve antisocial behaviour 
through alternative means such as mediation, the use of antisocial behaviour 
contracts (ABCs) etc. About half of all full ASBOs granted in both 2003/04 and 
2004/05 in Scotland were of indefinite duration (Scottish Executive, 2005a, s.5.5) 
and orders range in length from less than a year to an indefinite duration. For some 
landlords, placing an indefinite duration upon an ASBO is ‘simply a standard 
approach or part of their official policy’ (s.5.8).  
There is also diversity in the types of act that ASBOs are being granted to 
prohibit, which is, in part, a consequence of the broad definition of antisocial 
behaviour as behaviour that causes, or is likely to cause ‘alarm or distress’. 
Research has found that behaviour prompting an ASBO application generally falls 
into one of three main categories – neighbour nuisance, noise and rowdy 
behaviour. Of the total number of ASBOs granted in Scotland, 40% relate to noise 
nuisance and a further 11% of orders prohibit the perpetrator from entering a 
specified area. In terms of the conditions placed on ASBOs, 44% were classed as 
‘other’ by local authority/RSL respondents, and involve the prohibition of a wide 
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range of behaviours, including shouting, swearing, vandalism, verbal abuse, 
threatening behaviour, intimidation and carrying a weapon (2005b: 3).  
Originally, Home Office Guidance on the 1998 Act (although it has since 
been superceded by Part 2 of the 2004 Act) stated that an ASBO should be used 
as a ‘last resort’. The 2004 Scottish Executive Statutory Guidance on the Use of 
ASBOs signals a moderate departure from this as it does not explicitly use the term 
‘last resort’, but it does state that local ‘authorities will want to consider a range of 
options…before deciding to pursue legal action’ (Scottish Executive, 2004a: s. 11). 
Hence, ASBOs may now be used when other methods are deemed inappropriate 
or less effective than an order, or perhaps used in partnership with support 
mechanisms. In general, ASBOs continue to be applied mainly to social sector 
tenants – in 2004/05, 89% of full ASBOs were granted to local authority/RSL 
tenants (Scottish Executive, 2005b), and the amount of orders granted in social 
sector housing appears to be a reflection of the actual incidence of antisocial 
behaviour. It was also found that ASBO offences are more likely to be committed 
by individuals, rather than by groups of people. Although a significant proportion of 
ASBO cases involved related applications being served on individual members of 
the same family (24%) or to members of gangs (11%) (ibid.). 
 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales, between April 1999 and December 2005, 9,853 ASBOs 
were issued. The minimum duration of an ASBO in England and Wales is two 
years but there is no maximum period, as it is for the court to decide the duration of 
the order depending on the severity of the antisocial behaviour in question. The 
latest published figures up to September 2005 show that 62 per cent of antisocial 
behaviour orders issued to young people aged 10 to 17 were for a period of less 
than three years (House of Commons, 2006). Research also demonstrates that the 
same factors affecting the wide geographical variation in the use of orders in 
Scotland, are affecting the issuing of orders in England and Wales. Both 
Campbell’s early work on the use of ASBOs, and the most recent study of the 
orders carried out by the National Audit Office, similarly highlight geographical 
variation, and the attitudes of practitioners to antisocial behaviour interventions 
(and available alternatives) within different locales, as effecting ASBO uptake (see 
Campbell, 2002a; NAO, 2006).  
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Cost  
The cost of taking out an ASBO has been known to range from £2,500 to in excess 
of £100,00037. Campbell’s (2002a) early review of the financial costs associated 
with ASBOs concluded that the average cost to police or local authorities was 
£4,800, including preparation of case, attendance at problem solving meetings and 
dealing with breaches and appeals. In 2004, the results of the Home Office’s 
‘Together’ ASBO Cost Survey then provided an estimate of £2,500 for the average 
cost of obtaining an ASBO. These results suggest that the average cost of 
administering an ASBO has fallen since Campbell’s analysis in 2002. The report 
notes that ‘the main drivers behind this decrease in costs appear to be the use of 
ASBOs on conviction and possibly more efficient administrative and legal 
procedures, as practitioners have become increasingly familiar with using ASBOs’ 
(2004c: 2). However, the report findings add that estimates of costs of ASBOs were 
wide-ranging in both the 2002 and the 2004 surveys38. Alternatively, many local 
authority antisocial behaviour protocols state that the minimum cost of an ASBO 
application is likely to be £5000 and will involve several weeks/months of 
preparatory work. However, the nature of ASBO applications, the diverseness of 
those made subject of them, and the differences between the authorities applying 
for them, mean that no 'standard cost' of an ASBO application can be given.39 
 
Antisocial behaviour perpetrators 
A substantial amount of evidence exits to show that ASBOs are being served for an 
increasingly broad range of behaviour. It has been suggested that the use of 
ASBOs across Britain to address a wider and more diverse range of behaviour, is a 
direct result of ‘growing pressure [on relevant authorities]…from both residents and 
elected members – for action on antisocial behaviour…a development…resulting in 
part from the high profile of the issue in the media’ (Scottish Executive, 2005a: 19). 
                                               
37
 The Metropolitan Police Authority, in a 2001 report by the Commissioner, stated that a 
detective sergeant involved in one application had spent more time on an ASBO application 
than she would normally have spent on a very serious criminal investigation. Officers 
estimated the cost of obtaining this ASBO was in excess of £100,000. 
38
 In 2004, the minimum estimated cost was £150 (for an ASBO on conviction).The 
maximum estimated cost was £10,250, which was the first ASBO issued by one CDRP. 
ASBOs on conviction were generally cheaper to administer than other types of ASBOs, 
costing on average £900 compared with over £3,000 for stand-alone orders (Home Office, 
2004). 
39
 In 2005, only 19 local authorities in Scotland were found to be collecting financial 
information about the cost of using ASBOs and other measures to tackle antisocial 
behaviour (Scottish Executive, 2005a: para. 2.4). Previously, the Convention of Scottish 
Local Authorities (COSLA) had emphasised the difficulties in estimating the average costs 
of ASBOs, but suggested that the costs were more often between £5,000 and £20,000 
(Scottish Parliament, 2004). 
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Moreover, it has been argued that the interim ASBO has greatly widened the 
appeal of the device because it has demonstrated that swift action on antisocial 
behaviour is achievable (Pawson et al. 2005). 
 
Inappropriate ASBOs  
Statutory guidance on the use of ASBOs states that an authority does not have to 
prove intention on the part of the defendant to cause alarm or distress (Scottish 
Executive, 2004a: para.27). This effectively removes the requirement for criminal 
intent or mens rea, upon which criminal cases are dependent. Brown has argued 
that ‘this explains why antisocial behaviour control is unconcerned about mental 
health problems, learning difficulties, addictions, domestic violence and other 
potential ‘mitigating factors’ that are common features of antisocial behaviour 
cases’ (2004: 206-207). Subsequently, there has been criticism, particularly from 
civil liberties groups and charities (BIBIC, 2006; Liberty, 2004; Mason, 2005; Napo, 
2004; SANE, 2005), of the serving of ASBOs against the mentally ill, children with 
learning difficulties, peaceful protesters, the homeless and prostitutes. For 
example, the Chief Executive of the mental health charity SANE, Marjorie Wallace, 
has stated that situations involving mentally ill people ‘should not be allowed to 
degenerate to the point where the police become involved and an inappropriate 
course of action is taken in the form of an ASBO’ (SANE, 2005). As a result, the 
inappropriate issuing of ASBOs has become an area of significant concern and 
debate. While the Home Affairs Committee has stated (House of Commons, 
2005a:73) that ‘we do not consider the inappropriate issuing of ASBOs…[to be] a 
major problem’, the Committee also recommended that ‘the Home Office 
commissions wide-ranging research in this area’ (ibid).  
 Hence, although numerous studies have identified that ASBOs are, to an 
extent, being issued to individuals who are vulnerable and/or marginalised, little 
analytic attention has been paid to judicial decision-making processes in these 
circumstances, or the way(s) in which the courts involved in such applications 
reconcile the granting of an order with the perpetrators personal circumstances 
versus the need to protect the wider community. Moreover, no studies have 
examined the contribution and influence of judicial discretion in cases involving 
individuals presenting with potential ‘mitigating’ circumstances such as mental 
health or addiction problems. As such, this research study seeks to contribute to 
the existing work on ASBOs issued to vulnerable individuals/groups by conveying 
some understanding of (the complexity of) judicial decision-making in 
circumstances involving applications where there exist potential ‘mitigating factors’. 
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ASBOs and Children 
In Scotland, ASBOs had originally only been available for persons aged 16 or over 
until a subsequent amendment in Part 2 of the 2004 Act extended ASBOs to 12-15 
year olds. The extension of the use of ASBOs for young people took place in 
October 2004, and requires local authorities/RSLs to develop specific policy and 
practice that directly involves social work and criminal justice practitioners, 
including Children’s Panels and Children’s Reporters. Research on behalf of the 
Scottish Executive (2005b.) states that it is to be anticipated that ‘social work or 
children services departments may take the pivotal role in determining whether, 
and in what circumstances, ASBOs are sought’ and that consequently, the use of 
ASBOs for adults, and for 12-15 year olds, might be significantly different within the 
same organisation and/or area (2005b: 44). 
Subsequently, there has been criticism from particular city councils in 
Scotland regarding what they consider to be the overly restrictive conditions 
contained within statutory provisions governing the use of ASBOs for persons 
under the age of 16. They have argued that the legislative provisions requiring 
consultation with social services and other agencies is too onerous and that 
statutory conditions ultimately makes it very difficult for local authorities/RSLs to 
apply for ASBOs against young people. For example, Sheila Gilmore, an Edinburgh 
city councillor, has stated that:  
 
‘The way the legislation has been framed means you are required to sign up 
the backing of children’s services, social work and the children’s reporter’s 
office to get an ASBO for an under 16. Also there are a lot of professionals 
who do not believe they should be used on the under-16s in the first place 
so are reluctant to use them.’ (The Scotsman, 10 November 2006) 
 
However, compared to the approach taken in England and Wales, the Scottish 
response to antisocial behaviour perpetrated by children is significantly different in 
certain fundamental respects. The use of ASBOs for 12-15 year olds in Scotland 
must complement the Children’s Hearing System, which continues to be ‘the 
primary forum’ for dealing with behaviour beyond parental control or offending 
behaviour by under 16s (Scottish Executive, 2005a) and represents a considerably 
more holistic, welfare-based approach to tackling the problem of antisocial 
behaviour in children. For example, prior to making an application for an ASBO in 
respect of an under 16, applicant agencies must consult the Principal Reporter and 
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the presiding Sheriff must have regard to any views expressed by the Principal 
Reporter before determining whether to make an order or an interim order. 
Additionally, the Sheriff must have regard to advice provided by a children’s 
hearing before determining an application for a full ASBO.   
Moreover, children under 16 cannot be detained for breaching ASBOs in 
Scotland. Section 10 of the 2004 Act makes clear that breach of an ASBO by a 
person under 16 will not lead to detention where no other offences are involved. If 
criminal proceedings are taken against a child for breach of an ASBO and he/she 
pleads or is found guilty, the court must, if the child is subject to a supervision 
requirement, seek advice from the children's hearing on how the child might be 
treated. If the child is not subject to supervision the court may still seek the advice 
of a hearing, and if the case is dealt with by the Reporter, the Reporter or a hearing 
will take into account what more can be done to address the child's behaviour and 
needs, considering the range of options available to them. Data collected for 
research on behalf of the Scottish Executive indicates that most local authority 
respondents in Scotland are setting up (or have already set up) specific procedures 
to tackle antisocial behaviour amongst young people and are considering a range 
of responses including parenting orders, ABCs, referrals to other agencies, and 
diversionary activities (2005b: 4). Furthermore, prior to September 2005, Scotland 
had been markedly different from England and Wales in the respect that there had 
been no ASBOs served against anyone under 16 years old - although 71% of 
Antisocial Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) currently involve young people under 16 
years of age (Scottish Executive, 2005b: 2). On 20 September 2005, Paisley 
Sheriff Court became the first court in Scotland to serve an ASBO on someone 
below the age of 16 when an ASBO was granted against a 14 year old from 
Renfrewshire. Edinburgh Sheriff Court followed on 17 October 2005, and awarded 
an ASBO against a 15 year old boy40. Presently however, only six ASBOs have 
been granted against persons under 16 years old in Scotland and around a fifth of 
ASBOs granted in Scotland in 2004/05 related to young people aged 16-18 years 
old (Scottish Executive, 2005b.) - although it should be noted that this is a 
disproportionate number bearing in mind the overall representation of the 16-18 
year old group within the Scottish population. 
                                               
40
 Welcoming the outcome of the case in Edinburgh, City Councillor Donald Anderson 
remarked in the Edinburgh Evening News (19 October 2005) that ‘an ASBO should be seen 
as a warning, not a last resort’. He also promised an increase in the use of ASBOs against 
children who believed they were ‘untouchable’. 
 81 
 In particular, the use of publicity in ASBO cases involving children has 
prompted widespread debate among commentators and practitioners. While the 
police and local authorities in England and Wales have made wide use of the 
powers available to them to publicise the details of orders that have been issued to 
both adults and children in their locales, in Scotland, however, local authorities 
have been highly reluctant41 to make use of powers available to them to publicise 
details of those issued antisocial behaviour orders. Importantly, children in Scotland 
are protected from being identified by the imposition of automatic reporting 
restrictions42. However, the extensive use of publicity in England and Wales has 
raised civil liberties and human rights concerns, particularly with regard to the 
‘naming and shaming’ of children. While conceding that the serving of ASBOs 
should be made public, and that in this respect, reporting restrictions on young 
people need not always be strictly adhered to, the EU Commissioner on Human 
Rights commented in June 2005 that: 
 
‘the aggressive publication of ASBOs through, for instance, the door step 
distribution of leaflets containing the names and addresses of children 
subject to ASBOs risks transforming the pesky into pariahs…Such 
indiscriminate naming and shaming would, in my view, not only be counter-
productive, but also a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.’ (Gil-Robles, 2005: 
37) 
 
However, on the legal question of whether ‘naming and shaming’ did indeed 
constitute a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
High Court held, in the landmark test case of Stanley, Marshall and Kelly v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and The Chief Executive of Brent 
Council [2004], that ‘where publicity was intended to inform, reassure and assist in 
enforcing the orders and deter others, it would not be effective unless it included 
photographs, names and partial addresses’ (Kennedy L.J.). Scraton (2004) has 
argued that, not only does this judgement effectively mean that ‘naming and 
shaming’ has received the endorsement of the courts, but also that ultimately, 
‘ASBOs [are]…a classic example of net-widening through which children and 
                                               
41
 For example, Edinburgh Education Chief Ewan Aitken described the use of publicity in 
ASBO cases as ‘legalised humiliation’ and likened it to bringing back the stocks. Similarly, 
SNP justice spokesman Kenny MacAskill said he believed that the ‘naming and shaming’ 
policy could be a ‘waste of resources….We need a solution, not stigmatisation.’ (Edinburgh 
Evening News, 30 Jan 2006) 
42
 Although the Sheriff has discretion to lift reporting restrictions if he/she considers it to be 
appropriate. 
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young people in particular…[become] elevated to the first rung of criminalisation’s 
ladder’ (p. 15). Burney (2002) has contended that the practice of ‘naming and 
shaming’ ‘reinforces the image of a country at the mercy of 12 year old tearaways’ 
(p.475), while Willow (2005) has described the increasing use of ASBOs as a 
‘badge of honour’ for young people43. In this context, it is also important to note the 
very limited use that has been made of Individual Support Orders (ISOs) in 
England and Wales.  
Research has found that in England and Wales, very few ISOs have been 
used to support children with behavioural difficulties who have been issued with an 
ASBO (BIBIC, 2005). Support orders can be given to 10-17 year olds who have 
already been issued with an ASBO and are designed to tackle the underlying 
causes of the problem behaviour. However, only 7 ISOs were issued between May 
and December 2004; compared to over 600 ASBOs issued to young people aged 
10-17. Hence, the approach adopted by both practitioners and the courts in 
England and Wales is considerably different to that adopted in Scotland, both in 
respect of the position of the child in ASBO action, and in terms of the support 
networks that are in place to help young people with ASBOs who also have 
diagnosed behavioural problems. Support agencies have proposed that what is 
needed is a tiered approach to antisocial behaviour interventions, with closer 
assessment of problematic behaviours in multi-agency discussions. In cases 
involving young people, it has been argued that youth offending teams (YOTs) 
need to be involved at the earliest stage of a young person’s problematic behaviour 
so that learning or behavioural difficulties can be identified quickly, which would 
help to ensure that an inappropriate course of action is not going to be taken (YJB, 
2006). 
 Given the different jurisdictional approaches adopted with regard to child 
welfare, and youth justice in general44 - in so far as the Children’s Hearing System 
remains the primary forum for addressing problematic behaviour (or behaviour 
beyond parental control) for children under the age of 16 in Scotland – it is evident 
from existing literature that these differences have impacted on the uptake of 
                                               
43
 There is currently a paucity of research evidence available on the effectiveness of 
publicity in ASBO cases in Britain. However, in Scotland, Edinburgh city council is currently 
considering beginning a pilot research study to assess the effectiveness of ‘naming and 
shaming’ in ASBO cases in the South of Edinburgh. 
44
 For example, Squires and Stephen (2005: 4) equate the drive to tackle youth-related 
antisocial behaviour in England and Wales as predicated upon the growth in public 
perception that young antisocial behaviour perpetrators had been able to act with 
‘impunity…apparently confident that neither the police nor the rest of the youth justice 
system could touch them’. 
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ASBOs for children and young people, and the circumstances in which they are 
deemed appropriate. No empirical studies have so far explored the discongruity 
between the use of ASBOs for children and young people in Scotland, and in 
England and Wales in respect of legal and judicial decision-making. Hence, this 
thesis aims to examine the diversity in jurisdictional approach(es) to the use of 
ASBOs for children and young people, and, moreover, the influence of solicitors 
and the judiciary in shaping policy and practice outcomes on the use of ASBOs for 
children. 
 
ASBO breach 
Scotland 
Data collected on behalf of the Scottish Executive (2005a; 2005b) suggests that the 
term ‘breach’ is not consistently understood and moreover, that methods of 
statistical data collection within local authorities relating to types of breach are 
‘patchy and inconsistent’. This led to further guidance on ‘monitoring, identifying 
and dealing with ASBO breaches’ being requested by practitioners involved in their 
research survey group (2005a: s.5.15). Due to the lack of clarity in the monitoring 
of breaches, the Executive’s first report of research findings was only able to 
analyse results from 25 of the 32 local authority areas in Scotland (2005a: s.5.11) 
and the data from the Scottish Executive Justice Department was also at variance 
with the survey returns. It was found provisionally that 67% of orders had been 
breached during 2003/04, although respondents emphasised that a breach did not 
necessarily constitute a failure (s.5.15). Of the total number of breaches identified, 
just under three quarters had been reported to the Procurator Fiscal (s.5.12).  
The second report of their findings again identified that ASBO breaches are 
being interpreted differently by different local authorities and that ASBO data is 
being collated and recorded differently across the country. It was found that 
information on ASBO breach is often collected by police and/or other agencies and 
is not necessarily passed to local authorities. The study data collected from local 
authorities/RSLs for the study year 2004/05 on the numbers of ASBOs breached 
found that 140 of the 544 ASBOs in force (both interim and full) were allegedly 
breached in this period. These findings were then compared with data provided by 
the Scottish Court Service. According to the court data, there were a total of 303 
breaches of ASBOs recorded by the courts in 2004/05. This compared to a total of 
133 breaches recorded by local authorities/RSLs as being reported to the Sheriff’s 
Court. However, it should be noted that the court data did not identify how many of 
the 303 recorded breaches may be accounted for by multiple breaches of the same 
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order. Scottish Executive survey data found that, in the survey year 2004/05, just 
over half of alleged breaches were reported to the Procurator Fiscal. A further 23% 
involved the perpetrator being detained in custody for an appearance in court. In 
14% of cases no action was taken following initial police or officer visit (2005b: 40). 
 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales, for the period to December 2005, the breach rate for 
ASBOs was 47 per cent overall (57 per cent for juveniles and 41 per cent for 
adults)45. However, the same problems apply in England and Wales in relation to 
the monitoring of the orders and the quantification of their efficacy if they are being 
breached (see also below, ‘ASBO effectiveness’). Hence, it is clear that the 
quantification and analysis of ASBO breaches is presently an area that requires 
further research and study. Research evidence has also found that issues relating 
to the servicing and effective monitoring of ASBOs are perceived by practitioners 
as being of fundamental importance to the successful implementation of the orders. 
Without the resources to effectively and consistently monitor the provisions of 
serviced orders, ASBOs can become what has been described as a ‘Paper Tiger’, 
whereby the police are unable to enforce the amount of orders granted; a situation 
which has become more prevalent in England (for example, in the Greater Leeds 
and Manchester areas). If ASBOs appear unenforceable, this, of course, has public 
confidence implications.  
 
Sentencing for breach 
However, for the purposes of this research study, the particular area of interest with 
regard to ASBO breach is in respect of sentencing tariffs, and specifically, the 
principle of ‘composite sentencing’. Macdonald (2006: 792) states that: ‘One of the 
primary objectives of the ASBO was…to provide a mechanism for the imposition of 
composite sentences on perpetrators of such behaviour, i.e. sentences which 
reflect the aggregate impact of a course of conduct as opposed to the seriousness 
of a single criminal act.’ However, he also observes that courts sentencing 
defendants for breach of an ASBO have failed to impose composite sentences, 
citing McCann as the most likely reason for this (p. 795). As has previously been 
discussed in this review of the literature, the court’s ruling in McCann (that ASBO 
proceedings were to be classified as civil) subsequently meant that findings of fact 
from proceedings for the imposition of an order could not later be employed at 
                                               
45
 Lords Hansard Text for 7 Dec 2006 (pt 0001) 
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proceedings for breach - a principle which was emphasised by Lord Steyn’s 
statement that ASBO proceedings are ‘separate and independent’ from 
proceedings for prosecution for breach of an order46. As a result, Macdonald 
argues (2006: 796) that there now exists a confusing body of case law on the 
sentencing tariffs available for breach.  
 An examination of relevant court decisions on breach proceedings in 
England and Wales47 certainly demonstrates, as Macdonald posits, that confusion 
exists within the courts as to available tariffs, the principle of composite sentencing, 
and, its relevance to the ASBO model. Moreover, in Scotland, very little case law or 
research evidence exists on breach proceedings in ASBO cases. Hence, this study 
aims to build on and to contribute to existing analyses of sentencing in breach 
proceedings (principally, Macdonald’s analysis of court decisions on breach, 2003; 
2006) by providing additional insight into judicial decision-making processes in 
proceedings for breach. I address this issue by obtaining empirical data from 
members of the judiciary who have been involved in sentencing proceedings for 
breach. The variation in sentencing for breach, with regard to specific courts, and 
individual judges, will also be considered within the wider context of consistency in 
sentencing and procedural justice. 
 
Appeal 
The number of ASBOs granted is increasing annually – and in both England and 
Wales and in Scotland, the courts have refused one per cent of all ASBO 
applications (Home Office, 2005b: 3, Scottish Executive, 2005a: 3). In terms of 
cases appealed once an order has been granted, in Scotland, appeals to the Court 
are rare (Scottish Executive, 2005b). Of the total number of full ASBOs granted 
during 2005/06, only six were appealed by the defendant and in only one case was 
the appeal upheld in Court. In three cases, the order was varied as a result of the 
appeal and in two the outcome was as yet unknown. Similarly, ASBO appeals are 
also rare in England and Wales, although Campbell found that the exact number of 
appeals was unknown (2002a). While the Home Affairs Committee notes that it is 
‘relatively straightforward to apply to the Court…for the terms [of an order] to be 
varied’ and that ‘there is also a right of appeal’ it further notes that ‘cases in which 
these options are not being taken highlight the variable quality of legal 
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 [2002] UKHL at 23 
47
 See, amongst others, R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395, W v DPP [2005] EWHC 
Admin 1333, and R v Kirby [2005] EWCA Crim 1228 
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representation rather than any difficulties with the current provisions for variation 
and appeal’ (House of Commons, 2005a: 73). 
Given the very high success rate of ASBO applications, and the limited 
number of appeals that are subsequently being made, it is evident that wider issues 
about legal aid, legal representation, and access to justice, are factors which 
require to be considered further in this context. As such, this research study 
provides an examination of appeal procedure(s), and the opportunities that exist for 
ASBO actions to be defended. The empirical data obtained from solicitors (in 
particular) will aid the study’s analysis of one of the central themes of this thesis - 
procedural fairness in ASBO applications. 
 
ASBO effectiveness 
Until very recently, there has been a dominant focus upon the bureaucratic aspects 
of the use of ASBOs in existing empirical research, and an absence of evaluations 
of ‘what works’ in reducing antisocial behaviour. For example, the Scottish 
Executive’s most recent research project on the use of ASBOs (2005a; 2005b) was 
concerned with ‘monitoring’ the use of the orders – it was not concerned with 
evaluating or analysing effectiveness, or attempting to determine quantifiable 
‘successes’ and ‘failures’. As research to date has largely been concerned with 
investigating the administration and application of the orders, a large proportion of 
the evidence on the effectiveness of ASBOs has been essentially anecdotal. 
Burney (2002: 481) found that there exist anecdotal examples of a reduction in 
antisocial behaviour as a result of certain orders being granted, and similarly, 
examples of the ineffectiveness of the orders, but ‘no means of knowing whether 
they add up to a significant whole.’ Moreover, the few evaluations that are in 
existence have been carried out locally and with very little standardisation in 
methodology (Armitage, 2002).   
A report published on behalf of the National Audit Office in December 2006 
was, however, the first national study (in England) to attempt to review the use of 
ASBOs with other antisocial behaviour interventions (warning letters and 
acceptable behaviour contracts (ABCs)), with the purpose of providing an analysis 
of whether interventions were successful in deterring further acts of antisocial 
behaviour. The study sampled 893 case files of ASBOs, warning letters, and ABCs, 
issued in six areas: Wear Valley, Easington, Liverpool, Manchester, Exeter and 
Hackney. The study found that (in the cases sampled by the Audit Office), almost 
two thirds (65%) of people stopped behaving antisocially after one intervention; 
over four out of five stopped after two interventions; and after three interventions, 
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antisocial behaviour had been stopped in more than nine out of ten cases. A small 
proportion of individuals were, however, repeatedly engaged in antisocial 
behaviour. The report found that approximately 20% of the sample cases received 
a (disproportionate) number of interventions - totalling 55% of all interventions 
issued in the period covered by the study (NAO, 2006: 5). This same group had a 
higher number of average convictions (50) than those in the total study sample who 
also possessed convictions (24) (ibid.). The report also suggested that about 55% 
of anti-social behaviour orders had been breached by offenders either committing 
more offences or by breaking the terms of their orders (NAO, 2006: 7). While the 
average number of breaches was four per person, the report found that 35% of 
ASBO holders breached their orders on five or more occasions (ibid.).  
It is difficult to quantify from this data, the extent to which the orders have 
definitively been ‘effective’, particularly with regard to ASBO breaches. The 
government has argued that, where breaches are reported it means that individuals 
are being monitored and that communities feel confident enough to report them. 
Alternatively, critics contend that the orders can only be effective if they are 
properly enforced, and that the existence of the figures on breach demonstrates 
that this is not the case. 
The National Audit Office report (2006: 7) made several recommendations 
to encourage the most effective use of antisocial behaviour interventions: 
 
• Improved case management 
• Provision of support to those administered interventions 
• Training to be provided to organisations involved in administering 
interventions to young people/children 
• Formal evaluation of cost and effectiveness of the various antisocial 
behaviour interventions 
 
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to study, or to evaluate, the effectiveness of 
ASBO use in Britain in reducing or preventing antisocial behaviour, the National 
Audit Office’s report provides relevant and useful data in respect of this study’s 
central research questions. The report specifically highlights case management in 
antisocial behaviour interventions as an area which might lead to improved 
procedural implementation and administration of interventions (including ASBOs). 
As this thesis is specifically concerned to understand legal procedure(s) in ASBO 
applications and the way(s) in which legal and court processes intersect to shape 
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the administration and outcomes of ASBO use, the relevance and the potential 
advantages of, case management is also examined in the course of this 
investigation by studying data on court procedure which is derived from solicitors 
involved in ASBO applications across Britain.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed a range of literature on the bureaucratic and 
administrative aspects of ASBO use in Britain. As such, the above discussion has 
highlighted the paucity of empirical research evidence which exists on legal and 
court procedure(s) in ASBO applications, and the ways in which these dimensions 
intersect to shape the management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. As such, 
this research seeks to illuminate specific areas of ASBO procedure which are at 
present under-researched, and hence this study will examine a number of relevant 
socio-legal aspects of ASBO use. Specifically, given the flexible statutory definition 
of antisocial behaviour and the subsequent level of discretion inherent in legal and 
court processes, this research will investigate due process and bureaucratic 
aspects of ASBO application procedure (including the use of judicial discretion). 
Additionally, in view of the paucity of empirical research evidence on the use of 
interim orders and orders on conviction, the grounds on which these types of order 
are obtained and the evidentiary requirements that are required to be met by 
applicant agencies will be examined. Moreover, judicial attitudes towards the 
prosecution of interim order breaches, the impact of mitigating factors and the use 
of ASBOs for persons under the age of 16 years will be considered in order to 
illuminate the complexity of judicial decision-making. Potential variation in 
sentencing for breach will be studied particularly with regard to consistency in 
sentencing. The research will also investigate appeal procedure, together with the 
opportunities for ASBO action to be defended and alongside the examination of 
legal representation and access to legal aid. Additionally, the study will provide new 
data on jurisdictional variation in ASBO procedures. Hence, the objective of this 
socio-legal study on ASBOs is to contribute to existing knowledge(s) about the use 
of ASBOs, but also to widen the sphere of sociological analysis within a growing 
body of literature in the research of antisocial behaviour policy and the use of 
ASBOs in Britain. The study findings will then be discussed using an analytical 
approach which incorporates both the legal and sociological dimensions of the 
research, and in the wider context of socio-legal conceptions of administrative and 
procedural justice, and ‘fairness’ in criminal justice processes. Additionally, this 
chapter provides a basis for the next in which the methodology used to investigate 
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the research questions is explained, and the data analysis methodology is 
elaborated upon. 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
From analysis of existing research (Campbell, 2002a; Burney, 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2005a; 2005b; Brown, 2004; National Audit Office, 2006), specific gaps 
in the knowledge and understanding of ASBO use in Britain has been identified48. 
What has been overlooked in empirical research on the use of ASBOs in Britain, is 
a deeper insight into the fundamental contribution and situs of the court system and 
legal process(es) in determining the administration and management of antisocial 
behaviour orders in both Scotland, and in England and Wales. Hence, the subject 
of this research study is a socio-legal analysis of the administration of antisocial 
behaviour orders, and the ways in which the dimensions of due process and legal 
primacy; and juridical power and discretion intersect to shape the management and 
outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. 
Moreover, there are also no comparative studies in existence that analyse 
the substantive differences/similarities between ASBO administrative procedure(s) 
in Scotland, and South of the border. Hence, it is also the purpose of this research 
study to provide a comparative account of relevant aspects of legal and 
administrative procedure(s) in Scotland, and in England and Wales, in ASBO 
applications. It is hoped that clearly identifying the successes and encountered 
difficulties in the application process within the separate jurisdictions, will be a 
relevant, and hopefully useful, contribution to research in this area. Hence, the 
following chapter discusses the methodology employed in this study in order to 
determine to what extent legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion influence the 
administration, management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. 
 
Data collection methodology 
The data production approach(es) applied in this thesis are both quantitative 
(positivist) and qualitative (phenomenological) in their composition – hence, a 
pluralist (mixed method) research design has been used. Quantitative data was 
obtained through the use of an online survey questionnaire, and qualitative 
information was derived from both ‘unobtrusive’ (Lee, 2000) methods of data 
collection (document examination), and semi-structured interviews.  
 
                                               
48
 See Chapters 1 and 3 
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Justification for a mixed method approach 
It is essential for the production of high quality, rigorous data and research, that 
researchers have a coherent understanding of the most appropriate philosophical 
position from which to derive a suitable research method (Hines, 2000: 7). Clarity in 
the researcher’s methodological justification(s) enables a clear study focus and 
consistency of research design (ibid.). According to Cohen and Manion (1980: 
233), a ‘mixed method’ research design enables the researcher to: 
 
‘map out or explain more fully the richness and complexity of human 
behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint, and, in so doing, by 
making more use of both qualitative and quantitative data.’ 
 
However, a mixed method approach has not been used in the course of this study 
with the expectation that it will provide form(s) of certainty about a specific social 
reality. Neither is it the purpose of the pluralist research design merely to aim to 
validate research findings. For the purposes of this research investigation, mixed 
methods are not used simply to ‘deepen’ understanding(s) of the ways in which the 
dimensions of due process and legal primacy; and juridical power and discretion 
intersect to shape the management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain, but also 
to ‘widen’ them (Olsen, 2004: 1). While Weiss (1968: 349) argues that, in research 
processes, there is ‘a capacity to organise materials within a plausible framework’, 
the use of mixed methods within this research study is designed with the intention 
of providing a more holistic research methodology, which does not suffer from 
oversimplification. As Olsen (2004: 4) observes:  
 
‘A certain pluralism of theorising is needed to accompany pluralism of 
method. Therefore the methodological pluralist approach is relatively 
challenging and does not easily allow research topics to be simplified. 
Parsimonious models are unlikely to result from this approach. Since a 
parsimonious model would have only a few variables in it, it would be likely 
to be mono-causal rather than holistic. Such models might suffer from over-
simplification.’ 
  
The multi-method approach of using different modes of enquiry will enable the 
cross-referencing of data. Importantly, it could also reduce the potential for error 
and researcher bias and help to ensure the validity of the aims of the research 
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investigation. Opposing empiricist observations that qualitative and quantitative 
modes of enquiry are irreconcilable (Olsen, 2004: 4), a mixed methods approach is 
used within this investigation to transcend the qualitative/quantitative divide, and to 
attempt to elucidate and to better contextualise the research aims, within a 
balanced framework of enquiry that is not arbitrarily conceived. 
 Moreover, specifically with regard to practical elements of consideration 
(such as time management and participant response rates), a mixed method 
approach was appealing. Due to the technical, sometimes complex, socio-legal 
nature of the study – particularly in respect of statutory provisions, court 
procedure(s) and legislation – it was necessary to, at the outset of the research 
investigation, familiarise myself with, analyse, and become extensively 
knowledgeable about, these aspects of the study area before designing, or 
proceeding to, fieldwork involving interaction with actors involved in the ASBO 
process. Thus, ‘unobtrusive’ data collection, in the form of document examination 
and analysis, underpinned the beginnings of my mixed method approach to data 
production. 
 The online survey questionnaire was then chosen as the next method of 
data production. As the research study is specifically interested in the ways in 
which the dimensions of due process and legal primacy intersect to shape the 
management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain, it was important to obtain data 
from solicitors involved in the legal process in order to determine the way(s) in 
which antisocial behaviour legislation was being used in practice, in the context of 
legal procedure(s) and the court system. The use of the online questionnaire was 
particularly appropriate because it enabled the collection of large scale survey data 
on ASBO legal process(es), of which little salient research-based knowledge 
existed. Importantly, the survey also enabled a wide range of solicitor’s 
perspectives on the court process to be ascertained, which would not have been as 
likely to have been achieved with a more limited number of one to one interviews. 
As will be discussed in the course of this chapter, given the many derivative 
benefits of online surveys with regard to ease of use and data collection, the online 
questionnaire was evidently the most suitable method of data production for this 
part of the investigation. In particular, the busy working lives of solicitors 
necessitated an accessible, easy to use and non-time consuming mode of enquiry, 
which was provided by the online survey questionnaire. 
 The final stage of the data production was in the form of one to one semi-
structured interviews with the judiciary. Juridical power and decision-making is also 
a central theme of this research study. Thus, in order to investigate context, 
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meaning and complexity in judicial decision-making, a phenomenological approach 
was constructed. Moreover, a qualitative data production method was chosen 
because qualitative enquiry as an ethnographic method would enable the 
delineation of particular legal examples and situations identified in both the initial 
document analysis, and in the survey questionnaire responses. A 
phenomenological approach was used in order to be able to generalise the findings 
to theory, rather than to populations49. Hence, each stage of the methodological 
process informed the construction (and direction) of the next stage of data 
production. In this respect, the mixed method approach was essential in my 
knowledge ‘layering’ process, whereby each stage in the methodology was 
fundamental to the accruing of essential information that would develop the 
investigation further at the next stage of the data production process.  
 
‘Unobtrusive’ data collection 
I began my research investigation using what are customarily described as 
‘unobtrusive’ methods (Lee, 2000) of data collection that do not involve the ‘direct 
elicitation of information from research subjects’ (Berg, 1995). These ‘unobtrusive’ 
methods of data collection can be collapsed into three categories: found data; 
captured data; and retrieved data (ibid.). As detailed within the Literature Review 
(Chapter 3), the existing research evidence on ASBOs was examined, alongside 
academic journal articles and popular written work on the subject of the 
investigation. Moreover, case files and legal precedent were also examined, which 
acted as a key source of information here. Hence, the ‘unobtrusive’ examination of 
existing data and information facilitated a reciprocal and collaborative relationship 
that not only helped to mould the direction of the research and to define the 
research questions but it also went some way to answering those questions. 
 
Online survey questionnaire 
A quantitative data production method (online survey questionnaire) was chosen 
for the second part of the research study. Quantitative research uses modes of 
enquiry imported from the physical sciences that are fundamentally positivist in 
                                               
49
 The latter part of this chapter examines the role of the judiciary as ‘elites’, and as such it 
is submitted that, obtaining access to this particular group is subsequently very difficult. For 
this reason, a large scale quantitative study of judicial attitudes to the administration and 
outcomes of the ASBO process would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – to achieve. 
Instead, individual interviews were chosen as the best method of data production for this 
‘hard to reach’ group. The use of one to one telephone interviews was considered as a 
possible alternative to interviews in person although these were not required as sufficient 
numbers of the judiciary agreed to be interviewed in person. 
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design and which are primarily concerned with implementing, administering and 
achieving objectivity, reliability and validity in their research findings. In particular, 
quantitative research studies are designed to ensure that the researcher is 
extraneous to the research process(es). Qualitatively-based information, 
particularly an individual(s) personal observations, will inherently contain a relative 
degree of biasing, and as such, these inconsistencies can highly bias the analysis 
and any subsequent recommendations of a research investigation (Potts, 1990).  
Alternatively, the independence of the quantitative researcher permits 
research findings to be generalised and replicated because the research has 
(potentially) been unconstrained by researcher bias50. Research procedures 
adopted to further or to promote objectivity and validity in research findings include 
the random selection of research participants, the standardisation of research 
methods and the use of statistical methods to test predetermined hypotheses 
regarding the relationships between specific variables. In terms of data analysis, 
quantitative information can also be analysed much more expeditiously than 
qualitative data, and is subject to a much lower degree of misinterpretation and 
biasing. Moreover, the use of software that is capable of generating cross-
tabulations and performing other types of statistical analysis means that analysis of 
quantitative data can be more productive and dynamic than is possible in analyses 
of qualitative data. Thus, the quantitative paradigm is capable of generating 
objective, quantifiable, and reliable data that can be formatted into generalised 
categories that are applicable to a larger population. 
It is important, however, to be aware of the limits of methods of quantitative 
data production. The quantitative mode of enquiry is ineffectual, for example, when 
the social reality being studied proves problematic to quantify or to measure. 
Moreover, the quantitative approach is insubstantial in its ability to contextualise 
behaviour(s) in a way that presents circumstances within the subjects studied ‘lived 
                                               
50
 I am not in any way arguing here that a quantitative methodology is free from researcher 
bias. Rather, I am suggesting that quantitative methods possess, as do qualitative methods, 
means through which researcher bias can be delimited. Both positivist and interpretive 
paradigms seek to define a ‘reality’ but the way in which each defines meaning and truth is 
at variance. As Wildemuth observes: ‘it is true that the positivist approach, with its goal of 
discerning the statistical regularities of behaviour, is oriented toward counting the 
occurrences and measuring the extent of the behaviours being studied. By contrast, the 
interpretive approach, with its goal of understanding the social world from the viewpoint of 
the actors within it, is oriented toward detailed description of the actors cognitive and 
symbolic actions, that is, the meanings associated with observable behaviours’ (1993, 451). 
That is to say that positivist research distinguishes a ‘reality’ that is not dependent on the 
researcher, while phenomenological research identifies ‘reality’ as socially constructed. 
Further discussion of the distinction between phenomenological and positivist traditions are 
included in Chapter 2. 
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realities’, and a quantitative research design also tends to ignore the effects of 
variables that have not been included in the design model.  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are the third major area of data collection. Glazier 
(1992: 6-7) argues that: ‘[t]he strength of qualitative data is its rich description…The 
richness of the data is ensured by the breadth of the context captured with the 
data.’ Hence, qualitative research seeks to represent, to understand and to 
delineate a situation within its ‘lived’ context. Thus, because 
people/organisation(s)/institution(s) as research study participants may be best 
understood within their ‘lived realities’ (which have not been disembedded from 
their true context), descriptive detail is used to contextualise participants’ 
experience(s). Moreover, Gorman and Clayton (1997: 23) state that: ‘[t]he ultimate 
goal of qualitative research is to understand those being studied from their 
perspective’. This fits with Bryman’s definition of qualitative research which isolates 
the importance of the participant’s perspective(s); description and context; 
processes; flexibility; and concepts and theory as outcomes of the research 
process (2001: 264).  
Qualitative methods of research enquiry are frequently occupied with 
examining and understanding how events or patterns unfold over a period of time, 
and the process(es) involved. Alternatively, quantitative modes of enquiry are often 
engaged with the analysis of static or constant situations/circumstances.  
Furthermore, a qualitative research design enables greater flexibility in terms of the 
defined structure(s) of the research, which subsequently permits the researcher to 
take advantage of new discoveries or interpretations. For example, a semi-
structured interview schedule (such as the type utilised in this part of the research 
fieldwork), facilitates greater adaptability and permits ideas to be initiated by, and 
created from, the interview itself.  
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Questionnaire 
Following on from my document analysis and examination of existing research 
evidence, I was able to identify specific gaps in the knowledge and understanding 
of ASBO use in Britain – expressly relating to the court process. I distinguished 8 
specific areas of interest for further research and analysis: 
 
1. The consultation process in ASBO applications 
2. The use of evidence  
3. Court procedure (to include interim order and order on conviction 
applications, and the right of appeal) 
4. Defence counsel 
5. Decision-making of judiciary 
6. Antisocial behaviour legislation 
7. The use of ASBOs for children and young people 
8. Improvements to current system and/or court procedure(s) 
 
Hence, the survey schema was informed by the data/document analysis (this will 
be discussed further in the study data analysis – Chapters 5 and 6) and the survey 
questions were subsequently drawn from the 8 defined areas observed as requiring 
further investigation. 
 
Pilot survey 
Before deciding to use a web-based format for the questionnaire, I sent out a 
paper-based pilot survey to 20 potential respondents in England and Wales, who 
had all expressed a possible interest in participating in the research. The solicitors 
had been contacted through the local authority antisocial behaviour co-ordinator, or 
community safety officer. The solicitors provided me with contact addresses and I 
then sent the paper-based survey to the potential respondents and included a 
stamped addressed envelope for ease of return. Follow up/reminder letters were 
sent out to the potential respondents after 3 weeks and reminder emails were sent 
after 5 weeks. A total period of 8 weeks was allowed for completion and return of 
the paper-based surveys. The purpose of the paper-based pilot survey was to 
enable an informed decision to be made on whether to proceed with the paper-
based format after the conclusion of the pilot survey. Moreover, the pilot survey 
would also allow for any comments/suggestions/problems identified with the survey 
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questions or survey structure to be addressed, hence providing an opportunity for 
me to assess and refine the survey design. 
 
Primary analysis of success of pilot survey 
After a period of 8 weeks, I had received only 1 returned questionnaire. I then 
followed up the remaining 19 potential respondents to enquire as to whether they 
would still be interested in participating in the survey. The majority of the feedback 
that I received (12 responses in total) continued to express an interest in 
contributing to the research but asked to be sent an email/web-based version of the 
survey (11 respondents). Some respondents also stated that they had misplaced 
the paper-based survey (3 respondents), while others added that they felt that a 
web-based version would be much more straightforward and less arduous to 
complete (5 respondents). 1 respondent stated that they had not found any spare 
time to complete the survey questionnaire. 
Due to the low response rate for the pilot survey, it was necessary to also 
pre-test the questionnaire with colleagues within my department to try to ensure (as 
far as possible) question relevancy and completeness, and effective survey 
structure. This involved two reviews of my survey by my supervisors, which 
enabled the survey to be further refined with regard to question wording, the 
elimination of questions that lacked relevancy, and also in respect of ensuring that 
confidentially and anonymity concerns were explicitly addressed (c.f. Andrews et 
al., 2003: 26). As such, it should be noted that there was no pilot survey for the 
online survey questionnaire – although the final draft survey questions and schema 
were informed by the one returned paper-based survey questionnaire, and from my 
discussions with my academic colleagues. 
 
Use of online survey software 
In view of the responses gathered from the pilot study, it was decided that an online 
questionnaire would be the most appropriate means to survey (potential) 
respondents. Despite the widespread use of e-technology, the use of online 
questionnaire surveys in the social sciences is, surprisingly, relatively limited 
(Madge, 2006). In my own university department, for example, although online 
software had previously been used (successfully) for another research project 
within the department, there was no longer any software package available for 
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staff/research students to use in formatting web based surveys. The previous 
software package51 then had to be re-ordered from the service providers. 
The limited use of online survey methods within my own university, and the 
social sciences generally, is also surprising given the numerous derivative benefits 
of using online software (Mueller, 1997). For example, online questionnaires enable 
the researcher to contact a wide geographical spread of (potential) respondents, 
which can accommodate both national and international research (ibid.). Moreover, 
online research methods can be used to approach ‘hard to reach’ or isolated 
individuals/groups including those who are disabled, incarcerated, immobile or in 
hospital, as well as those who are ‘socially isolated’ such as the terminally ill, or 
those with addiction problems (Madge, 2006: 5). The nature of online research is 
such that it can also prove to be an economically viable option for researchers and 
can reduce costs attributed to travel and data collection et cetera. The financial 
costs per response in fact reduce significantly as sample size increases (Watt, 
1999). Data is supplied quickly, and in this respect, online research can provide an 
expeditious alternative to paper-based/postal, face to face and telephone surveys 
(Mueller, 1997; Madge, 2006) 
It has been suggested that the limited use of online research methods is 
due, in part, to the perception that a degree of technical expertise is required to 
make use of online software (Madge, 2006: 7). However, as we shall see later in 
this Chapter, the specialised nature of information technology (IT), and the 
sometimes complex and unreliable nature of online software, means that the 
concerns of researchers are, to an extent, justified. 
 
Advantages and disadvantages 
Madge (2006) has developed a detailed set of preliminary guidelines that address 
some of the practical and ethical considerations regarding on-line research, which 
have also been used to frame the following discussion about the present 
investigation. 
 
Response rates and data collection 
As has already been noted, online questionnaires can offer an expeditious 
alternative to traditional survey methods and can allow for a high volume of data to 
be gathered at speed and with reduced expense. Although it can be labour/time 
intensive to format the questionnaire, response times for the return of completed 
                                               
51
 The software package used was ‘Surveymonkey’. The software is discussed further later 
in the chapter 
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questionnaires are usually much faster than for postal surveys. For example, Harris 
(1997, cited in Madge, 2006: 4) reports a return time of 48-72 hours for most 
completed online survey questionnaires. However, researchers must remain 
conscious that a large volume of responses does not necessarily equate to a large 
volume of high quality responses (ibid.). Research has also found that online 
survey participants frequently write longer and more detailed responses than they 
would do on traditional postal surveys (Schaefer and Dillman, 1998; Bachman and 
Elfrink, 1996; Kiesler and Sproull, 1986; Loke and Gilbert, 1995; cited in Andrews 
et al., 2003). 
Online software is also a very useful tool in terms of data collection and 
interpretation. Researchers are able to view their survey results as they are 
collected in real time; amend or update specific questions as necessary; and 
software packages can also calculate percentage response rates for each 
question. It is also possible to download the raw data into Excel or SPSS. This can 
be particularly useful in reducing the time spent on data analysis but it is also 
effective in minimising researcher error in data collection, calculation, entry, 
collation, and coding. There are no problems associated with handwriting 
interpretation, and the software program can return an error message where an 
incorrect or invalid value is entered that requests the respondent to review and 
amend their entry before re-submitting the survey (Madge, 2006: 5). Hence, data 
entry errors are often low with online survey questionnaires. 
 
Cost 
Particularly for large scale surveys, the expense involved in the use of online 
questionnaires can be substantially less than the costs involved in postal surveys 
(Mueller, 1997). For example, expenditure relating to paperwork, telephone, 
postage and printing can all be minimised or perhaps even eliminated altogether. In 
comparison with on site survey questionnaires, no comparable expense would be 
incurred for travel to interview sites; or for hiring/organising an interview venue 
(Madge, 2006: 4). Some online survey software can be obtained for free52 or 
researchers may be able to make use of software available from their 
department/institution/organisation.  
Madge (2006: 4) has observed that financial benefits only accrue to 
researchers (who are using online survey software) with institutional support in 
terms of computer equipment, software literacy training costs, internet connection 
                                               
52
 Although the software used for the purposes of this thesis was obtained at a cost of £300 
per annum to my university department 
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and technical support. However, researchers are only dependent on these factors 
to a certain degree: in the course of my online survey fieldwork, I was reliant only 
upon the use of department online survey software – the other identified factors 
were not applicable. It should also be noted that indirect costs can potentially be 
passed on to respondents in online survey research because, for example, survey 
respondents usually carry the cost of internet connection time which can raise 
ethical issues (ibid.). 
 
Adaptable design 
Online survey questionnaires can be formatted to be as user friendly as possible in 
terms of their appearance, structure and clarity, which can potentially elicit higher 
response rates than onsite surveys (Kaye, 1999). Once respondents have access 
to an online survey, they are instantly able to see how (potentially) simple and 
quick it is to respond. Questions can be multiple choice or open-ended, and 
surveys can be formatted to enable respondents to have the option to add in 
additional information when and where they wish through the use of drop down 
boxes. Questionnaires can be modelled so that respondents are not required to 
answer every question, thus allowing for selected response and ease of survey 
completion (Kaye, 1999; Madge, 2006). 
Online survey questionnaires can be formatted as part of a particular 
website (for example, the website of an organisation/university institution). This can 
allow for potential respondents to find out more about the research subject, the 
researcher(s), and the affiliated institution (Madge, 2006: 4), and it can also help to 
eliminate concerns that a research project may not be legitimate or worthwhile 
(although a lack of survey salience remains a barrier to increased response rates, 
(Sheenan and McMillan, 1999)). Particular software packages also allow for multi-
lingual formats, audio visual stimuli and prompts for when a respondent skips a 
question, which may prove useful in raising a respondent’s motivation to complete 
the questionnaire (Zhang (1999), cited in Madge, 2006: 4). However, although 
visual stimuli can enhance survey presentation, it is important for researchers to be 
mindful that the use of images and animation also increase download time 
therefore possibly affecting response rates (Yun and Trumbo, 2000). 
 
Anonymity   
Online surveys can be designed to be anonymous and software packages - such 
as the one that I used for my survey fieldwork - can ensure that the identities of the 
respondents are not tracked. Although, as with my survey questionnaire, an option 
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can be provided for respondents to leave contact details if they wish to receive 
details on the research findings and outcomes. However, the information provided 
by respondents is held anonymously and it is therefore impossible to trace 
respondent data back to them individually. Harris (1997, cited in Madge, 2006: 5) 
suggests that interviewer bias can be reduced or even removed entirely in online 
surveys when responses are anonymous. Moreover, because the physical 
presence of the researcher is removed during online survey questionnaires, Pealer 
et al. (2001, cited in Madge, 2006: 5) suggest that respondents are more inclined to 
answer socially inauspicious questions when participating in online questionnaires 
as opposed to onsite surveys. In this way, online research can be a ‘great 
equaliser’ (Madge, 2006: 5), whereby the involvement of the researcher is more 
limited, the researcher has less ability to manipulate the research process, and is 
thereby less likely to become a ‘participant researcher’ (ibid.).  
Alternatively, it has been argued that, in the creation of survey 
questionnaires, the agenda(s), bias(es) and epistemic interests of the researcher 
are clearly apparent in the formation of the online questions (Sweet, 2001; cited in 
Madge, 2006: 5). Moreover, the importance of the ability of the researcher to set 
the research agenda, ask specific questions and to gain potential advantage(s) and 
benefit(s) from the research findings is, in effect, largely ignored by the ‘equaliser 
argument’ which does not attempt to discuss the relevance of ‘structural power 
hierarchies’ in the research process (Madge, 2006: 5). Further, McCartney, 
Burchinal and Bub (2006) have argued that bias can be found in many areas of 
quantitative study such as data management, measurement, missing data, growth 
modelling, mediation and moderation and in sampling bias through systematic error 
in measurement or sampling procedures that produces erroneous results. 
 
Access  
As previously mentioned, online survey questionnaires are a particularly useful 
research tool in terms of access to potential respondents who may be physically or 
socially isolated, and is an expedient way to obtain large scale data (Couper, 
2000). Furthermore, because online questionnaires are often quick and easy to 
complete, they can be more favourable to potential respondents than onsite 
surveys which require dates/times/venues to be organised. The use of online 
questionnaires also allowed for a group which was both ‘hard to reach’ and 
traditionally disenfranchised from research processes by virtue of their 
circumstances, to be contacted (ibid.). 
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Sampling 
Online survey questionnaires require, essentially, a pro-active approach to the 
recruitment of potential respondents. Once a questionnaire has been formatted, it 
is necessary to then actively target and approach potential respondents – it is 
ineffective to ‘wait’ for respondents to find a site (Coomber, 1997, cited in Madge, 
2006: 17). Online surveys are increasingly being used as market research tools 
and online users are becoming more aware that they are in fact vicariously bearing 
the cost of being ‘over-surveyed’ (McDonald and Adam, 2003, cited in Madge, 
2006: 17). As a result, online users now increasingly consider pop–ups and 
unsolicited communications to participate in online surveys to be ‘spam’ (Harris, 
1997, cited in Madge, 2006: 17), therefore affecting online survey response rates 
which Witmer et al. (1999) report as being at approximately 10-20% or lower for 
online questionnaires. A variety of factors may affect responses rates, including 
‘ISP access policies, email filtering software, multiple addresses for individuals and 
increasing volumes of email’ (Andrews et al., 2003: 11). 
However, one of the most fundamental problems that has been identified 
with the use of online questionnaires is that there is a lack of an accurate sampling 
frame. For example, there is no means to verify how many users are logging on 
from a particular computer or how many accounts/user names an individual may 
have. This presents serious problems for a study based on the quantitative 
paradigm (Madge, 2006: 17). Moreover, random sampling or gaining a 
representative sample is, in effect, impossible. This is because online surveys pre-
select the users to participate in the questionnaire - through either self-selection or 
non-probability sampling (ibid.). Yet, while self-selection is problematic, it is also 
vital in research studies where marginal groups are the focus of the questionnaire, 
or where the researcher is conducting an interpretive investigation. For example, 
Coomber (1997, cited in Madge, 2006: 17) posits that online self-selection is most 
suitable when researching a particular group of internet users, especially when a 
group shares a common interest but is not otherwise connected (O’Lear, 1996: 
210, cited in Madge, 2006: 17). 
It is not clear, however, to what extent the internet provides a fundamentally 
biased sample population for quantitative studies. The internet, and the use of e-
technology, was at the outset dominated by users who were traditionally young 
white males with relatively high incomes (Sheehan and Hoy, 1999; Madge, 2006), 
and correspondingly, those with lower educational levels, lower incomes, living in 
rural areas, and Black or Hispanic people, were underrepresented (Witte et al., 
2000; cited in Andrews et al., 2003; Mann and Stewart, 2000, cited in Madge, 
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2006). There is also research evidence to suggest that those individuals who 
participate in online surveys tend to be more experienced and confident in their 
internet use, and that they have stronger IT skills, than those who do not (Kehoe 
and Pitkow, 1997; cited in Andrews et al., 2003). With the passage of time, it 
continues to be argued that internet access is still deeply unevenly distributed as 
regards economics, social factors, age and ethnicity (Janelle and Hodge, 2000; 
Warf, 2001; cited in Madge, 2006). However, there is an increasing amount of 
research evidence to suggest that the internet user population is becoming wider 
and more diverse (Dodd, 1998: 63; Litvin and Kar, 2001; Umbach, 2004; cited in 
Madge, 2006: 17), and that the gap between men and women internet users has 
disappeared (Andrews et al., 2003) 
Although it is important to note that, for the purposes of sampling 
procedures in online surveys, it is often not possible to confirm or verify the identity 
of online questionnaire respondents. This is especially relevant to my online survey 
questionnaire in respect of the possibility that multiple solicitors from one local 
authority or police area may have potentially responded to the survey (see below, 
‘target population’). Moreover, Roberts and Parks (2001, cited in Madge, 2006; 18) 
note that some respondents adapt their online identity when answering surveys, or 
they may in fact be ‘spoofs’. 
 
Non response bias 
Non response bias is introduced when respondents who do answer an online 
questionnaire have fundamentally divergent or deeply contrasting attitudes/beliefs 
or demographic characteristics to those who do not respond. This type of bias is of 
particular relevance to online survey questionnaires because the use of internet 
technology is lower among particular groups (for example, pensioners, members of 
some ethnic groups, those with limited financial resources and people with lower 
educational levels (Umbach, 2004)). Non response bias is increased further when 
respondents possess varying levels of IT ability, and this becomes more 
problematic if the survey sample is small. Low response rates can also be a result 
of concerns about internet viruses or identity theft (Madge, 2006: 18). 
 
Survey response rates 
Harris (1997, cited in Madge, 2006: 5) identifies that online survey response rates 
tail off after 10-15 questions, which is directly and negatively linked to questionnaire 
length. Hence, online survey questionnaires may require to be shorter in length 
than those conducted onsite. However, in a comparison of short and long survey 
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questionnaires, the shorter surveys did not produce significantly higher response 
rates than the longer surveys (Witmer, et al., 1999; cited in Andrews et al., 2003: 
12). Moreover, drop out rates for online questionnaires is much more likely than for 
onsite questionnaires (Witmer et al., 1999). A lack of survey salience may be 
prohibitive or off putting to potential respondents (Sheehan and McMillan, 1999; 
Watt, 1999; cited in Andrews et al., 2003) and technical problems can keep 
responses low (Couper, 2000). 
As online questionnaires (or the link to them) can be easily deleted, ignored 
or forgotten about, several reminders may need to be sent to potential 
respondents, and obtaining a reasonable response rate may prove difficult. 
However, Crawford et al. (2001) suggest that a single email reminder can 
potentially double the number of survey respondents. The optimum number of 
contacts described by Schaefer and Dillman (1998) was four, which yielded the 
greatest response rate. Bosnjak and Tuten (2001, cited in Andrews et al., 2003) 
have identified specific categories of survey response type(s) that include: 
 
• Complete responders  
• Unit responders (do not participate) 
• Answering drop-outs  
• Lurkers (view questions but do not respond to any) 
• Lurking drop-outs (partially view survey) 
• Item non-responders (selectively answer some questions and complete 
survey) 
• Item non-responder drop-outs (selectively answer some questions and do 
not complete survey) 
 
 
Technical difficulties 
Due to the great variance in the technical capacities of computers, laptops, 
monitors, browsers and internet connections, online questionnaires that work on a 
high-spec system may be impossible to read on a low-spec system. If 
questionnaires are long, this can increase the probability of a computer crashing. 
As Madge (2006: 33) has observed, reducing the reliance upon complicated 
technical features is important and careful piloting should reduce technical 
difficulties. However, the use of online survey questionnaires does require a certain 
amount of technical knowledge by both the respondent and the researcher. Even if 
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this is present, it still may not be possible to eliminate errors or encountered 
difficulties. 
 
Finding and engaging respondents 
Target population 
For the purposes of this research study survey questionnaire, the target population 
was identified as local authority affiliated solicitors in England and Wales, and in 
Scotland, who were involved in ASBO applications. As the contact details for local 
authority solicitors are not freely available, it was necessary to first approach 
individual local authority antisocial behaviour co-coordinators/community safety 
officers53. Contact details for antisocial behaviour co-coordinators/community safety 
officers were available on local authority web sites and also on the Home Office’s 
‘Together’ website54. I emailed the relevant officers of each local authority directly, 
giving them details about my institution and the research project that I was 
conducting. I then asked if they would consider forwarding an email to their 
solicitor(s) involved in ASBO applications, detailing the nature of the research 
project and providing them with the link to the online survey questionnaire (the 
email letter template is provided in the thesis appendices, as appendix 2). 
In Scotland, there are 32 local authorities and I contacted the antisocial 
behaviour co-coordinator/community safety officer for each authority as detailed 
above. In England and Wales, there are 410 local authorities and I contacted the 
antisocial behaviour co-coordinator/community safety officer for each local 
authority. However, unlike in Scotland, where it is only the local authority or 
Registered Social Landlord (RSL) which acts as the relevant agency for the 
purposes of ASBO applications55, in England and Wales, a relevant authority can 
be a local authority, registered social landlord (RSL) or the police56.  
As I discovered when contacting local authorities, many local authorities in 
England and Wales are not involved as the lead agency in pursuing ASBO 
applications for their area. Instead, ASBO applications are exclusively applied for 
                                               
53
 Part 1 of the Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 places a statutory duty on 
each local authority and relevant chief constable in Scotland to prepare a strategy for 
dealing with antisocial behaviour in the authority's area. Similarly, the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 also places a statutory duty on chief police officers and local authorities in 
England and Wales to work together to develop and implement a strategy for reducing 
crime and disorder, hence individual authorities in both Scotland, and in England and 
Wales, possess antisocial behaviour co-coordinators, community safety officers et cetera, 
for the purposes of their statutory duties in respect of reducing antisocial behaviour, crime, 
and disorder.  
54
 http://www.together.gov.uk 
55
 s. 2 of the Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scot) Act 2004 
56
 s.2 of the Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003 
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by the local police force57. In these instances, the local authority antisocial 
behaviour co-coordinators/community safety officers provided me with contact 
details for the relevant local police officer, who I then contacted with the same 
details about my research and institution as previously detailed. Again, I asked if it 
would be possible for details of the research project and a link to the questionnaire 
to be forwarded to them. 
A number of the larger local authorities (for example, Manchester city 
council) use an external firm of solicitors for their ASBO cases, and do not have an 
affiliated local authority internal solicitor(s) for ASBO applications. In these 
instances, I also followed up contacts provided to me for external solicitors whom I 
approached to see if they would consider taking part in the research project. The 
survey responses also include those from individuals within the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) who were involved in seeking orders on conviction, although this 
accounted for only a very small proportion of potential respondents (2%). In order 
to differentiate between the numbers of responses provided by an internal solicitor 
(specific to one local authority) and the number of responses provided by an 
external solicitor/CPS (who can represent multiple authorities), the survey 
questionnaire asked respondents to identify whether they act in the capacity of 
internal or external counsel. However, it was not possible to determine how many 
solicitors from each local authority had answered the survey questionnaire. It 
should also be acknowledged that, because local authority staff had access to the 
survey URL, they were also potentially able to respond to the survey themselves 
(although it was specifically communicated to them in the email that the survey 
sought responses from solicitors only). 
 
Data limitations 
As previously detailed, Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) are also empowered 
under the relevant legislation58 to make ASBO applications. However, research has 
shown that the number of ASBOs originating directly from RSLs is small. For 
example, in Scotland, 13% of full ASBOs were found to originate from 
RSLs/housing associations/co-ops, (Scottish Executive, 2005: 4.1). Due to the high 
number of RSLs in existence in Scotland (296), and in England and Wales (over 
1,800 in England alone), it was felt that it would not be prudent or expeditious for 
                                               
57
 However, under s. 1E of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the police and local authorities 
must consult each other when applying for orders  
58
 Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003; Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 
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the purposes of this research study to contact RSLs to try to obtain contact details 
for solicitors involved in ASBO applications that they may be pursuing.  
Moreover, no defence solicitors were approached to participate in the 
survey. The decision not to survey defence solicitors was made for two reasons. 
Firstly, in order to legitimately compare the survey responses of prosecution 
solicitors with defence solicitors, broadly similar sized samples would be required. It 
was felt that it would be difficult to obtain the contact details for many defence 
solicitors involved in ASBO cases as these details are not necessarily freely 
available and would involve a level of ‘cold-calling’, which may have been viewed 
as an invasion of privacy (see below, ‘Ethics’). Secondly, another survey would 
have had to have been constructed for defence solicitor participants, and a new 
data set(s) created. Again, it was felt that the time constraints of the study meant 
that this would not be prudent. The study of defence solicitors in ASBO applications 
would, however, be a particularly useful contribution for future research in this area. 
 
Ethics 
In conducting online survey questionnaires, it is essential that the confidentiality 
and privacy of the respondents is guaranteed, and that informed consent is 
obtained. As unsolicited emails can be considered ‘spam’, and because spamming 
can be seen as an invasion of privacy (Umbach, 2004, cited in Madge, 2006: 8), it 
was essential to ensure that the privacy of potential respondents was respected. 
Andrews et al. have observed that email pre-notification and survey follow up 
procedures can be found to invade the individual’s privacy - unsolicited mail from 
researchers can be considered rude and an example of ‘spamming’ (Schillewaert 
et al., 1998; Swoboda et al., 1997; cited in Andrews et al., 2003). The survey 
software was also formatted to safeguard the respondent’s anonymity – the 
identities of the respondents could not be tracked and at no time were respondents 
required to provide personal or identifying information. 
Thus, great care was taken when initiating contacting procedures so that 
the individual solicitors’ privacy was respected. As local authority antisocial 
behaviour co-coordinator/community safety officer contact details were freely 
available, it was, as detailed above, necessary to approach them first to ask if they 
would consider forwarding their internal solicitors an email regarding their possible 
participation in the research. Burgoon et al., (1989) have observed the ways in 
which the prudence of others can protect the privacy of survey respondents by 
allowing potential participants to make an independent evaluation of whether or not 
they wish to participate in the survey. In this way, antisocial behaviour co-ordinators 
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and community safety officers acted as gatekeepers to the solicitors, and access to 
the solicitors was entirely dependent upon whether or not the antisocial behaviour 
co-coordinator/community safety officer was willing to contact the solicitor(s) 
themselves to forward details of the research survey on to them.  
Cho and LaRose (1999, cited in Andrews et al., 2003: 6) have suggested 
that the improved recognition and management of the privacy issues of potential 
respondents by the researcher facilitates an increased willingness in potential 
participants to respond and to disclose information. For the purposes of this 
research survey, the solicitors were not being approached directly by the 
researcher, and it was hoped that they would subsequently feel that their privacy 
was being respected and that they would be more inclined to consider participating 
in the survey. 
All emails to the antisocial behaviour co-coordinators/community safety 
officers were sent directly to a single recipient and more than one address was 
never listed in the ‘to’ or ‘cc’ field. This ensured that the recipient’s anonymity and 
privacy was respected. My own valid email address was listed in the ‘from’ field and 
the ‘subject’ field was listed as ‘ASBO Research Study’, so that recipients were less 
likely to delete the email instantly as ‘spam’. The email did not possess any 
attachments, so recipients would hopefully be less concerned about virus threats. 
The email message was kept as short as possible, but still contained all the 
relevant information which included: the aims of the study, research procedure, 
researcher’s details, institutional affiliation et cetera. The URL for the survey 
questionnaire was included in all emails to the antisocial behaviour co-
coordinators/community safety officers, which would take potential respondents 
directly to the online survey questionnaire. By providing the URL to the antisocial 
behaviour co-coordinators/community safety officers, it was hoped that they could 
simply forward the link on to the relevant solicitor(s) if they considered it to be 
appropriate. 
Hence, once the solicitors had received details of the survey questionnaire, 
they were then able to obtain any further details about the research by asking 
questions and/or providing comments about the research, by contacting either the 
researcher, or the research supervisors - or they could simply follow the URL 
provided that would take them directly to the online questionnaire. If they chose to 
follow the URL, the first page of the survey questionnaire that they were able to 
view gave more details about the research project, and it also ensured that 
informed consent was obtained before they chose to continue to the next page and 
begin the survey questionnaire. In both the email message, and the first page of 
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the survey questionnaire, the anonymity of respondents is guaranteed. The first 
page also explained that participation was entirely voluntary and that respondents 
need not answer every (or any of the) survey questions.  
For the purposes of the ethical considerations emanating from this research 
investigation, informed consent was obtained by designing the on-line survey so 
that the first web page was an information and consent form rather than the first 
section of the survey. The nature of internet research is such that it is not currently 
possible to obtain a written signature on a consent form. Thus, an alternative 
means of obtaining the requisite consent must be sought. In this instance, the 
bottom of the first page of the survey required (potential) respondents to click on an 
on-screen button that enabled them to continue to the first page of the survey, and 
by clicking on this link the participant necessarily implied acceptance of the terms 
of the consent form and proceeded to the first section of the survey. It was also 
important to ensure that potential participants were made aware that their 
participation was entirely voluntary, and that they could choose to ‘quit’ the survey 
at any time. Hence, potential respondents had to first choose to link to the internet 
survey site; they then had to read the information about the research and the 
nature of the online survey questionnaire itself, before deciding to click on the on-
screen button to continue to the survey proper. 
Anonymous participation was fundamentally important and was guaranteed 
to study participants. Participants were not required to provide any identifying 
information as part of the survey proper. However, for those study participants who 
wanted to receive information on the results of the investigation, a separate ‘Thank-
you’ web page was presented at the conclusion of the survey which asked 
participants to provide their e-mail or office address if they wished to receive 
feedback. Contact details for the principal researcher and the research 
supervisor(s) were also provided to respondents to ensure that participants had a 
direct means of contact with the researcher(s) post-participation, should they have 
any immediate concerns or questions.  
 
Survey design 
The online survey software chosen was ‘Surveymonkey’, which is an American 
based online survey provider. The software had previously been used 
(successfully) for another research project within my university department and it 
had been reported that surveys were easy and quick to design, and the collection 
and analysis of responses was also very effective. Using only the web browser, it 
was possible to create a detailed and specific survey instrument. The software 
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enables the researcher to select from over a dozen types of question format (for 
example, single choice, multiple choice, rating scales, drop-down menus, et 
cetera). The software options then allow the researcher to require answers to any 
question, control the flow with custom skip logic, and randomise answer choices to 
eliminate bias. The researcher also has complete control over the colours and 
layout of the survey. 
As Madge (2006: 34) has identified, the presence of a welcome screen for 
online surveys is of paramount importance, in order to make potential respondents 
aware that they have ‘come to the right place’. The welcome screen should provide 
brief details about the research (aims, purpose, et cetera) and it should also 
articulate the importance of respondents’ contributions to the research. It should 
further emphasise that participation is relatively simple and not time-consuming 
(ibid.). Hence, the welcome screen for my online survey questionnaire included a 
short description of the research study; contact address(es) for both myself (as the 
principal researcher) and my supervisor(s) (as the research project supervisor(s)); 
the expected time required to complete the survey questionnaire; and a guarantee 
of anonymity for respondents. 
As we have already observed, the survey was constructed in 8 sections. 
Most of the question formats chosen were multiple-choice. However, respondents 
were provided with additional space to add in extra information where appropriate. 
The last section of survey questions (improvements to the system and/or court 
procedure(s)) was constructed using only open-ended questions. This was to 
enable the maximum volume and range of answers to be collected, which would 
then be collapsed into specific categories within the data analysis. Finally, space 
was available for respondents to leave their contact details should they wish to 
receive details of the research findings. If an email address was provided, the 
identity data was stripped from the main database before analysis began and was 
only accessible via a separate database file. A hard copy template of the full survey 
is provided in the appendices, as appendix 3.  
I found the survey software to be particularly useful in terms of data 
collection and analysis. For example, the researcher can view the survey results as 
they are collected in real-time. It is also possible to securely share the survey 
results with others, while filtering allows the researcher to display only the specific 
responses that they are interested in. Responses can also be downloaded into 
Excel or SPSS. With regard to survey duration, Crawford et al. (2001, cited in 
Madge, 2006: 39) have recommended that online questionnaires should take 
respondents no more than ten minutes to complete – longer questionnaires tend to 
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result in lower participation rates. Madge (2006: 39) for example, has observed that 
respondents to an online survey at the University of Leicester typically took less 
than 13 minutes to answer 119 questions. There are only 75 questions within my 
online research questionnaire. However, it was anticipated that completion of the 
survey would take up to a maximum of 15-20 minutes due to the technical and/or 
complicated nature of some of the questions, and in particular, as a result of the 
open ended questions in the last section (where it was hoped that respondents 
would provide relatively detailed answers which would in turn be more time-
consuming). 
 
Response rates 
The survey was completed by respondents (in all jurisdictions) between January 
and March 2007. In Scotland, of the 32 local authorities approached, I received 18 
survey responses. Some local authorities had one designated internal solicitor 
dealing with ASBO applications (for example, Dundee City Council), while other 
local authorities had a team of solicitors for ASBO applications (for example, 
Edinburgh City Council). Hence, it is not possible to determine whether one 
response is equivalent to one local authority, or if multiple solicitors from one local 
authority have responded to the survey. Nor is it possible to determine which local 
authority solicitors participated in the survey. In England and Wales, of the 410 
local authorities that I approached, I received 137 survey responses. These 
responses include those from police solicitor(s) involved in ASBO applications, 
where the local authority is not involved in ASBO applications for the area. The 
responses also include those from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and from 
external solicitors, although this accounted for a very small proportion of 
respondents (2%). As previously detailed above, defence solicitors or solicitors 
attached to RSLs were not approached to participate in the survey. 
 
Technical problems  
Although the survey software had previously been used (successfully) for another 
research project within my department, I encountered several problems with the 
web-link for the questionnaire when respondents tried to access the survey. Once 
the survey had been uploaded to the website, the software then provided me with a 
link to send to all respondents. I then had to copy and paste the link from the 
website onto an email that I sent to individual respondents. Unfortunately, a 
significant proportion of respondents initially experienced difficulties when trying to 
access the survey via the web link. 
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I contacted the helpdesk for the software provider, and although they 
responded promptly, they could offer no appropriate advice to remedy the problems 
that I was experiencing. In the end, after several days of attempting to resolve the 
problem, I managed to format the web link in such a way that potential respondents 
were then able to access the survey (this involved removing the ‘http://’ in the web 
link address and beginning the web link address only with ‘www’). Enabling 
participant access to the online questionnaire was the principal difficulty that I 
encountered with the survey - which was significant in the respect that, as other 
researchers have observed, it can be an inherently challenging process to engage 
potential respondents to participate in research projects such as this (see, for 
example, Couper, 2000; Andrews et al., 2003; Sheehan and Hoy, 1999; Sheehan 
and McMillan, 1999; Watt, 1999; Keyhole and Pitkow, 1996). Access to the survey 
proved especially problematic when I had been contacted by solicitors who had 
received details of the research project and who were interested in participating in 
the survey, but who were unable to subsequently access the questionnaire. Not 
only did this make the research appear potentially unprofessional but it also meant 
that in order to attempt to rectify the error, I was required to enter into a 
correspondence with the solicitors which drew out the process further, using up 
more of their time and making it less convenient for them as respondents. 
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Semi-structured interviews 
The inherent value of the interview as a method of enquiry, as opposed to, for 
example, the questionnaire, is that interviews can provide a more contextual 
analysis of (a set of) circumstances. Questionnaires may only be able to provide a 
superficial examination of a situation, whereas, particularly semi- or unstructured 
interviews, can elevate the level of detail provided and enable a more descriptive 
account of events. Hence, semi- or unstructured interviews can be more versatile 
and elastic in structure, and can possess a more conversational style. As 
previously discussed, semi-structured interviews also facilitate an immediate 
response to a question, and can potentially empower both the researcher and the 
interviewee to explore the meaning of the questions and the answers and to 
resolve any ambiguities in a propitious, convenient, and even ‘friendly’ manner 
(Gorman and Clayton, 1997: 124). The use of semi-structured interviews allows the 
interviewee the opportunity to explain events from their own perspective, which can 
facilitate a greater understanding and elucidation of process(es) and organisational 
structures. The interview participant may also feel a greater degree of autonomy in 
the interview process through their opportunity to determine elements of the 
interview (such as content, direction et cetera). 
Yet, (semi-structured) interviews are not devoid of associated difficulties. 
There are several fundamental problems inherent in the use of interviews as a 
research tool, which include the time involved in the interview process(es); the 
related costs(s), and; perhaps most significantly, the opportunity presented for the 
influence of personal bias (Gorman and Clayton, 1997: 125). Moreover, interview 
transcripts may not be able to represent the differences between the recorded 
interview dialogue and the interviewee’s de facto opinion(s) on a given subject. 
Burke and Innes (2004: 2) warn, for example, that any published research following 
from an interview ‘is an interpretation of a discussion, an interpretation that cannot 
convey the dynamic of a conversation (including tone, register, accompanying 
gesture and so forth).’  
 
‘Elite’ interviewing 
Odendahl and Shaw (2002: 229) define an ‘elite’ thus: 
 
‘Elites generally have more knowledge, money, status and assume a higher 
position than others in the population. The privileges and responsibilities of 
elites are often not tangible or transparent, making their world difficult to 
penetrate.’ 
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Yet, although elevated economic and social status is often characteristic of an 
‘elite’, they are by no means the exclusive standards of measurement. For 
example, Dexter (1970) suggests a three-fold definition of ‘elite’ interviewing, which 
is based upon the fundamental purpose of the interview, as opposed to the status 
(economic, social, or otherwise) of the interviewee. Dexter ascribes that (1) the 
interviewee’s determination of the situation is of primary importance; (2) the way in 
which the interviewee constructs a narration of the situation being investigated is 
fundamental, and; (3) it is the interviewee, as opposed to the researcher, that 
determines what the issues of relevance are. 
However, as Burke and Innes (2004: 9) observe, Dexter’s definition of ‘elite’ 
is heavily methodologically embedded, and amalgamates a large portion of 
Merton’s theory of the focused interview (1946). The definition of an ‘elite’ is not 
concerned simply with methodology, although it is concerned with (as Dexter 
observes) the intercommunication, reception and transmission of knowledge(s). An 
‘elite’ interviewee is perhaps most easily identified by what they can bring to the 
interview. That is to say that, ‘an elite respondent can communicate information 
that is not available from any other source, from the vantage of his/her personal 
involvement in the source material’ (Burke and Innes, 2004: 9). Within this 
interpretation of ‘elite’, I think that the judiciary – who are the subjects of my semi-
structured interviews - are feasibly defined. 
Goldstein (2002: 669) has suggested that there are essentially three main 
reasons for administering elite interviews: (1) to obtain information from a sample of 
interviewees to facilitate the creation of theorised, general research claims; (2) to 
ascertain a specific piece of information, or to acquire a particular document, and; 
(3) to inform and to accompany research that uses other data sources. For the 
purposes of this investigation, elite interviews are to be placed within a wider 
research methodology that includes data analysis and quantitative research design, 
in order to inform and to elucidate my other research findings. Moreover, elite 
interviewing has been designed with the research purpose as its primary objective 
– the use of elite interviews is underpinned by one of the central aims of the 
research investigation (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 675), that is, an 
examination of the contribution and influence of judicial discretion and decision-
making in ASBO applications in Britain. 
The elite interviews were not conducted until the later stages of the 
research, however. The purpose of the interviews is not to override issues raised 
by alternative sources, but instead to provide another perspective(s). Hence, in 
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conducting the elite interviews once I had compiled and evaluated the data from 
the other sources (‘unobtrusive’ data collection, online survey questionnaires), it 
was hoped that this would allow me to develop the direction of the elite interviews 
in a way that would best serve the research aim(s). Furthermore, I was also able to 
identify specific areas which would benefit from further examination. However, it 
was also necessary to conduct the interviews towards the latter stages of my 
research investigation in order that I was thoroughly familiar with the research 
subject. As Leech (2002: 665) has observed, the importance of preparation for elite 
interviews cannot be underestimated:  
 
‘The danger here is that – especially when dealing with highly educated, 
highly placed respondents – they will feel that they are wasting their time 
with an idiot, or at least will dumb down their answers and subject the 
interviewer to a Politics 101 lecture.’ 
 
Yet, advance preparation is not simply a cursory requirement of manners or 
politeness. As Burke and Innes (2004: 10) rightly observe, preparation also informs 
‘interrogation’. This means that the responses given by the ‘elite’ can be (more) 
fully discussed within the course of the interview when the researcher is privy to, 
and better understands, the issues of salience. Of course a wider and more 
expansive knowledge of a range of issues – not limited to those of ‘apparent’ 
salience to the interviewer – would be better still, and could potentially facilitate the 
discovery of new areas of interest to the research which had previously been 
ignored or not recognised. As Leech argues: ‘what you already know is as 
important as what you want to know’ (2002: 665). Thus, interviews were conducted 
only after I had accumulated a body of detailed knowledge of the research subject, 
and once I had ensured that the interviews matched my research design (Rubin 
and Rubin, 1995: 147). 
 
Designing the interview 
Hence, it was decided that semi-structured interviews would provide a particularly 
useful data set through which to contextualise and to elucidate the research further 
– providing a more rounded and dynamic research structure. In terms of the 
interview schema, ‘elite’ interviewing duplicates the same debate as in other 
interviewing literature (Burke and Innes, 2004: 11) which focuses upon the ability - 
or power - of the interviewer to control the direction of the interview, through 
determining the questions or areas to be discussed, and also the extent to which 
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the interviewee is permitted to establish the line(s) of inquiry. In particular, 
arguments focus upon whether the use of semi-structured or unstructured 
questions is more scientifically valid (ibid.). The use of a semi-structured schema is 
certainly more popular within the sociological discipline nowadays, however, 
Dexter’s original preference had been for the use of an unstructured schema, that 
applies unstructured questions (1970). Dexter’s paradigm of unstructured 
interviewing, affords primacy to the interviewee and restricts the role of the 
interviewer, thus providing a means of enquiry that is inherently limiting in respect 
of researcher bias. 
Yet, Dexter’s paradigm, although seeking a worthy aim, is not necessarily a 
practical proposition. The importance of conducting interviews that are informed by 
the research design is essentially usurped by the importance of eliminating 
interviewer bias. Although Dexter observes that it is the interviewer who is seeking 
instruction, and who is attempting to access the interviewee’s knowledge, the 
relevance of the research aim(s) is secondary. Alternatively, Kvale, for example, 
provides a moderating observation and an acceptance that the interview should be 
determined by the research aim(s) and the research purpose, as well as 
possessing a predisposition towards the primacy of the interviewee (1996: 178, 
cited in Burke and Innes, 2004: 33).  
Hence, as previously discussed, a semi-structured interview schema was 
selected for use in the ‘elite’ interviewing process. A semi-structured interview 
schema allows for specific questions or areas of research interest to be addressed, 
but at the same time allows for a discussion of any areas that may arise which are 
of significance or relevance. This permits both the formal and informal aspects of 
the interview to be sustained, whilst at the same time, the research aim(s) are 
pursued and new lines of enquiry are explored. The formation of interview 
questions in the elite interviewing process differs markedly from the composition of 
questions in traditional research interviews, however. Kvale (1996: 130), for 
example, posits that interview questions should typically be: ‘easy to understand, 
short, and devoid of academic language…The academic research questions need 
to be translated into an easy-going colloquial form to generate spontaneous and 
rich descriptions.’ Alternatively, an elite interview requires that the phraseology 
incorporated into the research questions (and throughout the interview as a whole 
no less) is elevated to a level that will dovetail the status of the elite interviewee. As 
Burke and Innes (2004: 14) observe:  
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‘In published academic interviews both the interviewer and the interviewee 
are designated as “Elite” by virtue of their knowledge, and their qualification 
to take part in the interview is constantly reaffirmed through their informed 
discourse, which is further stressed by their lexical choices. Moreover, the 
act of publication “legitimises” their role as informed interlocutors; thus, it is 
in the interests of both participants to reaffirm their unique qualification 
through thought and language (original emphasis).’ 
 
Hence, while the interview procedure uses a semi-structured format guided by 
specific questions and topics, it was also open-ended in nature to be responsive to 
emergent issues and themes (the interview schema is provided in the appendices, 
as appendix 7). It was important to design the interview schema in such a way as 
to enable the uninterrupted free-flow of information between the researcher and the 
interviewee, and although pre-formatted questions were organised as part of the 
interview schedule proper, they were only introduced where appropriate in order 
not to disrupt the ‘conversational’ style of the interview. Answers were recorded 
clearly on a digital audio recorder. 
 
Gaining access 
Goldstein (2002: 669) argues that gaining access to ‘elites’ is the most 
fundamentally important aspect of the interviewing process; because organisation 
and preparation is worthless if access is not obtained. His advice is specific to three 
categories: (1) geographical; (2) logistical, and; (3) organisational. Goldstein 
advocates that interviewers should be close in proximity to their (potential) ‘elite’ 
interviewees; that interviewers should be logistically prepared thus possessing, for 
example, email and mobile phone contact details and relevant technological 
support (software, interview equipment et cetera); and that researchers should try 
to form good impressions with ‘elites’ so as to establish credibility for future 
potential interviews. 
 Cowan et al. (2006: 548) have identified lower court judges as a ‘hard to 
reach’ group to research due to the existence of the different types of gatekeepers 
determining access arrangements59. I found this to be true for the purposes of my 
research investigation also. Due to the ‘elite’ nature of the potential interview 
                                               
59
 Cowan et al. found that, for the purposes of their research study on District Judges, both 
the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) and the individual courts themselves acted 
as gatekeepers. Researchers were required to negotiate a ‘Privileged Access Agreement’ 
through the DCA with the courts they intended to research - provided that these courts 
agreed (Cowan et al: 548). 
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subjects, I was required to follow specific protocols in order to gain access to the 
judiciary. However, I was only partially successful in obtaining access to the lower 
courts. 
 
Scotland 
To obtain access to Sheriffs (residing in the Sheriffs’ Court) in Scotland, it was 
necessary to write a formal access request letter to the Lord President, and the 
Sheriffs Principal of the 6 Sheriffdoms in Scotland (Grampian, Highland and 
Islands; Tayside, Central and Fife; Lothian and Borders; Glasgow and Strathkelvin; 
North Strathclyde; and South Strathclyde, Dumfries and Galloway)60. Although I 
was granted permission by the Lord President to approach the 6 Sheriffs Principal, 
when I contacted the Sheriffs Principal, they did not all consent to me contacting 
individual Sheriffs to seek their participation in the study. Thus, unfortunately, I was 
not able to interview Sheriffs from all six jurisdictions which would have provided a 
more representative sample of judicial attitudes. However, I was able to obtain 11 
semi-structured interviews with individual Sheriffs from 2 different Sheriffdoms, 
which yielded a significant - and valuable - amount of empirical study data. The 
interviews did not commence until the relevant access approval had been granted 
by both the Lord President and the Sheriffs Principal of the relevant jurisdictions, 
and the consent of the individual Sheriff participant had been obtained61. The 
template access request letter(s) to the Lord President and the Sheriffs Principal is 
provided in the appendices, as appendix 4 and 5 respectively. The consent form for 
interview participants is provided as appendix 6. 
 
England and Wales 
A similar access protocol was followed in order to obtain access to district judges 
and lay magistrates in the lower courts in England and Wales. An access request 
application was made which detailed information on: 
 
• Which courts I planned to work in, and over what period of time; 
                                               
60
 The District Court is the first level of the court hierarchy in Scotland. However district 
courts deal only with summary criminal matters and so are unable to consider ASBO 
applications since ASBOs are civil law remedies. Hence, I did not include the District Courts 
in Scotland in this study. Under s. 19 (2) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, relevant 
authorities apply to the Sheriff Court of their local authority jurisdiction for an application for 
an order. 
61
 The process of requesting, and obtaining, access to the Scottish courts was very efficient 
and did not take longer than 6 weeks to complete 
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• What interviews were planned, and what questions would be asked of 
whom; 
• Who would be involved in the research 
 
The application form was then sent to Her Majesty’s Data Approval Panel for 
consideration. Unfortunately, this process was complex and time consuming. The 
application process took six months, after which time my access request was 
denied by the Senior Presiding Judge on the grounds that it would be inappropriate 
for interviews to be conducted with district judges and magistrates who would be 
asked to comment on the decisions of the higher courts. 
 Gummesson (1991: 21) argues that gaining access to participants is the 
researcher’s single biggest difficulty - which proved to be true in the context of this 
study. Other researchers have found similar difficulties in attempting to access the 
courts - for example, Ashworth et al., were denied access to the judiciary for their 
study of sentencing in the Crown Court (1984), while Hood experienced similar 
difficulties in his study of racial disparity in sentencing (1992). However, it is 
unfortunate that access was denied to the lower courts in England and Wales, 
particularly because there exists so little research on judicial decision-making in 
ASBO applications and so the proposed interviews would have been timely, and 
would, moreover, have contributed significantly to knowledge in this area.  
My denial of access to the courts also has significant impact upon the value 
of the data collected – and how it is to be interpreted and discussed. In presenting 
the interview data, I have used case files and records of judicial decisions to 
compare and contrast the outcomes of cases in England and Wales, with my 
interview data for judicial decision-making in Scotland. However, the data obtained 
from the interviews remains limited in value and is effectively only of use to inform 
understandings of the operation of the law on ASBOs in Scotland. The use of 
reported decisions in England and Wales can act (at best) only to inform the reader 
of developments in the law in other jurisdictions. As such, the interview findings for 
Scotland are not comparable with the other survey jurisdictions but should be read 
as relevant to research on the use of ASBOs as a whole, rather than providing 
parallels with other jurisdictions. 
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Conduct of the interviews 
Kvale (1996:178) has advised that researchers should: 
 
‘Think about how the interviews are to be analysed before they are 
conducted. The method of analysis decided on – or at least considered – 
will then direct the preparation of the interview guide, the interview process, 
and the transcription of the interviews. Every stage in an interview project 
involves decisions that offer both possibilities and constraints in later stages 
of the project.’ 
 
It was necessary to ensure that interviews were recorded to allow for comments to 
be quoted verbatim, and to act as an aide-memoire, enabling the interviewer to 
concentrate upon directing and engaging in the interview process (Gorman and 
Clayton, 1997: 131-5). Tizard and Hughes (1985) recommend the use of notes 
alongside taped interview conversations to enable faster interview analysis and 
dissemination. However, for the purposes of this research investigation, the use of 
a digital audio recorder alone in the interview process proved sufficient. Not only 
could the interview recordings be replayed at speed, but it was also possible to skip 
to relevant quotations/answers instantly. Hence the digital audio recorder was a 
superior and expedient alternative to the conventional tape recorder. 
All interviews took place between April and June 2007, and were conducted 
in Sheriffs’ chambers. I had stipulated to the interview participants in advance that 
the length of the interview would be entirely at their discretion, although I had 
suggested that, if they were able to allocate half an hour of their time, then this 
would be ideal. All interview participants were very generous with their time, and 
the length of the interviews varied from half an hour, to an hour and a half in 
duration. Although it has been argued that the use of digital or tape recorders in the 
interview process can potentially act as a barrier to obtaining detailed information 
which limits the prospects for interviewees to impart sensitive information, and that 
recordings can sometimes be impaired by external noise(s) (Gorman and Clayton, 
1997: 135), these difficulties were not readily apparent in this interview process. 
Indeed, Sheriffs spoke freely, and at length, about many sensitive issues relating to 
the legislation and case law, and several participants also expressed their views on 
policy matters62.  
                                               
62
 Several participants had previously been interviewed by researchers from my University 
for another (unrelated) study. These Sheriffs stated that they had found the previous 
interviews to be a positive experience, and that their anonymity had been respected in 
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Ethics 
As with the ethical considerations of the online survey questionnaire, informed 
consent for the purposes of the semi-structured interviews imparted the potential 
interviewee with information about the research project (aims, purpose et cetera); 
the researcher and researcher’s institution; the potential risks and benefits of 
participation; the voluntary nature of their participation; a guarantee of anonymity; 
and details about the interview procedure itself. This information was contained in 
all introductory letters to sheriffs, and it was again included within the consent form 
that was presented to the interviewees at the time of the interview. Interviewees 
were required to provide written consent by signing the consent form prior to the 
interview beginning. Participants were also given a copy of the consent form for 
their own reference (as stipulated above, the consent form is provided as appendix 
6). The anonymity of interview participants was protected using the following 
methods: (a) all identifying information was removed from the interview after it had 
been transcribed, (b) quotations to be used for publication (in this thesis, or in any 
other documents) were framed in such a way that the individual’s identify is hidden, 
and (c) coding (for example, s.1, s.2) was used where necessary.  
 
Data limitations 
Despite the interviews being recorded verbatim on the digital audio recorder, it is 
important to be mindful of the limitations of the resulting published interview quotes. 
Written transcripts of interviews provide an imperfect narrative account of how the 
interviews took place in reality (Burke and Innes, 2004: 15). For example, the 
published interview transcript of an academic interview will always be an amended 
or edited version of the actual interview. The published text appears verbatim, 
without being able to illustrate hesitation, repetition, digression et cetera, and is 
‘decontextualised’ from the interview situation (Kvale, 1996: 165). Moreover, the 
physical interpretation of words; the emotion invested in words (Burke and Innes, 
2004: 16) and; the relevance of the verbose in shaping meaning, is essentially cut 
out from the interview transcript. Hence, caution must be exercised in the 
interpretation of meanings derived from interview transcripts and transcript quotes.  
 Moreover, the limitations of the semi-structured interviews as a method of 
data production also include small sample size (which was limited to sentencers in 
                                                                                                                                   
resulting research documents. Hence, it is suggested that, as a result, these participants 
were comfortable participating in further studies involving researchers from the same 
University, and thus were perhaps more willing to give full and frank answers because there 
was a level of trust in the research conducted on behalf of my University institution. 
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the Scottish courts) and possible selection bias. Selection bias may have occurred 
as a result of Sheriffs with negative experiences of, and attitudes towards, the use 
of antisocial behaviour orders being more inclined to agree to be interviewed. 
However, as the research findings identify63, the interview participants 
demonstrated a range of experience(s) of, and attitudes to, the use of ASBOs in 
Scotland. Moreover, the primary purpose of the semi-structured interviews was not 
to arrive at robust findings and generalisations about judicial decision-making in 
ASBO cases, but to present findings of qualitative research that can be generalised 
to theory, rather than to populations64. As a result, the interview findings do provide 
valuable information about the observations and experiences of Sheriffs involved in 
ASBO applications in Scotland. 
 
Data analysis 
As we have seen, the nature of this research investigation is such that it makes use 
of a multi-method approach to data collection. Correspondingly, more than one 
method of data analysis will be deployed in the study of the derivative information 
acquired from these processes of enquiry. Atkinson (1993: 213) observes that 
‘many a conventional tool of social analysis can be plundered to good effect’, and 
thus it is prudent to appreciate that ‘all technologies come burdened with their 
original purpose and, indeed, the ghost of the context which created them.’ Hence, 
the data analysis methodology employed within this research study will be 
underpinned by a fundamental understanding of its utility within the research 
context, but also by an appreciation of the potential for methodologies to create 
‘false realities’ based upon an ‘interpretation’ of recovered research data which has 
the capability to present a simplified, generalised and/or unrealistic representation 
of ‘reality’. 
 
Online survey questionnaire 
Due to the large number of responses that were received for the online survey 
questionnaire, a precursor to the data analysis was that this information should be 
collectively coded, entered and checked. As previously discussed, one of the main 
benefits of the online survey software (Surveymonkey) was that it enables the 
researcher to download the raw data into statistical analysis packages, allowing the 
coding and formatting of the retrieved information. 
                                               
63
 See Chapter 6 
64
 See Chapter 7 
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The questionnaire (appendix 2) was split into eight sections and the raw 
survey data was subsequently downloaded from the online survey website where 
responses had been collected, and then the software package SPSS version 14.0 
was used for the survey data analysis. SPSS was chosen for the data analysis 
because the software was specifically designed to enable the recoding and 
transforming of data; data management; and large-scale data analysis. In 
particular, the ‘data editor’ tool was found to be a very useful feature of the 
software, which enabled data to be made immediately visible, and accessible for 
editing. The imported data was then held in data tables where each row 
represented a specific respondent and their data, and where each column 
represented a specific data variable. Each variable possessed a unique title and a 
specific level of measurement (nominal, ordinal and scale). The measurement level 
of each variable then determined the type of analysis that was undertaken. The 
next chapter (5) discusses the survey data in respect of specific data variables, and 
the way(s) in which the data sets obtained have been used to inform the central 
research study question. 
 
Interview data 
The coding of data is of fundamental importance to qualitative research primarily 
because coding necessarily substantively influences data interpretation and 
analysis. Flick (1998: 179-80) has developed a concept of ‘open coding’ whereby 
different categories are coded at varying degrees such as ‘word’, ‘sentence’, 
‘paragraph’ et cetera. The formulation of theories is then achieved through an 
analysis of the inter-relationship(s) between the codes (p. 185). This method of 
‘open coding’ was applied to the transcribed interview data. Interview transcripts 
were stored as a Word format and then read through to identify salient themes. The 
database on Word contained all the transcripts of the interview questions and 
answers. Each question and its transcribed answer formed one individual file65.  
After the initial reading of the transcripts, a significant number of key themes 
could be readily identified. The extracted themes were composed of issues arising 
from the interview data itself, but also from concepts and issues simultaneously 
arising in the survey questionnaire data. These themes were then used to form 
                                               
65
 Each file also contained separate searchable fields for: a unique reference number; 
category of question; notes on the interview schedule; court name; and date of interview 
 
 
 125 
coding trees in the qualitative software package NVivo 7 (upgraded version of 
NUD*IST 6). The categories generated are listed below:  
 
• ASBO prohibitions 
• Evidentiary requirements and the burden of proof 
• Criminal behaviour 
• Interim orders 
• Orders on conviction 
• Defending ASBO action 
• Mitigating factors 
• Breach proceedings 
• ASBOs, young people and children 
• The political climate 
 
The software package NVivo 7 was selected to facilitate analysis of the data 
collected primarily because the software is specifically designed for use with textual 
documents; it facilitates the indexing of components of transcripts; and it enables 
data theorising, including the exploration of trends and the building and testing of 
theories. Moreover, NVivo 7 has a highly efficient search engine which enabled me 
to search for words and phrases at speed, and I was also able to insert additional 
key themes into the index coding as they arose. Overall, I found the software easy 
to obtain and to use. Once the data had been coded into specific themes, I was 
then able to view each specific theme and its relevant data, and in turn cross-
reference the data with other data nodes. I then analysed and evaluated each 
theme in turn.  
However, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that ‘coding’ 
can fracture data. For example, Catterall and Maclaran (1996) have identified that 
process elements in qualitative data may be removed by coding. Thus, when using 
computer programs for qualitative data analysis, attention must be paid to the 
contextual nature of the coded data, and its original place within the wider interview 
data structure. Hence, it was important that I carried out my data analysis whilst 
also working with the complete interview transcripts as off-screen documents. 
Coding provided a way into, or a way of understanding, the qualitative data 
produced and acted as a method of simplifying complexity, organising data, and 
building an account of judicial decision-making in ASBO applications. Indeed, 
coding operated to render more visible and understandable the complex nature of 
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judicial decision-making, within the wider sphere of legal administrative processes, 
which will be discussed in the subsequent data analysis chapters (Chapters 5 and 
6). 
 
Conclusion 
The mixed methodology approach of this research investigation is designed both to 
deepen and to widen understanding(s) of the ways in which the dimensions of due 
process and legal primacy; and juridical power and discretion intersect to shape the 
management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. One method of enquiry is not 
advanced as more authoritative or legitimate than the other modes of enquiry. 
Instead, the key purpose of this chosen methodology is to enable the comparison 
of data derived from different sources to be examined in the hope that it will provide 
a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the administration of antisocial 
behaviour orders in Britain.  
However, as Burke and Innes (2004: 19) have argued: individual methods 
of enquiry are not ‘only validated when equally corroborative subjective data is 
forthcoming from another source’. Rather, they have merit on their own operative 
basis. Hence, the modes of enquiry that I have chosen in fact have value in and of 
themselves as data sources. Although it is propitious, for the purposes of the 
research investigation, to seek to compare and to contrast the information and 
perspectives acquired from the different modes of enquiry, the validity of the data is 
not conditional upon agreement of the collective sources. A dependence upon the 
concurrence of information could result in ‘tyranny by the lowest possible 
denominator: that an interpretation is only reliable when it can be followed by 
everyone, a criterion that could lead to trivialization of the interpretations’ (Kvale, 
1996: 181). Alternatively, it is the purpose of the methodology in this investigation 
to balance the strengths of quantitative and qualitative modes of enquiry 
(Sudweeks and Simoff, 1999) to produce a range of comprehensive (but non-
exhaustive) data sets that will inform understanding(s) of to what extent legal 
procedure(s) and judicial discretion influence the administration, management and 
outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. 
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Chapter Five 
Solicitors’ Experiences and Observations of ASBO Procedure 
 
Introduction 
As I have discussed in earlier chapters, no empirical research studies have 
previously sought to specifically examine or to explore current ASBO legal and 
court process(es). Moreover, there have also been no comparative studies in 
existence that have identified differences/similarities between the ASBO application 
procedure in England and Wales, and in Scotland. With this in mind, the online 
survey questionnaire sought to explore solicitors’ experiences of court and legal 
process(es) in ASBO applications in order to better understand to what extent legal 
procedure(s) and judicial discretion influence the administration, management and 
outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. From the survey data collected, eight specific 
emergent themes were identified: civil procedure and the standard of proof; 
evidence gathering and case management; the judiciary; defence counsel; orders 
granted on conviction (CRASBOs); children and ASBOs; appeal; and breach 
proceedings. The findings are discussed in turn, below.  
 
Data limitations and the presentation of findings 
As previously discussed in the methodology chapter, the value of the research 
study data is constrained by both the low number of solicitors in Scotland who 
participated in the online survey, and by the denial of access to the courts in 
England and Wales. Consequently, the best evidence from England and Wales is 
in respect of the online survey of solicitors, and the best evidence from Scotland is 
in respect of the interviews with the sentencers. While I have still included (in this 
chapter and the next) the data obtained from solicitors in Scotland who participated 
in the survey and also the reported judgements of sentencers in England and 
Wales that were obtained from case files, it is important to underline that the value 
of this data is limited given the low number of participants in the online survey 
(Scotland) and the denial of access to the courts (England and Wales). Moreover, 
the findings in respect of solicitors’ responses to the survey (in England and Wales, 
and Scotland) detailed in this chapter are not presented as substantively 
comparable with the other survey jurisdictions - nor should they be interpreted as 
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providing such a comparative link66. Instead, it is suggested that data derived from 
each jurisdiction is relevant to research on the use of ASBOs as a whole, rather 
than providing parallels with other jurisdictions. 
 
Civil procedure and the standard of proof 
Although ASBO proceedings are civil in both Scotland, and in England and Wales, 
the standard of proof in ASBO applications is lower in the Scottish courts. Hence, 
the empirical data obtained for this section is set out in two parts. The first section 
will discuss findings from England and Wales, and the second part will discuss 
findings from Scotland. 
 
England and Wales 
The civil nature of the ASBO process means that civil rules of evidence apply, 
including the use of hearsay and professional witness evidence. However, although 
the application for an ASBO is a civil process, the consequences of the breach of 
an order are criminal. This, in turn, has implications for the burden of proof in ASBO 
cases: ASBO proceedings are subsequently regarded as quasi-criminal in nature. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in the House of Lords case R (McCann) v Manchester 
Crown Court [2002] All ER 593, their lordships made ASBO applications an 
exception from the normal standard of proof in civil proceedings (on the balance of 
probabilities) and ruled that the heightened civil standard, equivalent to the criminal 
standard, was to apply. It was held that an individual must be shown to have 
perpetrated behaviour that is antisocial, and that such an order must be ‘necessary’ 
to protect persons from harassment, alarm or distress. The question of ‘necessity’ 
is, however, one for the exercise of the judge’s individual evaluation and discretion 
- without a standard of proof as such. In considering the burden of proof in interim 
order applications Kennedy LJ explained in R (Manchester City Council) v 
Manchester City Magistrates’ Court [2005] EWHC 253 (Admin), that: ‘The test to be 
adopted by a magistrates’ court when deciding whether or not to make an interim 
order must be the statutory test: whether it is just to make the order.’ Similarly, in 
the leading case of R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395, it was held that no 
prohibition may be imposed in the order unless it was ‘necessary’ for the purpose 
of protecting persons from further acts of antisocial behaviour by the defendant.  
                                               
66
 That is to say evidence of, for example, witness intimidation in cases in England and 
Wales should not be interpreted as equivalent to data presented on witness intimidation in 
cases in Scotland. 
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It has been argued that the ‘amalgamation’ of elements of the civil and 
criminal law within the relevant antisocial behaviour legislation has effectively 
blurred the ’fundamental boundary’ between the civil and criminal law (Burney, 
2002: 483). However, the quasi-criminal nature of ASBO proceedings (in the 
respect that proceedings are civil, with civil rules of evidence, and a criminal 
standard of proof applies) is not necessarily problematic in and of itself67, but it 
must certainly be examined in terms of the effective operation of the relevant 
legislation, and arguments about the civil law status of ASBO procedure(s) should, 
at least in part, be investigated from a functionary perspective. In this respect, the 
‘hybrid’ of civil and criminal procedure appears to have generated a degree of 
confusion68 and practical difficulty within the court process in ASBO applications, as 
demonstrated by the survey responses. Figure 5.1 shows the number of 
respondents who found the quasi-criminal nature of ASBO proceedings, and the 
corresponding civil rules of evidence, to be ‘problematic’. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Civil rules of evidence (England and Wales) 
 
Do you think that it is problematic that civil rules of evidence are used 
in ASBO cases when (the equivalent of) a criminal standard of proof 
applies? 
 
    Response  Response  
    Percent Total 
Yes    24.6   31 
No    65.0   82 
Other (please specify) 10.3   13 
    
 Total Respondents   126 
 Skipped Question     11 
 
 
Hence, nearly a quarter (24%) of solicitors in England and Wales who responded to 
this part of the survey questionnaire cited difficulties relating to court procedure in 
ASBO applications. Additionally, of the 13 who responded ‘other’, 9 stated that they 
                                               
67
 This legal position is not unique to ASBOs. For example, see restraining orders (under 
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s.3) and sex offender orders (under the Sex 
Offenders Act 2003 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. s.2). The effect of the nature of 
the proceedings being regarded as ‘civil’ will be considered more fully in the course of this 
chapter 
68
 Indeed, in her research on ASBOs, Campbell (2002: 49) confused the ‘civil’ nature of the 
orders with a ‘civil burden of proof’. She cites McCann as settling the issue on the burden of 
proof required – although she misunderstands that it is the heightened civil standard, and 
not the traditional civil standard (‘on the balance of probabilities’), that applies. 
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‘sometimes’ or ‘occasionally’ found it to be problematic. The questionnaire then 
asked those respondents who had experienced difficulties to explain why they had 
found this area to be problematic. From the responses obtained, the specific 
problems encountered could be collapsed into five categories, detailed in Figure 
5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Area(s) of difficulty (England and Wales) 
 
 
Problem Identified 
 
 
Response Total 
 
Magistrates’ Court 
Procedure 
 
 
10 
 
Lack of guidance for 
interim ASBOs 
 
2 
 
Burden of Proof in 
County Courts 
 
4 
 
Confusion about 
‘necessity test’ 
 
4 
 
Frustration about 
limited use of County 
Court 
 
 
11 
 
Total Respondents 
 
 
31 
 
Skipped Question 
 
 
0 
 
 
Respondents cited magistrates’ court procedure; a lack of guidance on the level of 
evidence required for interim ASBOs; confusion regarding the ‘necessity test’; 
difficulties relating to the burden of proof in the county courts (due to the two 
different standards of proof that they were required to meet – the standard of proof 
for the ASBO and the standard of proof for the action that the order is ancillary to); 
and, a frustration that the majority of ASBO cases could only be heard in the 
magistrates’ court. When asked about possible improvements that could be made 
to current legal and court process(es) in ASBO cases, the majority of solicitors 
(62%) cited the use of the County Court for (stand alone) ASBO applications as a 
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major improvement that could be made to the existing court procedure for ASBOs. 
It was suggested that because ASBOs are akin in many ways to antisocial 
behaviour injunctions (ASBIs)69, County Court District Judges and Officers would 
be more able to process such cases expeditiously (unless the order is made on the 
back of a conviction). Moreover, many respondents found the Magistrates' Court 
process cumbersome when compared with that of the County Court. It was 
suggested that the use of the County Courts would benefit Applicants and 
Defendants if proceedings for stand alone ASBOs were made in the County Court.  
However, a large number of respondents (65%) did not find it problematic 
that civil rules of evidence are used in ASBO cases when (the equivalent of) a 
criminal standard of proof applies. The questionnaire asked those respondents who 
did not find civil rules of evidence problematic, to explain why. Figure 5.3 shows the 
responses obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
69
 ASBIs are also civil orders, designed to prevent and to control antisocial behaviour. 
Obtained in the County Court, an ASBI can compel a person over the age of 18 to do 
something and/or prevent a particular type of behaviour/action. Breach of an ASBI remains 
a civil court procedure however, and the court can impose a fine or a period of 
imprisonment. Using their powers under s222 of the Local Government Act 1972, local 
authorities can apply to the civil courts for injunctions to restrain antisocial behaviour that 
constitutes a public nuisance. 
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Figure 5.3: Why civil rules of evidence are unproblematic (England and Wales) 
 
 
Reason Given 
 
 
Response Percent 
 
Response Total 
 
Enables use of 
hearsay  
evidence 
 
 
85.0 
 
68 
 
Civil rules of evidence 
are easier than 
criminal rules 
 
 
3.7 
 
3 
 
Criminal rules of 
evidence too 
restrictive 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
7 
 
ASBOs are civil orders 
so corresponding 
rules should apply 
 
 
2.5 
 
2 
  
Total Respondents 
 
 
80 
  
Skipped Question 
 
 
2 
 
The predominant reason given by solicitors for why they found civil rules to be 
unproblematic (given the equivalent of a criminal standard of proof) was the 
importance specifically attached to the use of hearsay evidence in ASBO 
applications. Solicitors who supported the use of civil rules of evidence in ASBO 
applications, described the use of hearsay evidence as ‘vital’ and ‘crucial’ in the 
ASBO process, primarily with regard to protecting vulnerable witnesses who would 
not otherwise testify in court for fear of reprisals. For instance, 68% of respondents 
in England and Wales reported obtaining interim ASBOs based only on hearsay 
evidence and 22% of solicitors had also been able to obtain a full ASBO in this way 
(see below, Figure 5.4). It is important to note, however, that there is no statutory 
requirement that evidence should be led at the interim stage and there is no explicit 
provision for any representations to be made by or on behalf of the respondent 
 133 
before an interim ASBO is granted, although the Court can consider any such 
representations as it sees fit70.  
In terms of the type of evidence most frequently used for interim/ASBO 
applications, in interim order applications in England and Wales, hearsay was used 
‘frequently’ (46%) or ‘always’ (30%), video evidence was used ‘rarely’ (61%), 
photographic evidence was used ‘sometimes’ (46%) or ‘rarely’ (36%), PNC or 
intelligence printouts were used ‘always’ (51%) or ‘frequently’ (28%), incident 
diaries were used ‘always’ (28%) or ‘frequently’ (50%), non professional witness 
evidence was used ‘frequently’ (43%) or ‘sometimes’ (28%), and professional 
witness evidence was used ‘always’ (46%) or ‘frequently’ (22%). In full ASBO 
applications in England and Wales, hearsay was used ‘frequently’ (54%) or ‘always’ 
(24%), video evidence was used ‘sometimes’ (25%) or ‘rarely’ (59%), photographic 
evidence was used ‘sometimes’ (55%) or ‘rarely’ (21%), PNC and intelligence 
printouts were used ‘always’ (56%) or ‘frequently’ (24%), incident diaries were used 
‘always’ (24%) or ‘frequently’ (53%), non-professional witnesses were used 
‘frequently’ (52%) or ‘sometimes’ (25%), and professional witness evidence was 
used ‘always’ (51%) or ‘frequently’ (22%). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The use of hearsay evidence (England and Wales) 
 
(i) How often are you successful in obtaining an interim ASBO 
based only on hearsay evidence? 
 
     Response Response 
     Percent Total 
Always   25.8   31  
Frequently   31.6   38 
Sometimes    8.3   10 
Rarely     2.5    3 
Never    12.5   15 
Other (please specify) 17.5   21 
 
  Total Respondents   120 
  Skipped Question    17 
 
 
                                               
70
 In Scotland, if the initial writ has been served (for an interim order), the Sheriff may 
dispense with intimation of the motion for the interim ASBO and grant it without hearing the 
defender. Similarly, in England and Wales, an interim order may be granted ex parte, 
without intimation to the defender, and without any defence(s) having been lodged or 
presented in court. The implications of ex parte applications will be considered more fully in 
the course of this thesis (see Chapter 7). 
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(ii) Have you ever successfully obtained a full ASBO based only on 
hearsay evidence? 
 
     Response  Response 
     Percent Total 
Yes    22.5   25 
No    77.4   86 
    
Total Respondents   111 
  Skipped Question    26 
 
 
 
Respondents who had been successful in obtaining a ‘full’ ASBO based only on 
hearsay evidence were then asked to identify, in an open-ended question, how 
many times that they had obtained an ASBO in this way. Responses from these 
respondents have been collapsed into 4 categories, shown in figure 5.5, below. 
 
 
Figure 5.5  How often respondents have successfully obtained a full ASBO based 
only on hearsay evidence (England and Wales) 
 
 
Reason Given 
 
 
Response Total 
 
Once 
 
3 
 
Twice 
 
4 
 
3-6 occasions 
 
3 
 
7-12 occasions 
 
3 
 
More than a dozen 
times 
 
8 
 
Total Respondents 
 
 
21 
 
Skipped Question 
 
 
1 
 135 
The above set(s) of findings potentially raise questions about the legitimacy of legal 
action following breach of an order obtained solely on the basis of hearsay 
evidence71. Although it was observed in the English case of R (Keating) v Knowsley 
Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] EWHC 1933 (Admin), that, where a court is 
concerned with interim proceedings, it must bear in mind that no findings of fact 
have been made, that any allegations have not been proved, and that the 
defendant has had no opportunity to challenge the allegations, solicitors in both 
Scotland, and in England and Wales, argued that, where an interim order has been 
granted on the basis of hearsay evidence and the defendant is subsequently 
arrested for breaching the order, the breach should not carry criminal sanctions. 
One solicitor described their opposition to criminal sanctions for interim orders thus: 
 
I feel that it is highly unfair that an interim ASBO can be granted without the 
need for any evidence to be led and then that an interim ASBO can lead to 
a criminal conviction. The government is wanting its cake and eating it. 
They say the interim ASBO can be granted without the need for evidence 
because it is a civil order designed as a deterrent, but then people are being 
arrested for breaching an order, the validity of which has never been tested 
in court. I do not feel interim ASBOs should carry criminal sanctions, it is 
oppressive. 
 
Scotland 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, although the House of Lords had previously 
set out the law on the standard or proof in respect of ASBO applications in 
McCann, the position was not binding in Scotland. Therefore, Scottish courts were 
not obliged to follow the House of Lords judgement. In effect, this appears to have 
created uncertainty and confusion among the legal profession as to the appropriate 
standard of proof required in ASBO cases. Existing case law in Scotland is limited 
to essentially three principal cases: Glasgow Housing Association Ltd v O’Donnell 
(2004) GWD 29-604; Glasgow Housing Association Ltd v Sharkey (2004) HousLR 
130; and Aberdeen City Council v Fergus (2006) GWD 36-727 (for a discussion of 
these cases, see Chapter 3). 
Although these cases appear to set out the law on the criteria that requires 
to be satisfied in interim/ASBO applications, they are not definitive on whether the 
                                               
71
 It was noted, however, in the course of the semi-structured interviews (see Chapter 6) 
that the Inner House in the Court of Session in Scotland is currently considering a case on 
this matter. 
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requisite standard of proof is necessarily a civil or criminal one. Consequently, over 
half (10 out of 18) of the survey respondents in Scotland stated that they were not 
clear on what the appropriate standard of proof was in ASBO and interim ASBO 
cases. Participants cited the standard of proof as being particularly problematic for 
them because of (1) the existence of conflicting cases suggesting different 
standards of proof, and (2) what they observed to be a lack of case law and 
definitive legal precedent in this area.  
Hence, the difficulty in ascertaining the standard of proof in interim and 
ASBO applications (particularly with regard to Scottish cases); and the speed at 
which case law on evidentiary requirements, terms and breaches moves in each 
jurisdiction, would suggest that, to ensure - amongst other things - that consistency 
of approach and practice in the administration of the relevant legislation is 
achieved, further guidance is required. Survey respondents (in England and Wales 
and in Scotland) proposed that improved consistency in the ASBO process could 
be achieved by either the production of formal guidance reports (Practice Notes), 
and/or the formulation of regular information up-dates on case law et cetera for the 
legal profession (to include court staff and the judiciary). It was suggested by 
solicitors from all jurisdictions, that this would be highly advantageous and would 
enable good practice to be established with regard to the relevant legal and court 
processes in ASBO applications. 
 
Evidence gathering and case management 
As previously noted, survey respondents in all jurisdictions described the difficulties 
that they had experienced in the evidence gathering process, particularly with 
regard to obtaining testimony from witnesses vulnerable to intimidation or acts of 
retribution. In England and Wales, 71% of respondents had experienced problems 
in securing witnesses, of which 95% identified this as directly attributable to witness 
‘fear of reprisals’ (see figure 5.6, below). 
 
In Scotland, 15 out of 18 survey participants had difficulty in obtaining witnesses for 
ASBO applications, of which 13 of those respondents identified ‘fear of reprisals’ as 
effecting their ability to obtain witness testimony (see figure 5.7, below).  
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Figure 5.6: Difficulties securing witnesses (England and Wales) 
 
(i) Have you ever experienced difficulties in securing witnesses for ASBO 
cases? 
 
     Response Response 
     Rate  Total 
Yes    71.7  94 
 No     21.3  28 
Other (please specify) 6.8   9 
   
Total Respondents   131 
 Skipped Question     6 
 
 
 
(ii) If you have experienced difficulties securing witnesses, with what 
proportion of cases? 
  
      Response  Response 
      Percent  Total 
 All cases    4.3    4 
 The majority of cases  24.7   23 
 About half of all cases  22.5   21 
 Less than half of all cases  24.7   23 
 A very small proportion of cases 23.6   22 
 
Total Respondents   93 
   Skipped Question    1 
 
 
 
(iii) If you have experienced difficulties securing witnesses, was this as a 
result of (you may select more than one option): 
 
      Response  Response  
      Percent  Total 
 
 Witness intimidation  53.7   50 
 Fear of reprisals   95.6   89 
 Unreliable witness(es)  27.9   26 
 Witness unobtainable  16.1   15 
 Witness memory decay  6.4    6 
 Other     6.4    6 
 
Total Respondents   93 
    Skipped Question   1 
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Figure 5.7: Difficulties securing witnesses (Scotland) 
 
(i) Have you ever experienced difficulties in securing witnesses for ASBO 
cases? 
 
        Response 
        Total 
Yes           15 
 No               3 
Other (please specify)           0 
   
Total Respondents       18 
  Skipped Question          0 
 
 
 
(ii) If you have experienced difficulties securing witnesses, with what 
proportion of cases? 
 
  
        Response 
        Total 
 All cases        2 
 The majority of cases      2 
 About half of all cases      5 
 Less than half of all cases      3 
 A very small proportion of cases     2 
 
Total Respondents  14 
    Skipped Question    1 
 
 
(iii) If you have experienced difficulties securing witnesses, was this as a 
result of (you may select more than one option): 
 
        Response  
        Total 
 
 Witness Intimidation      4 
 Fear of reprisals     13 
 Unreliable witness(es)      8 
 Witness unobtainable      2 
 Witness memory decay      2 
 Other          1 
     
Total Respondents  14 
    Skipped Question    0 
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Although the use of civil rules of evidence was designed to enable the use of 
hearsay and professional witness evidence to protect vulnerable witnesses, it 
appears from the survey findings that the use of civil procedure has not produced 
the intended result and that some witnesses continue to suffer intimidation and 
retribution (before, during, and after) the court process. Throughout the 
questionnaire, it was noted that survey participants in England and Wales identified 
a range of problematic areas in the use of witnesses which have been condensed 
into 5 categories, shown in Figure 5.8, below. 
 
Figure 5.8: Problems related to the use of witnesses (England and Wales) 
 
 
Problem Identified 
 
Number of respondents citing 
this problem  
 
 
Lack of witness  
support services 
 
 
42 (30.6%) 
 
Lack of recompense 
for attending court 
 
 
 
8 (5.8%) 
 
No court transport 
 
 
5 (3.6%) 
 
Automatic right of 
appeal 
 
 
 
32 (23.3%) 
 
 
Respondents in England and Wales cited a paucity of witness support services; a 
lack of recompense for attending court; no court transport; and the existence of the 
automatic right of appeal72, which meant that witnesses may have to attend the 
initial application and then an appeal hearing. One respondent described their 
experience of resident witnesses in ASBO applications thus: 
 
 
 
 
                                               
72
 By virtue of s. 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, appeal is by way of full rehearing 
as per s. 79(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The relevant legislation for the purposes of 
appeal in Scotland is s. 5 the Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scot) Act 2004 
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It was obviously a worrying time for them. A number of them had to take 
unpaid leave to attend the initial application and then appeal hearings. It 
was impossible to explain [to the witnesses] that the defendants had an 
automatic right of appeal and that they would need to go through the 
horrendous experience again – especially when the defence barrister was 
overly aggressive in his cross-examination73. In their position, I would not 
have agreed to be a witness!74 
 
Furthermore, fifty-nine survey respondents (43%) in England and Wales described 
the ‘urgent’ need for the introduction of case management powers for ASBO 
applications. A lack of interagency consultation and co-operation; inconsistent 
attitudes towards information sharing; the presence of inexperienced evidence 
gatherers; the defence rarely serving evidence before trial; vague hearing dates; 
and, a disjointed framework for the ASBO process with different procedures in 
different courts, were all contributing factors that respondents argued necessitated 
the creation of powers to enable the courts to apply rigorous case management to 
ASBO proceedings, see figure 5.9, below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
73
 Campbell (2002) had previously identified the sometimes adversarial nature of defence 
counsel in ASBO cases. This will be discussed further in Defence Counsel, see below. 
74
 Quote taken from the England and Wales survey 
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Figure 5.9: Reasons for the introduction of case management powers (England and 
Wales) 
 
 
Reason Given 
 
 
Number of 
respondents citing 
this problem  
 
Lack of inter-agency 
consultation/information 
sharing 
 
25 (42.3%) 
 
Inexperienced evidence 
gatherers 
 
 
13 (22.0%) 
 
Defence not serving 
evidence before trial 
 
 
16 (27.1%) 
 
Vague/lengthy hearing 
dates 
 
22 (37.2%) 
 
Varying court 
Procedures 
(Magistrates’, County, 
etc.) 
 
 
21 (35.5%) 
 
 
Although there are currently 154 courts in England and Wales specialising in 
antisocial behaviour applications, a considerable number of survey respondents in 
England and Wales (46%) detailed the continuing difficulties that they were 
encountering with the speed at which the court deals with listing ASBO 
applications; and also with obtaining early court dates in urgent interim order cases. 
Figure 5.10 (below) gives details of the length of time ASBO applications take, from 
summons to final hearing (in England and Wales). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
Figure 5.10 Length of time - summons to final hearing (England and Wales) 
 
What is the approximate length of time an ASBO takes to come before 
the court, from Summons to Final Hearing? 
 
               Response              Response                 
               Percent               Total                           
 
 
1-6 weeks  4.9     6      
7-12 weeks  44.2    54 
13-18 weeks  30.3               37               
19 + weeks  20.4    25                 
   
Total Respondents      122                  
Skipped Question           15                               
 
 
Although it is ‘good [court] practice’ to list the first hearing of an application quickly 
so as to ascertain whether it can be contested, and if so, to identify the issues in 
the case (JSB, 2007), 20% of respondents in England and Wales, stated that the 
approximate average length of time an ASBO case was taking to come before the 
court, from Summons to Final Hearing, was more than 19 weeks75. One survey 
participant (England and Wales) stated that, when an application is contested, the 
hearing will not take place for between 6 and 9 months.  
 
In Scotland, 6 out of 18 respondents stated that the approximate average length of 
time an ASBO case was taking to come before the court, from Summons to Final 
Hearing, was more than 19 weeks76.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
75
 Campbell (2002: 56) had found that the average length of time, from summons to final 
hearing, was 13 weeks, with some applicant agencies reporting up to 6 months. 
76
 Fletcher (2002) found that more than half of ASBOs granted in Scotland (2001-02) took 
more than 16 weeks to obtain (from the date of lodging the application in court).  
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With regard to the role of the solicitor in the ASBO process, nearly a third (32%) of 
respondents in England and Wales believed that solicitors should have more 
control in the decision making process (at the consultation stage) on whether to 
proceed with an ASBO application. This is of particular relevance given that a 
quarter of solicitors had been involved in ASBO action which they felt was 
inappropriate (see figure 5.11, below). However, the majority of solicitors were 
involved in the decision making process at least to some extent (see again, figure 
5.11). Campbell (2002: 35) had originally found that, in 71% of cases studied in 
England and Wales, an external solicitor presented the ASBO case in court, and 
only 10% of cases were presented by a force or local authority solicitor. However, 
survey responses from England and Wales show that 76% of cases are now being 
presented by internal counsel. This is most likely due to the increased level of 
experience and the greater confidence of internal solicitors in preparing and 
presenting ASBO applications in court. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Role of the solicitor in ASBO cases (England and Wales) 
 
(i) Do you think that solicitors should have more control in the decision-
making process on whether to proceed with an ASBO application? 
 
Response              Response   
Percent              Total                                     
 
Yes 32.0       42    
No 67.9        89         
   
    Total Respondents              131                              
    Skipped Question                      6                                
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(ii) Who makes the decision not to proceed with an ASBO application? 
 
Response                Response                                                      
Percent                    Total 
 
Internal Solicitor 29.6      40       
Other 
professionals  
within applicant  
agency  11.1       15          
Collective  
decision of all  51.1       69       
agencies 
Other    8.1       11       
 
Total Respondents      135                   
Skipped Question           2               
 
 
 
(iii) Have you ever been involved in pursuing ASBO applications where 
you believed that an ASBO was an inappropriate response to the 
behaviour in question? 
 
Response        Response            
Percent            Total                  
   
  
Yes  25.1              32    
No  74.8              95    
   
Total Respondents              127                   
Skipped Question            10                     
 
 
 
 
(iv) If you answered ‘yes’, approximately how often have you been 
involved in an ASBO application that you believed was inappropriate? 
 
    Response             Response                 
                Percent                 Total                           
   
 
Always 6.2     2   
Frequently 18.7     7  
Sometimes 25.0     8    
Rarely  46.8    15   
 
       Total Respondents         32                
Skipped Question       0                
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The Judiciary 
Campbell’s early research (2002: 59) on ASBOs in England and Wales had found 
there to be a ‘great difference between the courts in different parts of the country as 
to how ASBOs are being treated.’ It was reported that there were frustrations in 
some areas about how magistrates were dealing with ASBO cases in respect of 
their varying attitudes as to definitions of ‘antisocial behaviour’ (ibid.). Although 
Campbell found that magistrates were generally positive about ASBOs, some 
magistrates were uncomfortable with certain types of behaviour being categorised 
as examples of antisocial behaviour (for example, prostitution) (ibid.). While some 
local authorities reported positively on the courts use of ASBOs, ‘in other areas 
there is a strong sense that the partnerships and the courts are pulling in different 
directions’ (p. 60). Similarly, 44% of online survey respondents in England and 
Wales reported having experienced ‘difficulties’ with judges and magistrates in the 
ASBO application process (see figure 5.12). 
 
Figure 5.12 Difficulties encountered with the judiciary (England and Wales) 
 
Have you ever encountered problems with Judges/Magistrates during 
ASBO cases? 
 
    Response Response 
    Percent Total 
 Yes   44.4  56 
 No   55.5  70 
    
Total Respondents 126 
   Skipped Question 11 
 
 
Identified problems included some magistrates’/district judges’ preference for the 
use of community orders instead of ASBOs; the inappropriate wording of 
prohibitions; proceedings sometimes being unfairly weighted in favour of the 
defendant; a misunderstanding of the legislation; ignorance of case law (in some 
cases, to the extent that McCann was unknown); confusion as to court procedure; 
and the failure to address the adversarial nature of defence counsel in civil 
proceedings (particularly with regard to witness testimony). Figure 5.13 (below) 
details the numbers of respondents (England and Wales) citing each type(s) of 
difficulty. 
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Figure 5.13 Type(s) of difficulties encountered (England and Wales) 
 
 
Reason Given 
 
 
Response Total 
 
Preference for 
community orders 
 
 3 
 
Inappropriate wording 
of prohibitions 
 
 
 1 
 
Judicial bias towards 
defendant 
 
 3 
 
Misunderstanding of 
legislation or ignorance 
of case law 
 
18 
 
Confusion over court 
procedure 
 
21 
 
Failure to address 
adversarial nature of 
proceedings 
 
10 
 
Total Respondents 
 
 
56 
 
Skipped Question 
 
 
0 
 
 
In Scotland, research on behalf of the Scottish Executive (2005) notes that a 
significant factor in ‘influencing the regional variations [in ASBO use in 
Scotland]…was the varying attitude of the courts’ (para.2.27) and it is apparent that 
as ASBOs have become more widespread, certain courts have increasingly begun 
to serve ASBOs for a more diverse range of behaviour(s), whilst other courts are 
evidently unsympathetic to the ASBO model. Of the online survey respondents in 
Scotland, half of the respondents (9 out of 18) reported having experienced 
difficulties with Sheriffs in ASBO applications, which related to the restrictiveness of 
prohibitions; and a lack of knowledge and understanding of the relevant legislation 
(see figure 5.14, below). 
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Figure 5.14 Type(s) of difficulties encountered (Scotland) 
 
 
Reason Given 
 
 
Response Total 
 
Inappropriate wording 
of prohibitions 
 
 
5 
 
Misunderstanding of 
legislation or ignorance 
of case law 
 
4 
 
Total Respondents 
 
 
9 
 
Skipped Question 
 
 
0 
 
 
It appears that certain Sheriffs are unsympathetic to the ASBO model perhaps, as 
has been suggested because they are ‘very uncomfortable with the idea of civil 
action with a criminal outcome’. The attitude(s) of the judiciary, and the extent and 
impact of judicial discretion in the granting of ASBOs, and the formation of ASBO 
prohibitions, will be explored in Chapter 6. 
 
Defence counsel 
Campbell (2002) found that defence solicitors were seen by certain partnerships in 
England and Wales as influencing or shaping the ASBO application court process. 
It was reported by some local authorities that they believed that, ‘many of the 
tactics used in criminal courts [were] being brought to the civil case…making the 
hearing much more confrontational and adversarial than was originally envisaged’ 
(p.52). Respondent agencies also reported that they believed that certain defence 
solicitors were ‘trying to build their reputation by spearheading case law. Others 
believed that they were trying to drag the process out in order to milk as much 
money as possible out of the process’ (p.53). 
 Dovetailing Campbell’s early research findings, in Figure 5.15, nearly half 
(45%) of respondents in England and Wales in this most recent survey, also 
reported having encountered ASBO cases whereby they believed that the defence 
counsel had acted unfairly or unprofessionally in terms of how they had presented 
their case in court.  
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Figure 5.15 Difficulties encountered with defence counsel (England and Wales) 
 
(i) Have you encountered ASBO cases whereby you believe that defence 
counsel has acted unfairly/unprofessionally in terms of how they have 
presented their case in court? 
 
   Response Response 
   Percent Total 
 Yes  45.3    58 
 No  54.6    70 
   
Total Respondents 128 
  Skipped Question     9 
 
 
 
(ii) If you answered ‘yes’, did this relate to (you may select more than one 
option): 
 
         Response       Response 
            Percent         Total 
The adversarial nature of their counsel  62.0  36 
The cross-examination of witnesses  27.5  16 
A set period of notice being required for 
the use of hearsay evidence   12.0   7 
Defence counsel arguing every prohibition 72.4  42 
Ability of defence counsel to appeal by way of  
rehearing without needing to state reasons 15.5   9 
Attempts to draw out the application/court 
process      65.5  38 
Other       10.3   6 
      
Total Respondents  58 
     Skipped Question    0 
 
 
 
(iii) From your own experience, how often are problems of this nature 
encountered during ASBO and interim ASBO cases? 
  
  Always        Frequently        Sometimes   Rarely          Respondent 
Total 
 
Interim   3.4% (2)     25.8% (15)        36.2% (21)       34.4% (20)  58 
 
ASBO    8.6% (5)     29.3% (17)         13.7% (8)         48.2% (28)                58 
       
Total Respondents 58 
       Skipped Question   0 
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In Figure 5.16, the data found that participants identified three specific areas of 
particular concern and difficulty for them: (1) The adversarial nature of defence 
counsel; (2) defence counsel arguing every prohibition, and; (3) attempts made to 
draw out the application/court process. It should be noted, however, that such 
difficulties (in particular, solicitors ignoring the spirit of civil procedure rules) are not 
unique to ASBOs. While some participants expressly recognised this in their 
responses, several respondents suggested that it would be more appropriate to 
work towards a system whereby uniform rules of evidence apply in both civil and 
criminal matters. 
 
In Scotland, 2 out of 18 participants identified difficulties with defence counsel, see 
below, figure 5.16. 
 
Figure 5.16 Difficulties encountered with defence counsel (Scotland) 
 
(i) Have you encountered ASBO cases whereby you believe that defence 
counsel has acted unfairly/unprofessionally in terms of how they have 
presented their case in court? 
 
     Response 
       Total 
 Yes          2 
 No         16 
    
Total Respondents     18 
  Skipped question       0 
 
 
(ii) If you answered ‘yes’, did this relate to: (you may select more than one 
option) 
 
                     Response 
               Total 
The adversarial nature of their counsel    0 
The cross-examination of witnesses    0 
A set period of notice being required for    0 
the use of hearsay evidence 
Defence counsel arguing every prohibition   1 
Ability of defence counsel to appeal by way of  
Rehearing without needing to state reasons   
Attempts to draw out the application/court   2 
process 
Other         1 
       
Total Respondents  2 
      Skipped this question 0 
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ASBOs on conviction (CRASBOs) 
Over 55% of respondents to the online survey questionnaire in England and Wales 
found obtaining an order on conviction to be ‘easier’ or ‘much easier’ than obtaining 
a standard order on application.  
 
Figure 5.17 Orders on conviction (England and Wales) 
 
 How easy do you find it to obtain an ASBO made on conviction? 
 
             Response
 Response 
               Percent       Total 
 
 Much easier than a stand alone ASBO application          16.1           21 
 Easier than a stand alone ASBO application      40.0           52 
About the same as a stand alone ASBO application     13.8           18 
More difficult than a stand alone ASBO application     21.5           28 
Much more difficult than a stand alone ASBO application   8.4           11 
        
Total Respondents         130 
      Skipped Question             7 
 
 
However, research demonstrates that the approach of the courts in imposing 
orders on conviction is inconsistent. Data on the use of orders on conviction in 
England and Wales suggests that despite the increase in the number of ASBOs 
granted on conviction, certain Magistrates’ and Crown Courts, and the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS), are becoming progressively less tolerant of local 
authorities and police services attempting to obtain orders at criminal trials where 
the criminal offence is unrelated to the antisocial behaviour problem (Home Office, 
2007). Moreover, the Court of Appeal has reinforced the principle that an order 
should not be made simply for the purposes of extending the penalty for committing 
an offence77. 
This has also been reflected in findings from the survey questionnaire with 
solicitors involved in ASBO cases in England and Wales; a proportion of which 
have stated that they find obtaining an order on conviction to be ‘more difficult’ 
(21%) or ‘much more difficult’  (8%) than obtaining a section 1 stand alone 
application. Only 19% of survey respondents had attempted to obtain an ASBO 
                                               
77
 R v Kirby [2005] EWCA Crim 1228. See also R v Adam Lawson [2006] 1 Cr App. R (S) 
323 and R v Williams [2006] 1 Cr. App. R (S) 305. 
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following a criminal conviction at a hearing where the criminal offence was not 
related to the antisocial behaviour problem, of which 69% of these respondents had 
been successful in obtaining an order in this way. However, 47% of survey 
respondents believed that it was appropriate for ASBOs to be granted at criminal 
trials where the criminal behaviour was unrelated to the antisocial behaviour 
problem. 
 
 
Figure 5.18 Orders on conviction (England and Wales) 
 
(i) Have you ever attempted to obtain an ASBO following a criminal 
conviction at a hearing where the criminal offence was not related to 
the antisocial behaviour problem? 
 
  Response Response 
  Percent Total 
 
Yes  19.2       25 
No  80.7     105 
  
 Total Respondents   130 
 Skipped Question        7 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii)          If you answered ‘yes’, were you successful in obtaining an order? 
 
  Response Response 
  Percent Total 
 
Yes  69.5       16 
No  30.4         7 
  
 Total Respondent       23 
 Skipped Question        2 
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(iii) If you have previously obtained an ASBO following a criminal 
conviction at a hearing where the criminal offence was NOT related to 
the antisocial behaviour problem, how frequently have you been 
successful in obtaining an ASBO in this way? 
 
            Response 
                Total 
 
Every time I have attempted to obtain an 
ASBO in this way       0 
The majority of attempts have been  
successful        2 
About half of attempts have been  
successful        2 
Less than half of attempts have been 
successful        4 
In only a very small proportion of cases    6 
     
   Total Respondents  14 
   Skipped Question     2 
 
 
 
(iv) Do you think that it is appropriate for ASBOs to be granted at criminal 
trials where the criminal behaviour is unrelated to the antisocial 
behaviour in question? 
 
    Response Response 
    Percent Total 
 
 Yes   47.0     63 
 No   52.9     71 
 
Total Respondents   134 
   Skipped Question      3 
 
 
Yet, despite the extensive use of orders on conviction in England and Wales, only 
65 ASBOs have been made on conviction in Scotland since they became available 
on 28 October 2004. In contrast to England and Wales, where a court can make an 
order on conviction on its own initiative (and an application for an order is not 
required) or the order can be requested by the police or local authority (who may 
make representations to the court in support of the request), in Scotland ASBOs on 
conviction are not applied for by any authority, or the procurator fiscal. Instead, it is 
a matter for the court based on the evidence given at trial or the Crown narration in 
court.  
However, all of respondents who answered the survey questions relating to 
the use of orders on conviction in Scotland (16 out of 18 survey participants) 
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reported that they found obtaining an order on conviction to be either ‘more difficult’ 
(3 respondents) or ‘much more difficult’ (13 respondents) than obtaining an ASBO 
on application (see figure 5.19, below). 
 
Figure 5.19 Orders on conviction (Scotland) 
 
How easy do you find it to obtain an ASBO made on conviction? 
 
      
Response 
                             Total 
 Much easier than a stand alone application     0 
 Easier than a stand alone application      0 
About the same as a stand alone application     0 
More difficult than a stand alone application     3 
Much more difficult than a stand alone application   13 
 
     Total Respondents   16 
     Skipped Question    2 
 
 
 
The predominant reasons cited by respondents in Scotland for the low numbers of 
ASBOs on conviction was the reluctance of Sheriffs to grant an order on conviction; 
and, the existence of problems relating to the Procurator Fiscals’ Service and role 
of fiscals in obtaining orders on conviction.  
 
Figure 5.20 Reasons for difficulty in obtaining orders on conviction (Scotland) 
 
 
Reason Given 
 
 
Response Total 
 
Reluctance of sheriffs 
 
7 
 
Fiscals unco-operative/unwilling 
to suggest as sentencing option 
 
 
9 
 
Skipped Question 
 
 
2 
 
Total Respondents 
 
 
16 
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There is a long and established tradition within Scots law that fiscals, and the 
crown prosecution, are not involved in the sentencing process in criminal trials. In 
contrast to the process in England and Wales, where, pursuant to section 1C of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, it is the prosecutor who is able to request that the 
court make an order on conviction, in Scotland, the role of the Procurator Fiscal in 
a case ends after the accused has been convicted of an offence and the court has 
been provided with all of the information that is admissible and relevant to the 
offence. Hence, it is not a matter for the fiscal to suggest an ASBO as a possible 
sentencing option.  
Nevertheless, the statutory guidance on the use of ASBOs on conviction in 
Scotland (2005), under section 19, states that:  
 
‘When the case is called for sentencing, the fiscal can suggest to the sheriff 
or the justice of the peace that they may wish to consider an ASBO as a 
possible sentencing option for the case.’ 
 
As a result, 9 survey respondents in Scotland identified that there are inherent 
difficulties with fiscals who are disinclined to remind sheriffs that a case may be 
disposed of by ASBO and are thus unwilling to suggest CRASBOs as a sentencing 
option to sheriffs. It was suggested that while Procurators Fiscal are ‘amenable’ to 
receiving information about antisocial behaviour from the local authority and the 
police, they do not consider it appropriate to submit the information to the court 
following conviction in case they are seen to be attempting to influence sentencing. 
Survey respondents also reported that fiscals were awaiting further guidance from 
the Crown Office on this issue, which had not been forthcoming - one participant 
stated that solicitors had been told ‘for years’ that fiscals were awaiting Crown 
Office guidance on this matter. 
 This represents a fundamental (and crucially important) anomaly in the 
legislation on ASBOs on conviction in Scotland. Survey respondents expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the composition of the legislation and guidance in this 
respect, which was described as ‘confusing’, ‘contradictory’ and ‘poorly 
constructed’. Respondents also felt that there was an overarching lack of guidance 
and training available for both the legal profession and antisocial behaviour 
practitioners in the use of CRASBOs in Scotland. Existing reports on the use of 
ASBOs in Scotland published by the Scottish Executive (2005a; 2005b), make no 
mention of ASBOs on conviction and do not contain any data on the numbers 
obtained, or the circumstances in which they have been granted. 
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Yet, it could also be argued that the problems inherent in the Scottish 
approach to orders on conviction are in fact partially mitigated by the potential 
‘safeguards’ presented by the statutory limits placed upon the involvement of local 
authorities and other agencies in seeking orders on conviction. In England and 
Wales, there is the potential for ASBOs on conviction to be issued inappropriately 
in certain circumstances: not only is there no statutory requirement for proof of prior 
interagency consultation78 but there is also the possibility that an order may contain 
inappropriate conditions. Where orders are being sought by agencies such as local 
authorities and the police for antisocial behaviour that has not been evidenced at 
the criminal trial, it follows that the conditions of that order may be less likely to be 
proportionate and specific to the antisocial behaviour in question (Donoghue, 
2007). So, in Scotland, because the appropriation of orders on conviction is a 
matter for the court based on the evidence given at trial, or the Crown narration in 
court, it could be argued that there is greater protection in Scotland against ASBOs 
being granted inappropriately in these circumstances, than there is currently in 
England and Wales. 
 
Children, young people and ASBOs 
Another interesting comparison that exists between Scotland, and England and 
Wales, is the difference in the approaches to the use of ASBOs against young 
people and children. As already discussed in Chapter 3, in England and Wales, the 
practice of using ASBOs against young people is widespread with about half of all 
ASBOs being granted against young people (Home Office, 2006), and the use of 
publicity or the ‘naming and shaming’ of children with orders is commonplace in a 
significant number of areas. In the English case of R (A) v Leeds’ Magistrates Court 
and Leeds City Council [2004] EWHC 554 (Admin), the court held that the interests 
of the child, when making an order in England and Wales, were a primary 
consideration – but not the primary consideration: the interests of the public were 
themselves a primary consideration. Alternatively, the use of ASBOs for 12-15 year 
olds in Scotland must complement the Children’s Hearing System (CHS), which 
continues to be ‘the primary forum’ for dealing with behaviour beyond parental 
control or offending behaviour by under 16s and represents a considerably more 
                                               
78
 Section 1E of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended) requires that before an 
application for an ASBO is made, a relevant authority is under a duty to consult: this duty 
does not apply to orders on conviction (although an authority pursuing an ASBO on 
conviction may be asked by the Crown Prosecution Service for supporting information and 
evidence as to how the antisocial behaviour requires an ASBO to protect the community). 
There are, however, no rules setting out the procedure to be followed in applying for an 
order on conviction. 
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holistic, welfare-based approach to tackling the problem of antisocial behaviour in 
children. Moreover, in Scotland, unlike in England and Wales, children under 16 
cannot be detained for breaching orders granted against them – instead, they are 
referred back to the children’s hearing system. Authorities in Scotland have been 
highly reticent to make use of the orders against children, with only 6 ASBOs 
issued against children since 2004. It appears that one of the reasons for the low 
numbers of ASBOs granted against children in Scotland is the statutory 
requirement for inter-agency consultation. Home Office guidance to antisocial 
behaviour orders in England and Wales recommends that when a relevant 
authority applies for an order against a child or young person, there should also be 
an assessment of his/her circumstances and needs. However, no legal duty 
exists79. In contrast, part 2 of the 2004 Act requires local authorities/RSLs in 
Scotland to develop specific policy and practice that directly involves social work 
and criminal justice practitioners, including Children’s Panels and Children’s 
Reporters.  
Subsequently, there has been criticism from particular city councils in 
Scotland who have argued that the legislative provisions requiring consultation with 
social services and other agencies is too onerous and that current statutory 
conditions ultimately make it very difficult for local authorities/RSLs to apply for 
ASBOs against young people (see Chapter 3). Moreover, in view of the existence 
of the Scottish statutory measures which prevent children from being detained for 
breaching the prohibitions of their order, it has been argued that the extension of 
the use of ASBOs to children and young people in Scotland is only of limited value. 
In this respect, the role of the solicitor involved in the consultation process, prior to 
the making of a formal application for an order, can be considered to be somewhat 
superfluous by virtue of the solicitor’s lack of expertise in child welfare (ibid.). The 
position of the solicitor in striving to find a balance between community safety and 
child welfare in their assessment of the de facto requirement for an order can thus 
be ‘underrated and misunderstood’ (ibid: 4.). Perhaps not incongruously (as 
previously detailed, see above, Evidence gathering and case management), 39% 
of survey respondents in Scotland agreed that solicitors should have more control 
in the decision-making process on whether to proceed with an ASBO application, 
and several respondents stated that, in particular, solicitors should be allowed 
                                               
79
 Judicial Guidance on ASBOs (England and Wales) does suggest, however, that a 
defendant may be able to ‘rely on the absence of such an assessment in support of an 
argument that an order is not yet necessary within s. 1(1)(b) of the Act’ (JCS, 2006: 46). 
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greater input at the evidence gathering stage which would assist in ascertaining 
whether or not the complaints would stand up in court as evidence.  
             In terms of the use of publicity to make the local community aware of 
children with ASBOs, and in particular, the conditions of those orders, the legal 
approach(es) of the jurisdictions of England and Wales, and Scotland are also at 
variance. No automatic reporting restrictions apply to children in England and 
Wales for either the granting of an order, or for the breach of an order (s. 141 of the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (2005) removed automatic reporting 
restrictions for children and young people convicted of a breach of an ASBO). In 
Scotland, however, children are protected from being identified by the imposition of 
automatic reporting restrictions, although the sheriff has discretion to lift reporting 
restrictions if he/she considers it to be appropriate. 
Results from the online survey demonstrate a fundamental difference in the 
approach to the use of publicity - 86% of survey respondents in England and Wales 
agreed with the use of publicity for children who had been granted ASBOs, 
although only 40% of respondents believed that the use of publicity was a deterrent 
to antisocial behaviour in children, see figure 5.21 (below). 
 
 
Figure 5.21 The use of publicity (England and Wales)  
 
(i) Do you agree with the use of publicity for children and young people 
(under 16) who have ASBOs? 
 
            Response      Response 
             Percent            Total 
Yes, Always              11.2  14 
Yes, but where appropriate exceptions are made        47.5  59 
Sometimes, but only when it seems essential         28.2  35 
Rarely, I don’t generally agree with the practice           1.6    2 
Never, I disagree with the practice             5.6    7 
Other                 5.6    7 
      
Total Respondents  124  
     Skipped Question    13 
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(ii) In your experience, how often are children and young people (under 
16) who have been granted ASBOs, also granted protection in court 
from being publicly identified? 
 
   Response Response 
   Percent Total 
 
Always  3.3   4 
Frequently  21.4  26 
Sometimes  30.5  37 
Rarely   32.2  39 
Never   12.3  15 
   
Total Respondents 121 
  Skipped Question  16 
 
 
 
(iii) Do you think that there should be a presumption against publicising 
details of children with ASBOs unless the Judge/Magistrate 
specifically adjudicates that it is in the public interest to do so? 
 
   Response Response 
   Percent Total 
 
Yes    30.4  36 
No   71.2  89 
    
Total Respondents 125 
  Skipped Question 12 
 
 
(iv) From your own experience of ASBO cases, do you agree that the 
prospect of being named in court is a deterrent to antisocial behaviour 
in children or adults? 
 
        Strongly Agree     Agree     Don’t know     Disagree         Strongly 
Disagree  
Children      9.1% (11)        31.6% (38)   18.3% (22)     29.1% (35)       11.6% (14)                               
Adults        13.3% (16)        35.8% (43)   10.8% (13)     30.8% (37)         9.1% (11) 
         
Total Respondents       120 
       Skipped Question         17 
 
 
Participants in England and Wales stated that, in their experience, children and 
young people (under 16) who had been granted ASBOs, were also given protection 
in court from being publicly identified ‘always’ (3%), ‘frequently’ (21%), ‘sometimes’ 
(30%), ‘rarely’ (32%) or ‘never’ (12%). Children and young people who had 
 159 
breached their order, were granted protection in court from being publicly identified 
‘always’ (9%), ‘frequently’ (15%), ‘sometimes’ (24%), ‘rarely’ (41%) or ‘never’ 
(12%). Moreover, 71% of respondents in England and Wales disagreed that there 
should be a presumption against publicising details of children with ASBOs unless 
the Judge/Magistrate specifically adjudicates that it is in the public interest to do so. 
 
In Scotland, 6 out of 18 respondents agreed with the use of publicity in ASBO 
cases involving children ‘sometimes but only when it seems essential’; 5 
respondents said that publicity should be used ‘rarely’ and that they ‘did not 
generally agree with the practice’; and 7 respondents believed that publicity should 
‘never’ be used for children with ASBOs granted against them. No respondents 
agreed with the ‘yes, always’ or ‘yes, but where appropriate exceptions are made’ 
categories (see figure 5.22, below). 
 
Figure 5.22 The use of publicity (Scotland) 
 
(i) Do you agree with the use of publicity for children and young people 
(under 16) who have ASBOs? 
 
                      Response 
                            Total 
 
Yes, Always       0 
Yes, but where appropriate exceptions are made 0 
Sometimes, but only when it seems essential  6  
Rarely, I don’t generally agree with the practice  5 
Never, I disagree with the practice    7 
Other        0 
      
Total Respondents           18 
    Skipped Question             0 
 
 
(ii) In your experience, how often do children and young people (under 
16) who have been granted ASBOs have reporting restrictions against 
them lifted by a Sheriff? 
 
  Response 
        Total 
Always          0 
Frequently           0 
Sometimes          0 
Rarely           3 
Never          14 
 
Total Respondents   17 
     Skipped Question    1 
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(iii) From your own experience of ASBO cases, do you agree that the 
prospect of being named in court is a deterrent to antisocial behaviour 
in children or adults? 
 
  
               Strongly Agree    Agree    Don’t know   Disagree    Strongly Disagree    
Children      1         3        1      10      3 
Adults          0         5        1       8        4 
        
Total Respondents 18 
      Skipped Question  0 
 
 
 
Appeal 
In both Scotland, and in England and Wales, the Courts have refused one per cent 
of all ASBO applications (Home Office, 2005b, Scottish Executive, 2005b). While 
the Home Affairs Committee has observed that it is ‘relatively straightforward to 
apply to the Court…for the terms [of an order] to be varied’ and that ‘there is also a 
right of appeal’ (2005: 73), it further notes that ‘cases in which these options are not 
being taken highlight the variable quality of legal representation rather than any 
difficulties with the current provisions for variation and appeal’ (ibid.). Survey 
respondents were asked to identify, based on their own experience, how frequently 
ASBO cases are appealed. 
 
Figure 5.23  Appeal (England and Wales) 
 
From your own experience, how frequently are cases appealed? 
 
                      Always    More than        About half     Less than half      Never   
                     half of cases    of cases          of cases                
      
Interim ASBO  0% (0)        0% (0)          1.5% (2)    22.5% (30)           75.9% (101) 
ASBO               1.5% (2)    1.5% (2)       1.5% (2) 34.5% (46)      60.9%  (81)
   
 
             Total Respondents      133 
      Skipped Question         4 
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Figure 5.24  Appeal (Scotland) 
 
 
From your own experience, how frequently are cases appealed? 
 
                         Always    More than         About half     Less than half       Never   
                        half of cases     of cases           of cases                  
       
Interim ASBO      0             0  0            2                    16 
ASBO        0  0  0            2                     16
    
    Total Respondents         18 
          Skipped Question             0 
 
 
Survey participants were then asked whether or not they agreed that the ‘variable 
quality of legal representation’ was the main reason why the right of appeal is not 
taken: 
 
Figure 5.25 Quality of legal representation (England and Wales) 
 
In a recent report (2005), the Home Affairs Committee stated that 
ASBO cases in which the right of appeal is not being taken, highlight 
‘the variable quality of legal representation rather than any difficulties 
with the current provisions for variation and appeal.’ Would you agree 
with this statement? 
 
      Response Response 
      Percent          Total 
  Yes    53.8  70 
  No    31.5  41 
  Other (please specify) 14.2  19   
      
Total Respondents  130 
    Skipped Question       7 
 
 
 
Of the 14% of respondents (England and Wales) who answered ‘other’, 89% then 
cited the lack of legal aid as the primary reason why cases are not appealed. 
Respondents who agreed that there was a variable quality of legal representation 
available to defendants in ASBO cases (53%), were then asked to detail to what 
degree they believed that defence counsel varied in quality: 
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Figure 5.26  Degree of variation (England and Wales)  
 
In your opinion, how varied is the quality of legal representation 
available to defendants in ASBO cases (England & Wales)? 
 
       Response Response 
       Percent Total 
  Highly variable   25.0  17 
  Varied, but generally of good 
quality    44.1  30 
Not particularly varied, of about  
an average standard  17.6  12 
  Consistent poor standard  4.4  3 
  Consistent good standard  2.9  2 
  Other (please specify)  5.8  4 
       
Total Respondents  68 
     Skipped Question  2 
 
 
 
Figure 5.27   Degree of Variation (Scotland) 
 
In your opinion, how varied is the quality of legal representation 
available to defendants in ASBO cases (Scotland)? 
 
         Response 
         Total 
  Highly variable       1 
  Varied, but generally of good 
Quality        8 
Not particularly varied, of about  
an average standard      7 
  Consistent poor standard      0 
  Consistent good standard      0 
  Other (please specify)      1 
       
Total Respondents  17 
      Skipped Question   1 
 
 
 
Given the existence of ‘inappropriately issued’ ASBOs (House of Commons, 
2005a) and the civil rules of evidence used in court proceedings, it would appear 
that, in the interests of fairness, the automatic right of appeal is an important 
provision within the antisocial behaviour legislation – although from the data 
gathered from the survey responses (see above), it is evident that the automatic 
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right of appeal is being used infrequently80. The reasons for the limited use of the 
right of appeal in circumstances where it may be appropriate, appear, in part, to be 
attributable to both a lack of legal aid for the defender, and (to an extent) the quality 
of legal representation available.  
 
Sentencing for breach 
As previously detailed within the Literature Review (Chapter 3), the area of ‘breach’ 
in ASBO cases is one which has presented problems for data collection, in part, 
because local authorities display a variance in their interpretation of statutory 
terminology and in the recording and collating of data of breaches. However, for the 
purposes of this research study, the area of specific interest was with regard to the 
corollary of breaches which have occurred as the result of criminal behaviour. 
Survey responses from solicitors of all jurisdictions show that a high proportion of 
participants thought that there were problems associated with those prohibitions 
relating to behaviour that was criminal and that this could then lead to a twin track 
approach when dealing with identical criminal acts. When participants in England 
and Wales were asked how often, from their own experience of ASBO cases, the 
antisocial behaviour referred to in applications relates in part (but not necessarily 
exclusively) to non-criminal behaviour, 4% stated ‘always’, 47% stated ‘frequently’, 
37% stated ‘sometimes’, 13% stated ‘rarely’ and no respondents stated ‘never’.  
Hence, its appears from this data that the prohibitions of orders often contain 
restrictions on behaviour that is already deemed criminal. This, of course, has 
implications following breach of these prohibitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
80
 The exact numbers of ASBO appeals are currently unknown (Campbell, 2002: 55). 
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Figure 5.28 Sentencing approach for identical criminal acts (England and Wales) 
 
As the antisocial behaviour definition includes behaviour that is 
already a criminal offence, do you think that (following breach of 
conditions) this can lead to a twin-track approach to identical criminal 
acts? 
 
            Response                   
            Percent           
           (Eng & Wales)        
 
Yes 56.4% (74)        
No 43.5% (57)         
  
 
Total Respondents           131   
Skipped Question                6 
 
 
 
The sentencing corollary of breaches that have occurred as the result of criminal 
behaviour will be explored and further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Conclusion 
The online survey questionnaire discussed above sought to explore solicitors’ 
experiences and observations of court and legal process(es) in ASBO applications 
in order to specifically investigate to what extent legal procedure(s) influence the 
administration, management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. The empirical 
findings derived from the online survey questionnaire highlight specific areas of 
salience with regard to the legal and court process(es) in ASBO applications in 
Britain. In particular, the data obtained in respect of civil procedure; evidentiary 
requirements; interim orders; orders granted on conviction (CRASBOs); children, 
young people and ASBOs; appeal; and sentencing for breach, will be used to 
inform (a proportion of) the semi-structured interview questions (for interviews 
conducted with the lower judiciary) which forms the next part of the research study 
methodology. The following chapter will further discuss the rationale for the choice 
of areas which are investigated in the course of the semi-structured interviews with 
the judiciary, and the empirical evidence obtained from the interviews will be 
presented and discussed in order to determine, in this next phase of the data 
analysis, to what extent judicial discretion influences the administration, 
management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. 
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Chapter Six 
Judicial Discretion and Decision-Making in ASBO Cases  
 
Introduction 
The following chapter presents research findings which were obtained from my 
interviews with Sheriffs in the courts in Scotland. As I was unable to obtain access 
to the lower courts in England and Wales, I bring attention to corresponding 
procedure and decision-making in ASBO cases in England and Wales, by 
reference to English case law, legislation, and legal precedent in ASBO 
applications. Differences in procedure(s) and outcomes in England and Wales, and 
Scotland are also highlighted81. As previously discussed in Chapter 4 
(Methodology), the interview schema (appendix 7) was partially informed by the 
survey questionnaire responses, the data from which had highlighted specific areas 
of salience. The issues examined in the survey, and in the interviews, are 
subsequently broadly similar, although the central focus of the survey questions 
was in respect of procedure(s), and the focus of the interview questions was with 
regard to decision-making and discretion. The findings discussed in this chapter 
have been condensed into nine categories: ASBO prohibitions; sentencing for 
breach; criminal behaviour; orders on conviction (CRASBOs); mitigating factors; 
interim orders; defending ASBO applications; ASBOs, young people and children; 
and ASBOs and the political climate82. Each topic is divided into two sections: first, 
the topic is set in its wider context, and corresponding procedure and decision-
making in ASBO cases in England and Wales is briefly discussed; and then the 
empirical research evidence obtained from the interviews with Sheriffs in the 
Scottish courts, is presented. Quotes made by sentencers have been coded to 
protect anonymity. 
 
ASBO prohibitions 
In England and Wales, the leading case on ASBO prohibitions is R v Boness [2005] 
EWCA Crim 2395, which states that any prohibition imposed must be necessary for 
the purpose of protecting persons from further antisocial acts by the defendant, and 
                                               
81
 A more detailed comparative analysis of the approach of the Scottish courts, and the 
courts in England and Wales, will be made in the next chapter (Chapter 7), and in the 
context of a wider analysis of legal procedure, judicial discretion and decision-making.  
82
 The issue of the ‘political’ nature of ASBOs should be acknowledged as being of 
particular relevance to the study findings, because the interviews with the judiciary were 
conducted shortly before the Scottish Parliamentary election and antisocial behaviour and 
the use of ASBOs had featured prominently within political and media discourse(s) at this 
time. 
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proportionate to the antisocial behaviour in question. The principle that each 
individual prohibition must be ‘necessary’ was introduced by s.1(6) of the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998. Similarly, in Scotland, statutory guidance on ASBOs states 
that: 
 
[T]he terms must be only those necessary to protect persons in the area of 
the local authority from further antisocial acts or conduct. They can be 
prohibitory only…They should be specific, and in terms that are easily 
understood so that it will be readily apparent to the person and to the local 
community what constitutes a breach. (2004: para. 109) 
 
Yet, one of the most fundamental criticisms of the ASBO model, has been that the 
prohibitions contained in the orders are often disproportionate and unduly onerous.  
 
Research findings - prohibitions 
Sheriffs’ responses to questions about the nature of ASBO prohibitions generally 
fell in to one of two categories: (1) those Sheriffs who that stated that they generally 
found the prohibitions drafted by applicant authorities to be ‘proportionate’ and 
‘reasonable’, and (2) those Sheriffs who cited significant concerns as to the 
conditions that were being sought by some agencies. For example, one Sheriff 
described his refusal to grant badly drafted orders thus: 
 
[T]hey are very badly drafted…which means that certainly when they come 
before me…they have a hard time getting them through. And sometimes 
they have been refused simply because they are so badly drafted and they 
are sent away to draft them properly. I have to say that when they come 
back in another form it’s almost as bad as the first attempt. (S6) 
 
In particular, those Sheriffs who stated that they often found ASBO prohibitions to 
be badly drafted cited broad geographical restrictions as being the most common 
problem encountered in this context. A Sheriff gave an example of a recent case 
that illustrates this problem: 
 
[A] case brought by the council against a young lady sought six prohibitions 
– some were quite typical such as a prohibition against playing loud music, 
non-molestation of her neighbours, a prohibition on damaging property…but 
[the council] also wanted to ban her from entering [two entire 
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neighbourhoods]…from being under the influence [in the whole of X local 
authority area] and from possessing alcohol [in the whole of X local 
authority area], which I felt was excessively wide. (S3) 
 
Similarly, a Sheriff in another jurisdiction felt very strongly that the prohibitions that 
were being sought by the local authority were not proportional: 
 
[ASBO prohibitions] are not [proportional], in the respect that, if it’s by a 
local authority, it tends to be to stop them doing certain things at a specific 
address where they are living –  ‘or any other address in [Z local authority 
area]’. You know, and that’s a load of nonsense. I’ve no problem with 
specific addresses, but blanket prohibitions about ‘any other address in Z’, I 
think goes too far. (S1) 
 
Interestingly, several Sheriffs who had said that they were generally satisfied with 
the prohibitions put before them, stated that when ASBOs had first been 
introduced, they had experienced some difficulties with applicant authorities 
seeking disproportionate prohibitions. However, these Sheriffs stated that such 
difficulties were simply early complications, or ‘teething problems’, and that the 
local authorities and the solicitors had since learnt from the Sheriffs refusals to 
grant these types of prohibitions, and were now competent in drafting orders that 
would meet with the standards required by the court. 
 Alternatively, Sheriffs who were dissatisfied with the drafting of the 
prohibitions of the orders felt that both applicant authorities, and solicitors, were 
failing to learn from past mistakes, and moreover, that they had not yet developed 
a rigorous and effective method of formatting ASBO prohibitions. For example, a 
Sheriff described the complacency of solicitors in constructing the terms of the 
orders thus: 
 
What I find the council are trying to do [with ASBOs]… they are 
fundamentally intellectually lazy about them – that’s the solicitors – they are 
intellectually lazy about them. They don’t treat them like a conveyancing 
document which is what they should do. A formal contract – they don’t treat 
it like that. And I suspect that whoever is instructing them, presumably the 
police, haven’t really worked out themselves what they really think the 
danger is, to produce these blanket things for areas. I’m far from convinced 
they’re effective. They don’t allow for the obvious things that people have to 
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do in the course of a day – you know, banned from certain areas from 7pm 
til 7am – you may have no choice about being in the area. (S6) 
 
It became apparent in the course of the interviews that those Sheriffs who found 
the conditions of the orders to be ‘necessary’ and broadly ‘proportionate’ were 
those Sheriffs who described having a good working relationship with the local 
council and with the solicitors involved in the ASBO process. By way of illustration, 
those Sheriffs repeatedly used phrases such as ‘those who apply to us from our 
local authority are very responsible and able people’, ‘the local authority do good 
work here’, and ‘we have a good bar here – and we listen to them, we know that 
they are not going to mislead us’.  
 It was also evident that the quality of the relationship between the Sheriff 
and the local authority personnel involved in ASBO applications played a crucial 
role in the outcome of ASBO actions with regard to circumstances involving 
potential mitigating factors (such as addiction and mental health problems). This 
will be discussed further below, see Mitigating factors. 
 
Sentencing for breach 
Figures on ASBO breach rate for England and Wales to the end of 2005, show that 
47% of ASBOs granted had been breached (Home Office, 2006a), while a more 
recent study by the National Audit Office (2006) found that, of the cases studied, 
55% of those with ASBOs had breached their conditions. In Scotland, a total of 544 
ASBOs (interim and full) were reportedly in force as at 31 March 2005. Of these, 
140 (26%) were allegedly breached during 2004/05 (Scottish Executive, 2005b). 
Given the relatively high number of ASBO breaches, and the very limited amount of 
existing research evidence on breach, this research sought, in particular, to 
understand the quantification of breaches and the approach of the judiciary to the 
sentencing for breach.  
It was held in the English case of Parker v DPP [2005] EWHC 1485 
(Admin), that the severity of a breach should be determined by a consideration of 
the individual and specific facts of a case, to include; the nature of the conduct, 
how soon the order was breached after it was made, and whether there was a 
repetition of the same breach. That is to say, each case must turn on its own facts. 
While the Judicial Studies Board (England and Wales) has made clear that 
breaches are to be treated as ‘a serious matter…A court should be wary of treating 
the breach of an ASBO as just another minor offence…An ASBO will only be seen 
to be effective if breaches of it are taken seriously’ (2007: 28) - it also distinguishes 
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breaches which do not involve harassment, alarm or distress. In such cases, it is 
suggested that community penalties should be considered by the court as an 
alternative to custody, in order to ‘help the offender to live within the terms of the 
ASBO’ (ibid.). Where a community penalty is not available, the custodial sentence 
should then be kept to a minimum.  
Alternatively, in Scotland, very little case law or research evidence exists on 
breach proceedings in ASBO cases. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, data 
collected on behalf of the Scottish Executive (2005a; 2005b) suggests that the term 
‘breach’ is not consistently understood by applicant authorities, and moreover, that 
methods of statistical data collection within local authorities relating to types of 
breach are patchy and inconsistent. Local authorities and RSLs display a variance 
in the interpretation of statutory terminology and in the recording and collating of 
data on breaches in ASBO cases. Nonetheless, statistics for the period 2004/05 
show that the majority of alleged breaches in Scotland were reported as having 
resulted in further court action. Just over a half of alleged breaches were reported 
to the Procurator Fiscal and a further 23% involved the perpetrator being detained 
in custody for an appearance in court. In 14% of cases was no action taken 
following initial police or officer visit (Scottish Executive, 2005b). 
 
Research findings – sentencing for breach 
Given the broad nature of ASBO prohibitions and the existence of a level of 
dissatisfaction among some Sheriffs that orders were often poorly drafted (see 
above, ASBO prohibitions); it is perhaps not unexpected that several Sheriffs felt 
reluctant to take seriously ‘minor’ breaches of ASBO prohibitions, such as entry into 
an exclusion zone (with no accompanying antisocial behaviour). One Sheriff 
explained their view on the technical breach of conditions thus: 
 
I’m not one who goes in for standing on the ceremony of the Court. I’m not 
a great one for punishing people for flouting a court order or ignoring the 
authority of the Court. I need to be persuaded that there is some substance 
to the complaint. It is sometimes a constant battle – you frequently come 
across it at bail application, it happens nearly every day, the Court might 
impose, for example, a curfew condition and you might have somebody 
whose committed a technical breach by being five minutes later than they 
should have been and he’ll be arrested by the police and be charged with 
breach of his curfew, and because it’s a breach of a court order, the Crown 
will take the view that this should result in the refusal of bail. They will hotly 
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oppose bail on the ground that the individual is demonstrating a disregard 
for court orders, virtually by reason of the nature of the offence, because it’s 
a court order, they ask the Court to oppose bail. And obviously, as I say, on 
a daily basis I have to consider debates about that. So that’s just really to 
illustrate the point that I don’t believe in punishing people just for the 
technical breach of court orders – there are so many circumstances that 
can lead to that, and for that reason I think that it would be a mistake to 
adopt that sort of approach in relation to antisocial behaviour orders. (S8) 
 
Several Sheriffs expressed the view that they supported the use of ASBOs as a 
means to avoid the criminal process (if appropriate), in so far as they believed that 
prohibitive orders could potentially act as a diversion from the criminal process and 
the ‘filling up of jails’ with individuals who had committed relatively minor acts of 
antisocial behaviour. However, there was also a concern that punishing 
minor/technical breaches of prohibitions could undermine the use of ASBOs and 
the potential for them to be used as an effective means for addressing problematic 
behaviour(s) without necessitating the criminal process. While they acknowledged 
that prosecution was appropriate for specific types of breach involving alarm and 
distress, they took the view that ‘technical’ breaches were often innocuous enough 
that they ought not to be brought before the Court.  
 Of particular interest to this research study is the corollary of breaches 
which have occurred as the result of criminal behaviour. A bifurcated relationship 
exists between ASBOs, and conduct that is criminally sanctioned. The two distinct 
contexts in which the interrelationship is evident are, firstly, with regard to ASBO 
prohibitions that specifically seek to prohibit conduct which has already been 
deemed criminal in law (see Criminal behaviour, below); and secondly, in respect 
of sentencing in breach proceedings. In particular, it is necessary to examine the 
extent to which the court has regard to the maximum sentence for the (criminal) 
offence, in the sentencing for breach of ASBO prohibitions.  
 The approach of the English courts on this matter has been, historically, 
somewhat incongruous, although a substantial body of case law now exists83. 
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 See for example, R v Tripp [2005] EWCA Crim 2253 and R v Morrison [2006] 1 Cr. App. 
R (s) 488 (85) (cited in JSB, 2007: 29). However, Sir Igor Judge PQBD (at paragraphs 26 
and 27) settled the issue in R v H, Stevens and Lovegrove [2006] EWCA Crim 255 by 
determining that the Court’s power should not be limited to the statutory maximum for the 
criminal offence. The decision by the Court of Appeal in R v H, Stevens and Lovegrove set 
a precedent that breach of ASBO conditions should be treated as a distinct offence in its 
own right – undermining the outcome of the earlier case of Morrison [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 
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However, in Scotland the law on sentencing for breach is considerably less well 
developed, with no definitive legal precedent on the maximum penalty available 
when the breach involves a criminal offence. Subsequently, I found that Sheriffs 
opinions varied widely as to what extent the court has regard to the maximum 
sentence for the offence in the sentencing for breach, and, moreover, the role of 
the ASBO in providing an increment in sentencing for persistent acts of antisocial 
behaviour. Sheriffs’ responses to questions about sentencing procedures and 
decision-making on breach were thus determined by whether (1) they took the view 
that the primary function of the ASBO was to allow increased penalties for 
behaviour which was a culmination of antisocial acts, or (2) they were of the 
opinion that in circumstances involving criminal behaviour, breach should not be 
afforded a different or elevated legal standing in proceedings.   
 Those Sheriffs who took the view that the primary function of the ASBO 
was to allow increased penalties for behaviour which was a culmination of 
antisocial acts, decided sentencing for breach accordingly: 
 
I think the ASBO is there for a purpose - to augment the available penalty. I 
wouldn’t feel restricted to the penalty for the offence itself. I tend to treat it in 
much the same way as a bail aggravation, and put on an extra month. I 
mean if it’s a breach of two or three bail orders, as it sometimes is, I’ll put on 
a month for each one. (S5) 
 
In contrast, the other Sheriffs were of the opinion that in these circumstances, 
breach should not be afforded a different or elevated legal standing in proceedings: 
 
I wouldn’t have any regard to [the maximum sentence for the offence in 
sentencing for breach] to be honest, I would just consider it on its merits. 
But it would be bound to be coloured by my subconscious views as to 
what’s an appropriate sentence for the crime in the end. But I wouldn’t give 
a breach of an ASBO some special status. (S7) 
 
Similarly, one Sheriff explained that the civil law nature of the ASBO as a 
preventative measure, as opposed to a punitive sanction, influenced their approach 
                                                                                                                                   
(S) 488 (85) which had found that the sentence for breach should be limited to the statutory 
maximum for the criminal offence. 
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to sentencing for breach, in the respect that this particular Sheriff was of the view 
that criminal behaviour should necessarily be prosecuted in the criminal courts84: 
 
I would be unlikely to exceed the statutory maximum [for the offence], 
because in these circumstances I would have expected the matter to be 
reported to the police and then to proceed by way of prosecution as 
opposed to by ASBO. An ASBO is a way that I see of trying to prevent the 
need for people to be prosecuted and therefore liable to a criminal sanction 
at an earlier stage. And with a lot of people it works. (S5) 
 
Sheriffs were also aware of the potential for a ‘twin-track approach’ to the 
sentencing of similar (or near identical) criminal acts in ASBO breach proceedings: 
 
[T]he penalty for breach of an ASBO could far out strip the penalties for the 
original crime…and I think that there’s an example of that happening in a 
case in England. Because the judge took the view that ‘this is a court order 
now’, it’s breach of a court order – that is more serious than the original 
thing you were doing before the ASBO. Well, I think that there is some merit 
in that approach. I can see why he comes to that view but the danger is that 
you end up  - if you had just prosecuted it properly, you would have had 
such and such a penalty, but because its become this sacred court order 
never to be breached, then you end up with far more. But that’s not my 
experience. (S3) 
 
The variation in the opinions of the Sheriffs on sentencing for breach, and in 
particular, the views of those Sheriffs who were of the opinion that the purpose of 
the ASBO was to augment the available penalty for a criminal act, means that – 
derivatively – different penalties apply for criminal acts, dependent on whether they 
have status within a court order. However, as several Sheriffs observed, a court 
order (in the form of an ASBO) will often be the result of a culmination of persistent 
acts of antisocial behaviour – so in their view it was wholly legitimate that breach 
could be treated more seriously than an individual criminal act. 
 With regard to ASBOs creating a ‘twin-track approach’ to identical criminal 
acts, public confidence in the sentencing process was largely seen as being 
irrelevant by most Sheriffs. Even those Sheriffs who disagreed with a ‘twin-track 
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 This is discussed in detail in the next section - Criminal behaviour, below. 
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approach’ to sentencing, did not believe that public confidence should be a factor 
for consideration: 
 
I can understand that public confidence might be affected but I think that 
judges as a whole are not particularly willing to take into account public 
opinion which is frequently uninformed. (S9) 
 
However, it is the reconciliation of criminal conduct (and in particular, violent 
criminal behaviour and drug dealing) within the ASBO framework, which the 
majority of Sheriffs felt most strongly about in this context, and which I will now 
consider in more detail in the subsection below. 
 
Criminal behaviour 
The Court of Appeal in England has indicated that prohibiting behaviour that 
already constitutes a criminal offence does not necessarily address the central 
purpose of the ASBO – which is to act as a prohibitive order85. It was suggested in 
Boness that it is preferable for the court, in such circumstances, to make an 
‘anticipatory’ form of order. That is, the court should seek to prohibit behaviour that 
may be preparatory to the commission of an offence. Hence, the order should 
prima facie attempt to prevent the commission of an offence, rather than prohibiting 
behaviour that is, in any event, already criminal.  
An illustration of this point was given by Hooper LJ in Boness86: 
 
‘If, for example, a court is faced by an offender who causes criminal 
damage by spraying graffiti then the order should be aimed at facilitating 
action to be taken to prevent graffiti spraying by him and/or his associates 
before it takes place.  An order in clear and simple terms preventing the 
offender from being in possession of a can of spray paint in a public place 
gives the police or others responsible for protecting the property an 
opportunity to take action in advance of the actual spraying and makes it 
clear to the offender that he has lost the right to carry such a can for the 
duration of the order. 
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 Boness at paragraph 36. See also Hills v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2006] EWHC 
2633 (Admin) and Gillbard v Cardon District Council [2006] EWHC 3233 (Admin) (cited in 
JSB, 2007: 17). 
86
 At paragraphs 36 and 37 
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If a court wishes to make an order prohibiting a group of youngsters from 
racing cars or motor bikes on an estate or driving at excessive speed 
(antisocial behaviour for those living on the estate), then the order should 
not (normally) prohibit driving whilst disqualified.  It should prohibit, for 
example, the offender whilst on the estate from taking part in, or 
encouraging, racing or driving at an excessive speed.  It might also prevent 
the group from congregating with named others in a particular area of the 
estate.  Such an order gives those responsible for enforcing order on the 
estate the opportunity to take action to prevent the anti-social conduct, it is 
to be hoped, before it takes place.’ (cited in JSB, 2007: 17) 
 
In Scotland, statutory guidance on the use of ASBOs states that: 
  
‘ASBOs for adults are intended to tackle behaviour that is likely to escalate 
to the criminal level, and patterns of behaviour which cumulatively cause 
considerable alarm or distress to the community. An ASBO is not intended 
as a substitute for criminal proceedings where these are appropriate.’ 
(2004: para. 19) 
 
Hence, while it is apparent that the essence of the ASBO is as a new genus of 
preventative order, which can be used to create, amongst other things, curfews and 
exclusion zones for defendants, it is evident that ASBOs are also being used to 
proscribe behaviour which is already criminal in nature. 
 
Research findings – criminal behaviour 
When Sheriffs were asked to determine whether the prohibitions of ASBOs that 
they had presided over more often related to behaviour that could be said to be 
preparatory to the commission of a criminal offence, or whether prohibitions more 
frequently related to behaviour that was already criminal, several Sheriffs stated 
that the prohibitions that they had had presented before them almost always 
related to criminal behaviour. The other Sheriffs generally responded that 
prohibitions contained a mixture of both types of behaviour. However, the majority 
of Sheriffs stated that they were very uneasy about criminal behaviour forming the 
basis of ASBO prohibitions. Of the Sheriffs who expressed this concern, all were of 
the view that inculcating prohibitions on criminal behaviour was ‘inappropriate’ 
and/or ‘ill-conceived’. For example, one Sheriff described the fundamental difficulty 
in prohibiting criminal behaviour thus: 
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[E]ssentially I think that criminal conduct should be the preserve of the 
police and this strikes at the very heart of ASBOs - the effect of them is to 
render criminal, conduct which would not otherwise be criminal, and I do 
have slight reservations about that to be honest, and I think a lot of 
authorities do. (S6) 
 
In particular, Sheriffs noted the difficulties for local authorities where an expectation 
existed among residents in certain locales that the council should be the ‘primary 
agency’ involved in addressing community problems such as drug dealing and 
aggressive behaviour. The majority of Sheriffs stated that they believed that 
criminal behaviour should remain a matter for the police – and not the local/housing 
authority: 
 
Any criminal behaviour should be a matter for the police and the 
prosecuting authorities. There is, I think, a worry that where it is an 
escalating neighbour dispute, which is very often how these things start off, 
the police take the view that it’s nothing to do with us, you know, ‘away and 
see your council’. And I suppose in some cases, if it were nipped in the bud 
quite early, it might not escalate – but it does escalate. (S3) 
 
Although several Sheriffs observed that prohibitions on criminal behaviour could be 
a useful and effective means of avoiding the criminal process for more minor 
infringements of the law, the majority of those Sheriffs were also of the view that 
any criminal behaviour that was violent in nature should not be a matter to be 
addressed by the council or housing authority: 
 
I am a great supporter of efforts to avoid the criminal process if 
possible…and so I am in favour of all these prohibitive orders as a starting 
point. But I would not want them to be used in circumstances, which are 
difficult to define, where a relatively serious criminal offence is involved. As I 
say, breach of the peace generally, criminal vandalism, drunkenness, these 
kind of relatively minor orders - anything which involves violence, however, I 
would expect not to be dealt with by the local authority and it should not 
become a matter for housing. Obviously when people are disturbed, it is 
probably a more speedy and effective way of giving satisfaction to 
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neighbours but when it becomes a matter of violence or in any way 
retaliation, I would expect that to be reported to the police. (S11) 
 
Moreover, in terms of the collection of evidence, several Sheriffs additionally stated 
that they did not believe that it was appropriate for council and/or housing officials 
to gather evidence in circumstances where there might be a risk to their personal 
safety – notably in those circumstances where violent/aggressive behaviour was a 
feature of the ASBO application: 
 
The police should be there. I mean, how do they get the particular evidence 
to support their application? Are they going to send people out to observe 
what these lads are doing? It’s a nonsense! It’s a police job. (S6) 
 
The prohibition of criminal behaviour is an aspect of ASBO use that Sheriffs felt 
very strongly about. It is suggested that this issue is, however, specifically pertinent 
to Scotland, and the Scottish Courts, because in England and Wales the police are 
empowered under the Antisocial Behaviour Act 2004 (as amended) to act as a 
‘relevant authority’ for the purposes of ASBO applications87. 
 
Orders on conviction (CRASBOs) 
As discussed in both the Literature Review (Chapter 3), and in the findings from the 
survey questionnaire (Chapter 4), orders on conviction are being used very 
infrequently in Scotland, in contrast to the position in England and Wales, where 
CRASBOs are now being granted more often than stand alone orders. The survey 
returns discussed in the previous chapter suggested that the two main reasons for 
the low numbers of CRASBOs in Scotland were, firstly, the reluctance of Sheriffs to 
grant orders on conviction, and secondly, the attitude(s) of fiscals towards 
‘becoming involved in the sentencing process…which [goes against] one of the 
fundamental principles of Scots law’88. 
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 As has been previously noted (see Chapters 4 and 5), in England and Wales, it is often 
the police that are the lead agency in pursuing ASBO applications. 
88
 Respondent (Scotland) answer to question (1) in section 8 of the survey (the full survey is 
provided as appendix 3) 
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Research findings - CRASBOs 
In the course of the interviews with the judiciary, it became apparent that although 
most Sheriffs were, indeed, reluctant to grant orders on conviction, this was not 
because of their de facto opposition to CRASBOs:  
 
I wouldn’t take any exception at all if the fiscal said that your lordship might 
consider that this might be a case where, because this person has been up 
before for broadly similar things 3 times in the last three months, or 
something like that, this may be a case for an ASBO to exclude him from [C 
local authority] shopping mall, to exclude him from there. I wouldn’t take 
exception to that. I wouldn’t regard that in any way as impertinent, or going 
beyond the bounds of propriety. (S5) 
 
Instead, the reluctance was in fact a result of the circumstances in which 
CRASBOs were being sought. The great majority of Sheriffs were of the view that 
they were very often unlikely to have been imparted with the appropriate and 
relevant knowledge/information (from the fiscals) that would enable them to 
legitimately grant such an order. Subsequently, at present, it is evident that many 
Sheriffs are very reluctant to grant/make use of orders on conviction. As one Sheriff 
stated: 
 
[Orders on conviction are] just not seen by many Sheriffs as being 
appropriate as a suitable disposal. (S11) 
 
The interview findings were almost unanimous in detailing the reason(s) for this, 
with almost all Sheriffs stating that orders on conviction will continue to be used in a 
limited fashion until an appropriate protocol/system is developed with regard to the 
necessary information being passed to the Sheriff.  
 
[A]lthough the statutory power has existed for us to impose these orders, 
our immediate point was always: ‘who is going to provide the detailed 
information which we need?’ – not just to make the order in principle, but to 
do it on an effective basis. And we would need serious information, like the 
kind we get from local authorities and as far as I know, the prosecutors 
were not only not keen, but they were refusing to get involved. We’ve had 
detailed discussions about that over the last twelve months, and saying 
‘well yes, in principle, there’s no reason why we wouldn’t use that power in 
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the appropriate circumstances’ but we would have to be sure that we have 
an agreement where the information is going to come from. Then if the 
fiscal – and he seems to be the appropriate person to produce it – if he was 
going to do that, he’d have to depend on the police, then we’d have to give 
the defence a chance to object to any information. To us, we seem far away 
from an appropriate system whereby that could properly and effectively 
operate. (S4) 
 
Most Sheriffs described the benefits that would accrue from the development of a 
standard protocol on information sharing, and they detailed the central importance 
of this aspect of the legal process in obtaining orders on conviction. It was readily 
apparent that these Sheriffs simply were not willing to grant orders on conviction 
without the requisite due process and the derivative safeguards89 of appropriate 
legal procedure(s). It was evident that the majority of Sheriffs interviewed were 
aware of this problem relating to the granting of orders on conviction without the 
necessary and requisite information, and many of those interviewed had discussed 
the matter with other members of the judiciary within their own jurisdiction, while 
others had discussed it with Sheriffs in other jurisdictions. While the majority of 
those Sheriffs interviewed were very positive about the prospect of the 
development of a protocol on information sharing, several Sheriffs noted that there 
were Sheriffs in other jurisdictions who would be very unhappy about such a 
development: 
  
This is an area that is actually very live at the moment because of the new 
legislation on bail, for example, where the decision is going to be the 
Sheriffs, but the Sheriffs are taking the view that we can’t make decisions 
without the information – and the only person that can give us the 
information is the fiscal. So I think it would do no harm for there to be some 
sort of protocol about information passing from one to the other – but I could 
see there being great resistance from certain Sheriffs about how this would 
infringe the independence of the judiciary et cetera, et cetera. But, you 
know, you’ve got to be seen to make…you’ve got to comply with the law 
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 Relating to the protection of the defendant’s rights. It is suggested here that due process 
in obtaining orders on conviction is seen by Sheriffs as very important because it negates 
the potential for the circumvention of democratic justice principles. Without due process, 
correct legal procedure(s) and legal safeguards may be bypassed. 
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and with the contention, you’ve got to have appropriate information – but 
who’s going to give you that information? It doesn’t just appear! (S3) 
 
It was also evident that some Sheriffs were of the view that, in order for the process 
for orders on conviction become successful and, ultimately, effective, it would be 
necessary for the application procedure to become longer in duration, whereby a 
case is continued in order for the judge to decide on matters arising from (the 
information contained in) the CRASBO application:  
 
The difficulty with [the use of CRASBOs}, which has been raised by the 
police here (and we see them fairly regularly and have conversations with 
them), and they’ve asked us what we think of CRASBOs, the problem is 
that you really have to spend time – as the council’s solicitors have not 
done in my experience – to work out exactly what the order should be – in 
detail. And it’s not something that you can just pontificate from the bench 
about. You have to give it consideration. You have to consider what is the 
problem that you’re trying to solve, and how can the order be made and so 
forth to make sure that it is clear and certain and the offender knows exactly 
what he has got to do. And I regard that as something that you just can’t do 
in the course of sentencing in the course of a busy court. So what you’d 
have to do would be to continue it – which is [presently] not possible – on 
another day and apply your mind to it. But even then, the bare facts of the 
case will not necessarily tell you what the real underlying problem is – you 
want more information than that. (S1) 
 
However, given the already overburdened case load of the Scottish courts, it is 
possible that any measures introduced with the potential to bring about further 
delay to court proceedings, may well be unpopular. Yet, it was clear that the 
Sheriffs (almost unanimously) felt that the current procedure for orders on 
conviction was fundamentally unsatisfactory: 
 
I don’t know what the police’s attitude is, I mean just giving the example of 
making compensation orders, we depend on the fiscals to give us details of 
that and they have to get that from the police and frequently, they will say 
‘sorry my Lord, we don’t have the proper information’. So I think a great deal 
more work needs to be done before the proper use of that power can be 
taken on. (S9) 
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Hence, it is very interesting to note the reluctance of the Scottish judiciary towards 
the granting of orders on conviction as a result of their dissatisfaction with the 
current court procedure(s) - compared with the approach of the English courts who 
have granted, despite the lack of any court rules or procedure for the making of an 
order on conviction90, a high number of orders on conviction since they became 
available in 2002. The courts in England and Wales have, however, sought to 
proscribe the use of orders on conviction for the purpose of extending the penalty 
for a criminal offence. In R v Kirby91, the Court of Appeal held that an order on 
conviction should not be made where its primary purpose was to enable the court 
to grant a higher sentencing tariff in the event of future offending of a similar nature 
(JSB, 2007: 37).92  
 
Mitigating factors  
Agencies that are involved in ASBO applications are not required to demonstrate 
that the individual named in the application intended to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress – only that antisocial conduct had taken place, which has, or is likely to 
cause alarm or distress to others. For example, the Scottish Statutory Guidance on 
ASBOs states: 
 
The authority applying for the order does not have to prove intention on the 
part of the defendant to cause alarm or distress. (2004: s.33) 
 
However, the guidance goes on to note that: 
 
While an authority does not have to prove intention, it would not be 
appropriate to use an ASBO where an individual cannot understand the 
consequences of their actions. For example, it is highly unlikely that an 
ASBO would be the most appropriate means to address the behaviour of an 
individual with autistic spectrum disorder or any disability or other 
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 Although in R v W and F [2006] EWCA Crim 686, the Court of Appeal set out general 
guidance on court procedure for orders on conviction. It is important to note also, that the 
granting of an order on conviction is conditional upon the prosecution being able to 
demonstrate antisocial behaviour by the defendant, in addition to the condition of 
‘necessity’. However, the impact of the sentence on the ‘necessity’ for an order should also 
be considered, since one may make the other unnecessary (JSB, 2007: 36). 
91
 [2005] EWCA Crim 1228 
92
 See also R v Adam Lawson [2006] 1 Cr App. R. (S) 323 and R v Williams [2006] 1 Cr. 
App. R. (S) 305 (cited in JSB, 2007: 37) 
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developmental or medical condition which is considered to cause their 
behaviour. Where an individual has such a condition, or it is suspected they 
may have such a condition, advice should be sought from medical experts 
or other bodies with expertise in the area on support which is available. 
(ibid. s.34) 
 
Hence, the Scottish Executive’s statutory guidance on the use of ASBOs, states 
that it is ‘highly unlikely’ that an ASBO would be an appropriate measure to deal 
with a person whose behaviour is the result of disability. However, this phrase has 
no basis in law and is open to interpretation. It relies upon a common sense 
approach of local authorities in interpreting the legislation, which means that 
essentially no legislative restrictions exist to prevent the use of the orders for those 
with disabilities or learning difficulties. The guidance states that in cases where an 
individual has a condition, or is suspected of having a condition, then advice should 
be sought from a ‘medical expert’. Disability charities have argued that this then 
creates an issue of workload, of GPs being approached who don't necessarily have 
the appropriate knowledge or information and, moreover, that this also effectively 
ignores the role organisations and agencies can play in providing appropriate 
advice and information on behaviours that are associated with diagnosed 
conditions.  
In England and Wales, local authorities already have a duty under the NHS 
and Community Care Act 1990 to assess any person who may be in need of 
community care services, which means that if there is any evidence that the person 
against whom an order is being sought may be suffering from, for example, 
learning difficulties or an autistic spectrum disorder, then the necessary support is 
supposed to be provided in tandem with the evidence gathering process. However, 
recent research (BIBIC, 2006) has shown that relevant information regarding 
learning difficulties is not always made available – or is not uncovered - soon 
enough and potential mitigating factors are subsequently missed in court.  
 
Research findings – mitigating factors 
Several Sheriffs raised concerns about the potential for mitigating factors such as 
addiction and mental health problems to be missed in ASBO proceedings. One 
Sheriff gave an example of a recent case as an illustration: 
 
In dealing with criminal matters, and particularly in sentencing, a Sheriff will 
not make any community based order, without first having obtained a social 
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inquiry report at the very least. Plus a psychiatric report, plus a report from a 
drugs and alcohol agency, in other words, any order relating to probation, a 
restriction of liberty order, or any conditions attached to a probation order, 
or psychiatric treatment or drugs treatment or anything like that would be 
done after a process of investigation and advice from experts. By contrast, 
a council can apply to the Court, even at the interim stage, for an order 
which might amount to the equivalent of a community based order such as 
a curfew. The case of [Y] illustrated that – a prohibition against entering 
certain areas. And what disturbed me about that case, which is a very good 
illustration [of the problem] was the prohibition against possessing alcohol, 
and the prohibition against being under the influence of alcohol. It’s only 
because I had an insight into the case that I knew that the young lady, who 
had been up before me numerous times was a very vulnerably young lady. 
It was only because I had that insight that I knew that she had a serious 
drinking problem, and she’s only [A or B years old], with a serious drinking 
problem, so I was pretty well aware that she needs to have her alcohol 
problem addressed but using a court order that would render it criminal for 
her to have a drink, to my mind, wasn’t the best way of doing it. And so I do 
think that there is a danger that these issues will be overlooked. If I was a 
visiting Sheriff, and I knew nothing about that lady, and the council came in 
with this litany of offending, I would have just said ok, yes, on you go. And 
that could have been very harmful to the young lady. So, I think that there is 
an issue there. (S1) 
 
However, those Sheriffs in the smaller Courts stated that it was very unlikely that 
such instances would arise in their Courts because the judiciary in smaller 
jurisdictions are highly likely to know of the circumstances of individuals who come 
before them from previous cases that they have presided over: 
 
I think in a smaller jurisdiction like this, the chances [of mitigating factors 
being missed] are less because I don’t think I’ve ever seen an ASBO 
application that wasn’t in respect of somebody I didn’t already know, and I 
already had quite a lot of information on them anyway, either through the 
criminal courts or the child and family side or whatever. (S3) 
 
While several Sheriffs expressed concern at the potential for mitigating factors to 
be missed in court, the majority of remaining Sheriffs, while acknowledging that 
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addiction and mental health problems were common features of the ASBO cases 
that came before them, did not think that this necessarily presented a problem for 
ASBO applications per se – most saw addiction and mental health problems as ‘a 
fact of life in these type of cases’ which was to be ‘expected’. One Sheriff described 
the presence of addiction and mental health problems in ASBO cases thus: 
 
Yes – drink, drugs, and, either separately, or because of drink and drugs, 
mental health problems – it’s a fact of life that the vast majority of those 
involved in the criminal court are going to have any one or more of these 
problems. But what can you do about it? Many of them have no desire to 
change, the facilities aren’t there to assist them to change, it’s a viscous 
circle. Until they give up the drink and drugs at the level they’re taking them, 
their mental health isn’t going to get any better – and most of them regard 
cannabis as being the cure for their mental health [problems] and not the 
cause of it! (S5) 
 
Of those Sheriffs who saw addictions and mental health problems as being atypical 
of ASBO applications (but who did not believe that this necessarily presented a 
problem for ASBO procedure in itself), about half were sympathetic towards 
individuals in such situations: 
 
[U]nfortunately, many of them are just hopeless cases…(s10) 
 
The other half of respondents, although not expressly sympathetic, mostly viewed 
the presence of these factors within a wider sphere of criminal offending that came 
before the courts, in which the presence of these factors was often ‘inevitable’.  
 
[M]yself, and all my colleagues here are very aware of…I mean it’s 
something like 70% of our criminal convictions here are by those who are 
either addicted to drugs or alcohol. (S4) 
 
However, in the same way that it was evident that the quality of the relationship 
between the Sheriff and local authority personnel involved in ASBO applications 
played a crucial role in determining the form of ASBO prohibitions in individual 
applications (see above, ASBO prohibitions), it was also apparent that this same 
relationship was again highly influential with regard to mitigating factors. Sheriffs 
attached a high level of importance to the views of local authority practitioners, 
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where a good relationship existed between the local authority and the Sheriff. If the 
individual Sheriff was of the view that the local authority professionals were 
competent and trustworthy, then they were much more likely to grant applications, 
and less likely to be concerned that mitigating factors could be missed. 
 
[T]hose who apply to us from our local authority are very responsible and 
able people - who have the ear of the court basically. We can trust them not 
to get an order in certain circumstances where they know that there is a 
problem. (S6) 
 
This was also true of the solicitors involved in the applications. It appeared that 
Sheriffs were more inclined to attach weight to the arguments of the bar if they, as 
before, believed them to be trustworthy and competent. 
 
We have a good bar here – and we listen to them, we know that they are 
not going to mislead us. (S7) 
 
Of course, the reverse was also true, and Sheriffs who believed that solicitors were 
‘incompetent’ and ‘lazy’ were unlikely to be ‘impressed’ by the ASBO applications 
put forward by them93. It was also apparent that, given the frequent presence of the 
aforementioned factors in ASBO applications (addiction problems, chaotic lifestyles 
of defendants), several Sheriffs were of the view that their role in ASBO cases was 
as much about ‘social work’ as it was about deciding the law: 
 
[T]here are times when I feel like I’m being made to be a criminal justice 
social worker! And I’m not! And I shouldn’t be made to be. (S3) 
 
One Sheriff suggested that it would be useful for Sheriffs deciding on ASBO 
applications if a social inquiry report was provided as part of the application. 
Another Sheriff described the difficulty in obtaining such reports for ASBO 
applications thus: 
 
In the real world, a Sheriff [in an ASBO case] would be very fortunate if he 
or she can get a social inquiry report just like that – I have enough trouble 
getting a social inquiry report just for my criminal cases!   
                                               
93
 The role of solicitors will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, see Defending 
ASBO applications. 
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Overall, however, it was felt by the majority of Sheriffs that a discretionary power to 
request a social inquiry report might be useful in some cases, but that the power 
should only ever be discretionary - and not statutory. (S9) 
 
Interim orders 
There is no explicit legal provision for any representations to be made by or on 
behalf of the defendant before an interim ASBO is granted. In Scotland, if the initial 
writ has been served (for an interim order), the Sheriff may dispense with intimation 
of the motion for the interim ASBO and grant it without hearing the defender94, 
although the Court can consider any such representations as it sees fit95. The 
Sheriff may grant an interim order provided the individual named on the application 
has received intimation of the initial writ and the Sheriff is satisfied that the 
antisocial conduct complained of would be established when a full hearing takes 
place.  
In England and Wales, an interim order can, with leave of the Justice’s 
Clerk, be made ex parte (without notice of proceedings being given to the 
defendant). In R (Manchester City Council) v Manchester City Magistrates’ Court96 
it was held, by the Divisional Court, that the Justices’ Clerk should have regard to a 
variety of factors (not limited to) the likely response of the defendant on receiving 
notice of the complaint; the gravity of the alleged behaviour; the nature of the 
prohibitions sought; and the rights of the defendant. The court has to be satisfied 
that an interim order is ‘just’. Kennedy LJ found in R (Manchester City Council) that: 
 
‘The test to be adopted by a magistrates’ court when deciding whether or 
not to make an interim order must be the statutory test: whether it is just to 
make the order. That involves consideration of all relevant circumstances, 
including…the fact that the application has been made without notice.’ 
 
The 1998 Act does not, however, give any indication as to whether or not evidence 
has to be heard (even in part) or whether or not the interim matter can be based on 
representations only. Although, it was observed in the English case of R (Keating) v 
Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] EWHC 1933 (Admin), that, where a 
court is concerned with interim proceedings, it must bear in mind that no findings of 
                                               
94
 As per s.115 of the Statutory Guidance on Antisocial Behaviour Orders (2004) 
95
 As per s.86 of the Statutory Guidance on Antisocial Behaviour Orders (2004) 
96
 [2005] EWHC 253 (Admin) 
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fact have been made, any allegations have not been proved, and the defendant 
has had no opportunity to challenge the allegations.   
 
Research finings – interim orders 
Sheriffs in Scotland observed that (although there is no explicit legal provision for 
any representations to be made by or on behalf of the defendant before an interim 
ASBO is granted) there were instances where evidence was produced at an interim 
stage. For example, one Sheriff described the type(s) of evidence that had come 
before the court for interim applications thus: 
 
There may well be productions lodged, for example, convictions referred to. 
I have seen photographs lodged, I’ve seen plans showing the location of a 
property in location to neighbouring properties, and I’ve seen, on occasions, 
witness statements taken from neighbours being used in support of interim 
orders. (S2) 
 
Several Sheriffs also described their views on the ‘fundamental importance’ of 
personal service in interim applications. Interim orders cannot be made ex parte in 
Scotland and the individual named on the application is required to have received 
intimation of the initial writ - although the defendant is not required to be present in 
Court for the interim application hearing. Where an individual has not been 
personally served with an interim order at the Court, it is good practice that the 
Court should be asked to arrange for personal service as soon as possible 
thereafter. Proof of service of an interim/ASBO is important because any criminal 
proceedings for breach may fail if service is challenged by the defence, and cannot 
be proved by the prosecution. 
For example, one Sheriff noted, with regard to personal service in interim 
applications, that: 
 
There would have to be, firstly, personal service before the hearing where 
interim orders are required. And then, when an interim order was granted, 
there would have to be personal service of that interim order. And provided 
these two things had happened, then I see no reasons why there shouldn’t 
be sanctions for a breach. But if there hadn’t been personal service of the 
order, then I take the view that it’s inappropriate to seek a sanction for the 
breach. (S5) 
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The parallels with procedure(s) for interim/interdict were also noted, and again, the 
importance of intimation to the defendant was cited as being a possible 
determinant of whether a breach should attract criminal sanctions: 
 
I would regard [criminal sanctions for interim antisocial behaviour orders] as 
a question of fairness, broadly similar to civil interdict or interim interdict. An 
aggrieved person can get an interim interdict simply on the basis of ex parte 
statements and without any notice to the other party but until interim 
interdict is intimated…if the opponent, the defender, in civil proceedings… 
until he has had intimation of it, then anything he does, which would 
otherwise be in breach, isn’t a breach - which seems to me eminently fair. 
Now I would think that the same principals should surely apply in relation to 
an interim ASBO, that it wouldn’t attract criminal sanctions until the subject 
has been made formally aware of it. In fact, in civil procedure, he doesn’t 
need to be made formally aware of it, but I think in this case, because it may 
potentially attract criminal sanctions, it should be formally intimated, and 
then once it’s formally intimated so he has had no opportunity to make 
representations if he chooses to breach it. (S11) 
 
Sheriffs’ observations on interim order proceedings generally feel into one of two 
different categories: (1) those Sheriffs who had found interim orders were being 
used effectively and appropriately, and (2) those Sheriffs who were very concerned 
by the prosecution of interim order breaches. Those Sheriffs who were, for the 
most part, positive about the use of interim orders observed that they had been 
effective in preventing antisocial behaviour: 
 
My experience of them here is that one wonders why [the council] are 
taking so long to apply to the court! (S8) 
 
However, the Sheriffs in the second category were deeply concerned by the 
prosecution of interim order breaches, the validity of which had never been tested 
in court by the hearing of evidence. Those Sheriffs took the view that this 
‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘ill-conceived’ aspect of the legislation was open to abuse by 
applicant and other agencies involved in the ASBO process. For example, one 
Sheriff, who noted that there was a currently a case before the Inner House in the 
Court of Session on the issue of interim orders, stated that, although they were 
granting interim orders, they were uncomfortable about doing so: 
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I must say, I doubt the validity of antisocial behaviour orders being granted 
without evidence. I feel uneasy about interim orders – I grant them because 
the legislation says that I should if I am satisfied on the basis of information 
given to me – but I might one day refuse and see if the council appeal me, 
because I think the matter needs to be looked at. (S1) 
 
Moreover, several Sheriffs questioned the premise upon which interim orders were 
based. It was suggested that interim orders were, in some cases, being used to 
‘get round’ existing legal barriers to prosecution, and were seen by some agencies 
as a means to avoid traditional encountered difficulties - and safeguards - in the 
legal process. One Sheriff, while acknowledging that (they believed that) criminal 
sanctions for interim order breaches were necessary, also noted that there existed 
important questions surrounding the legal nature and purpose of the interim ASBO: 
 
I think if you allow interim ASBOs to be granted at all, if you provide for 
them in the Act, then you’re going to have to have a penalty for breach - 
which means a criminal penalty. The question to my mind is a more 
fundamental one, as to whether they are a means of getting round the 
difficult job of actually prosecuting somebody. But I think that if you have 
them, it’s inevitable that you need a criminal penalty for breach. (S6) 
 
In summary, it was evident that a significant proportion of Sheriffs interviewed felt 
that the prosecution of interim order breaches was a matter that ‘needed to be 
addressed’. 
 
Defending ASBO applications 
Given the high number of successful ASBO applications (in England and Wales, 
and in Scotland, the Courts have refused one per cent of all ASBO applications, 
Home Office, 2005b, Scottish Executive, 2005b) coupled with the civil rules of 
evidence used in ASBO court proceedings, in the interests of fairness, the 
automatic right of appeal is an important provision within antisocial behaviour 
legislation, particularly with regard to the existence of ‘inappropriately issued’ 
ASBOs. While the Home Affairs Committee on Antisocial Behaviour has stated that 
‘we do not consider the inappropriate issuing of ASBOs…[to be] a major problem’ 
(2005: 73), the Committee has also recommended that ‘the Home Office 
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commissions wide-ranging research in this area’ (ibid). Moreover, the Home Affairs 
Committee notes that it is ‘relatively straightforward to apply to the Court…for the 
terms [of an order] to be varied’ and that ‘there is also a right of appeal’ (House of 
Commons, 2005a: 73), it further notes that ‘cases in which these options are not 
being taken highlight the variable quality of legal representation rather than any 
difficulties with the current provisions for variation and appeal’ (ibid.). 
 
Research findings – defending ASBO applications 
Several Sheriffs stated that defence solicitors were often very reluctant to appeal 
the orders, even when it was apparent that there was evidently a justifiable reason 
for doing so. As one Sheriff argued: 
 
[The ASBO applications that have come before me] are badly drafted but of 
course the defender’s solicitor is as bad in not coming to court immediately 
when it’s been granted, you know, get back in court and argue it - not on the 
merits of whether it’s a good idea or not - but argue it on the basis that this 
appallingly drafted document should not be allowed to go any further. (S6) 
 
Other Sheriffs observed that the majority of ASBO applications in their jurisdictions 
were the result of a culmination of persistent antisocial behaviour which was, in 
most cases, essentially indisputable. Hence, they felt that the solicitors saw ‘no 
merit’ in opposing such applications: 
 
[M]y experience is that the solicitors take the attitude that there is so much 
that has happened before we get to the stage of an antisocial behaviour 
order that there is no point opposing the interim order. (S4) 
 
It was also apparent that several Sheriffs were very unlikely to reject applications, 
even if they believed that the application was poorly constructed and/or not the 
most appropriate intervention, if the application was uncontested by the defence 
solicitor: 
 
I’ve had one [application] where I thought that it was the wrong route to 
take, and the defender was represented - but I didn’t object to it -  and it 
was to ban her from shoplifting in any shop in [X local authority area]. You 
know, what’s the point? But as I say, I didn’t object to it. (S3) 
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A small number of Sheriffs felt concerned that the chaotic nature of many ASBO 
defendant’s lifestyles (often as a result of addiction problems) might impact upon 
their ability to organise a defence to ASBO actions: 
 
For the very reason that [ASBOs] can be presented by one party, the 
subject of the order might be so chaotically organised that they don’t 
organise opposition, they don’t defend it, and you get a very one sided view, 
which may not be fair. (S1) 
 
The majority of Sheriffs, however, while acknowledging that the nature of ASBO 
proceedings was such that an application could succeed undefended, were for the 
most part, unsympathetic to the suggestion that the chaotic nature of defendants’ 
lifestyles could mean that they were disadvantaged in court because they had not 
organised a defence to an application. As one Sheriff observed: 
 
Well, there may be [problems with people subject to an application not 
organising opposition], but I mean, the same people, I’m quite sure, if you 
said ‘come along here at 12 noon tomorrow, and there’ll be a party with lots 
of booze’ – they would understand that enough. (S5) 
  
Several other Sheriffs made similar comments and stated that the chaotic nature of 
many ASBO defendants’ lifestyles was not a factor that they were generally 
sympathetic towards (see also Mitigating factors, above). 
 
ASBOs, young people and children 
As already described in Chapters 3 and 5, the use of ASBOs for children and 
young people is widespread in England and Wales, with about half of all orders 
issued being granted against young people below the age of 18. In marked 
contrast, the use of ASBOs for children and young people is in Scotland is limited, 
with only half a dozen orders having been granted to children (below the age of 
16). However, although there appears to be an overarching support for the use of 
alternative interventions (where appropriate) for children in Scotland, there has also 
been somewhat of a ‘backlash’ in certain locales, with practitioners arguing that 
more use should be made of the orders for under 16s. There has been criticism 
from particular city councils in Scotland regarding what they consider to be the 
overly restrictive conditions contained within statutory provisions governing the use 
of ASBOs for persons under the age of 16, and moreover, the statutory 
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requirement for inter-agency consultation (and a ‘level of agreement’ among 
interested parties to be reached) which, it has been suggested, inhibits the use of 
ASBOs against children.  
 
Research findings – young people and children 
Sheriffs generally agreed that it could be a difficult process to pursue orders 
against children, but felt that this was an important safeguard in the system: 
 
[The local authority] do a lot of good work to make [the use of ASBOs] 
unnecessary. I’ve met with a number of agencies which do excellent work – 
including with the under 16s – especially in our most troubled part of [the 
local authority]. Although I certainly agree that ASBOs for under 16s can be 
difficult to obtain. But I’m very glad that it is like that. (S8) 
 
Several Sheriffs expressed their support for the use of ASBOs for children. 
However, the majority of Sheriffs were of the view that orders for children were 
‘ineffective’ and ‘irrelevant’. In particular, Sheriffs raised concerns about the 
possibility of young people getting drawn into the criminal justice system 
unnecessarily: 
 
I think [using ASBO against under 16s] is falling into the trap of coming 
down hard on the people who have been spotted…I mean I’m sure there’s 
research that shows once an individual has come to the notice of the 
prosecuting authorities then the likelihood of their being prosecuted is 
higher, and I see it all the time here. People who offend are then given bail 
subject to conditions and they are very, very easily re-arrested for fairly 
innocuous matters. You get a crowd of youths who scatter - and the one 
who is caught, is the one who is recognised - and I think that antisocial 
behaviour orders merely put greater pressure of youngsters who are 
already having difficulty functioning in society and I’m not sure if that’s the 
best way to go about it. (S1) 
 
Sheriffs that were concerned about the use of the orders for children and young 
people, cited the implications upon breach, which they believed would mean that 
children and young people would inevitably become caught up in the cycle of 
children’s hearings or, in the case of young people, the criminal justice system: 
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[T]here is no point in seeking an antisocial behaviour order unless you want 
to follow it through with a prosecution in the event of a breach. Otherwise, 
the order is pointless. And so the structure of the legislation – the whole 
concept of antisocial behaviour orders – is to render conduct criminal that is 
antisocial, in effect. I would be very uneasy about using orders against 
children for that reason. I think it’s putting pressure on them to fail and be 
drawn into the children’s hearing system and the criminal court system 
sooner than they have to be. (S10) 
 
Furthermore, some local authority practitioners in Scotland have also expressed 
the view that ‘an ASBO should be seen as a warning [to children and young 
people], not a last resort’. Those Sheriffs who were generally supportive of the use 
of the orders for children and young people (in circumstances where such an order 
was genuinely deemed to be necessary) were of the view that it might, in some 
circumstances, be appropriate to use orders in this way: 
 
[I]t would depend on the circumstances…but if I thought that this was a 
really obnoxious child – and there are really obnoxious children - then I 
wouldn’t regard [the use of an ASBO] as merely a last resort. (S5) 
 
However, the majority of Sheriffs (who had expressed concerns about the use of 
the orders for children and young people) again stated that they did not believe that 
it was acceptable to use ASBOs as a ‘warning’ to children and young people: 
 
[ASBOs are] a criminal sanction. It’s inappropriate [to use ASBOs as a 
warning to under 16s], it should either be granted or it should not be 
granted, not used as a warning. It’s as if ‘oh well, we’ll grant the ASBO, and 
it’s OK Sheriff because we don’t intend to enforce it’ – and we can’t have 
that. [The council] either get it and they enforce it or they don’t. So it’s not 
appropriate. I mean, they’ve got all these contracts now [ABCs], so is that 
not the way around that? (S3) 
 
Of those Sheriffs that disagreed that ASBOs should be used as a warning to 
children and young people, most stated that alternative interventions should be 
made much greater use of: 
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What’s a parenting order for, rather than anything else, you know? If 
[councils] want [to use ASBOs as a warning], they should be getting 
parenting orders, rather than ASBOs. (S4) 
 
Although these Sheriffs suggested that such interventions were used rarely, if at all: 
 
I think the idea of parenting orders is a great idea – but I’ve never seen an 
application for a parenting order. (S4) 
 
Moreover, in view of the existence of statutory measures which prevent children 
from being detained for breaching the prohibitions of their order, Sheriffs felt that an 
ASBO granted against a child or young person in Scotland would be of little 
consequence: 
 
The virtual certainty is that it goes back to the Children’s Hearing, they will 
then either admonish the individual or they’ll put them on a supervision 
requirement. But if they need a supervision requirement then the chances 
are that they are already in front of the hearing through family’s and 
children’s issues in any event, so I just think that they are of little relevance. 
(S11) 
 
The issue of ASBOs being used as a ‘badge of honour’ by virtue of the lack of 
sanctions available upon breach, was also raised: 
 
[ASBOs for under 16s] would appear to be an order without sanction, which 
is why I suppose people are saying that some kids would regard it as a 
‘badge of honour’, rather than as a sanction, because I mean, what can you 
do? (S7) 
 
For the most part, the majority of Sheriffs did not believe that the use of ASBOs for 
children and young people, in their current legislative form, were a useful or well 
constructed part of antisocial behaviour legislation, particularly in view of the 
existing problems associated with offending behaviour by children and young 
people: 
 
[W]e already have extreme problems about the detention of children – not 
anything like sufficient places, and that’s only appropriate for serious 
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criminal offending. What else are you going to do? Impose fines? That 
would be an absolute waste of time. So that’s another reason why I regard 
the use of [ASBOs against under 16s] as very restricted to serious 
circumstances. (S9) 
 
Similarly, Sheriffs in Scotland were almost unanimous in agreeing that publicity 
should not be used for ASBO cases involving children.  As one Sheriff stated:  
 
I’m dead against it…[the use of publicity for under 16s] would be the wrong 
route to take entirely. (S1) 
 
ASBOs and the political climate 
As previously detailed earlier in this chapter, the interviews with the judiciary in 
Scotland were conducted shortly before the Scottish Parliamentary election and 
antisocial behaviour and the use of ASBOs had featured prominently within political 
and media discourse(s) at this time. 
 
Research findings – the political climate 
Despite the high level of media interest in antisocial behaviour legislation, and the 
increasing use of ASBOs in Scotland at the time of the interviews taking place, 
several Sheriffs commented that, from their experience in the Scottish courts, the 
range of interventions provided within antisocial behaviour legislation, including 
ASBOs, were being used in a very limited fashion. One Sheriff described the take 
up of antisocial behaviour interventions in Scotland thus: 
 
They [ASBOs] are not used. I mean all the antisocial – ‘bad behaviour’, if 
you like – legislation that there is in place, isn’t used. I don’t know why it’s 
not used, I don’t know if it’s not used because it’s awkward, it’s difficult, it’s 
a sledgehammer approach, you know, I don’t know why it’s not used. I 
rather suspect that there’s an awful lot of people that perceive themselves 
as being affected by antisocial behaviour that would love to see it used an 
awful lot more. But I think the idea of parenting orders is a great idea – but 
I’ve never seen an application for a parenting order. I’ve seen only (Y) 
applications for closure orders, amounting out of drug dealing. Great idea, 
as far as the local community and everything else is concerned – it 
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demonstrates that something is being done about something that is 
perceived by everybody as being an evil. (S3) 
 
Several Sheriffs also commented on the ‘political nature’ of ASBOs, and the way(s) 
in which the attitudes of local councils affected the uptake of antisocial behaviour 
interventions such as ASBOs: 
 
[I]t’s all politically driven isn’t it? You know, it’s a great idea – tough on 
crime, tough on the causes of crime – we’re going to sort out this antisocial 
behaviour, and we expect the Courts to support us!... [I]f the political 
masters of [W city council] suddenly decided that there should be greater 
use of ASBOs – then we will see greater use of ASBOs. There will be a 
resource found from somewhere to do it. (S9) 
 
Moreover, as the interviews were conducted in advance of an imminent election 
(for the Scottish Parliament), a number of Sheriffs argued that the use of ASBOs 
had risen high up the political agenda, predominantly because they believed that 
antisocial behaviour was seen by politicians as being something of a ‘vote winner’: 
 
I think to be fair to the politicians, my take on this is that, particularly at 
election time, they go canvassing in council estates and they arrive at some 
old folk’s doorstep - she has traditionally cleaned her step every year, she 
takes down her curtains to spring clean them, her wee patch of garden is 
perfect et cetera et cetera, you can imagine what I’m talking about. And she 
says well, the kids come along, they’re 9, 10, 11 and they throw stuff in her 
garden, they pull the flowers out, you go down the Spar shop and the kids 
are there, and they’re intimidating, so [they ask the politicians] ‘what are you 
going to do about it?’ And, the answer is, that with our court system, it’s 
very difficult to do anything about it. And it’s all very well saying the police 
should be there it but the police could be there all day and all night and it 
still wouldn’t stop. So you know, you can understand. They come up with 
this idea – this will stop it, this will stop the behaviour. It’s real and it’s quick 
– you don’t need to wait six months for a Sheriff to decide he’s guilty and 
then call for reports, time for deferred sentence, probation, breach of 
probation, all these things where it can go on for years and nothing gets any 
better. So superficially, it’s a great idea. My difficulty with it is that you 
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cannot bypass justice and at the end of the day, you are actually worse off. 
(S6) 
 
However, those Sheriffs who made observations about the ‘political’ nature of 
ASBOs also suggested that, after the (Scottish) election, antisocial behaviour and 
the use of ASBOs would feature much less in political discourse, and the uptake of 
ASBOs and other antisocial behaviour interventions would again be determined by 
the attitude(s) of local councils, who were seen as the ‘driving force’ behind ASBO 
applications and ‘instrumental’ to ASBO uptake. Politicians were largely viewed by 
those Sheriffs as elevating the profile of ASBOs at election time, but again, they 
noted that local level autonomy inherent in antisocial behaviour legislation meant 
that politicians could influence ASBO uptake to a limited degree. It was also noted 
that antisocial behaviour policy became much less prominent in politicians political 
priorities: 
 
[O]ne of the problems that I think we’ve got is that they shout from the 
rooftops about increased sentences for crime…be tougher on crime…the 
courts are not imposing tough enough sentences…there aren’t enough 
sentences…oh the jails are too full…and there aren’t enough social workers 
to do half the work they’re supposed to do. And at the moment, in the run 
up to [the Scottish] election, it’s a wonderfully political thing that when 
somebody gets elected for four years, then it’ll go on the back burner again. 
(S9) 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the empirical data presented throughout has demonstrated the 
significant influence of judicial decision-making and discretion on the 
administration, management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. Indeed, judicial 
discretion has been shown to be specifically influential in respect of prohibitions; 
interim orders; orders on conviction (CRASBOs); sentencing for breach; defending 
ASBO applications; and the use of ASBOs for young people and children. The 
research evidence has also found that there are different patterns of decision-
making both between courts and between individual Sheriffs. The next chapter 
discusses the variation between individual sentencers’ decision-making on ASBO 
applications, and provides a variety of (possible) explanations to account for the 
variations between different courts. Moreover, it will be assessed whether the 
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empirical data obtained in the course of the research study has been successful in 
determining the influence of legal procedure and judicial discretion in ASBO cases. 
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Chapter Seven 
Discussion 
 
Introduction 
Historically, the courts in Scotland, and in England and Wales, have long 
expounded the general principle that both legal procedures and the decision-
making of officials must be fair - and that a duty exists to act fairly and to afford all 
participants the right to be heard. Galligan has observed that: ‘Exceptions to the 
principle might still be made, but only where there are strong reasons for doing so; 
indeed the presumption is that the general duty to follow fair procedures will apply 
unless exceptions can be justified. The practical application of the principle can still 
be uneven, with various factors influencing a court’s appraisal of what procedures 
are needed’ (1996a: 329). Subsequently, this chapter examines the research study 
findings on legal process(es) and judicial discretion in the context of socio-legal 
conceptions of fairness within the criminal justice process, specifically in respect of 
theories of administrative and procedural justice. Additionally (and with particular 
reference to the use of interim orders, the impact of mitigating factors and the 
defence of ASBO action) the opportunity for law to act as a site of power within 
which individual autonomy is protected from the coercive influence of disciplinary 
power is discussed alongside the potential for law to act as an instrument of 
exclusion and/or domination. However, as I have identified already in this thesis, 
the research findings have specific limitations which now impact upon the 
discussion of the study data for the purposes of this chapter’s examination of legal 
procedure and judicial discretion. Consequently, legal procedure is considered 
using data obtained from the survey responses in England and Wales, and the 
discussion of judicial discretion is informed by data obtained from the sentencers in 
the Scottish Courts. The findings from the research that are discussed here are not 
presented as directly or substantively comparable with its composite jurisdiction 
north/south of the border. Instead, it is hoped that the findings presented will further 
illuminate understandings of legal procedure and judicial discretion within the 
jurisdictional areas studied, and moreover, that given the shared policy on 
countering antisocial behaviour in the three jurisdictions studied, the data provided 
here will highlight areas that may inform or may be of interest to future research in 
other jurisdictions.  
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Socio-legal conceptions of administrative and procedural justice 
Let us begin this discussion of the study findings on legal procedure and judicial 
discretion in ASBO cases by first considering how justice within (and equity before) 
the law will be defined for the purposes of my examination of fairness in ASBO 
legal and court process(es). Hence, it is necessary to now consider the terms 
‘administrative justice’ and ‘procedural justice’, and their substantive meaning 
within the socio-legal field of study, in greater detail. Essentially, ‘administrative 
justice’ is an umbrella term which encompasses the principles that can be utilised 
in the analysis and evaluation of the level of fairness in administrative procedural 
decision-making. Michael Adler posits that administrative justice is composed of 
two distinct elements: ‘procedural fairness’ – that is, the particular means by which 
individuals are treated within a specific process with regard to professional and/or 
bureaucratic decision-making; and secondly, ‘substantive justice’, which is a term 
that refers to de facto outcomes of decision-making and the derivative 
benefits/burdens subsequently conferred on the individual participant (2003: 324). 
Thus, administrative justice encompasses legal agents, the courts and tribunals, 
but also the decision-making of a plethora of other bureaucratic and professional 
agencies. 
 So, if we accept Galligan’s observation that ‘justice is the first virtue of law 
and politics’ (1996a: xvii); and we also consider procedural fairness a fundamental 
element in administrative justice, how do we conceive of, and conceptualise, 
notions of justice and fairness in administrative and procedural processes? And 
how does procedural fairness then ultimately contribute to the attainment of justice 
in the law? Hart (1961) described two basic elements fundamental in the concept of 
‘justice’: the importance of like cases being treated alike97, and the secondary, 
vacillating, element which was determined by the way in which likeness and 
difference was then quantified. However, Galligan (1996a: 57), in his (in my 
opinion) superior description of the concept of ‘justice’, rejects Hart’s analysis of the 
requirement for like cases to be treated alike, on the basis that ‘like treatment is not 
general enough in its scope’. For Galligan, what is of the most essential importance 
is whether an individual has been treated fairly or unfairly – comparison with the 
treatment of other individuals is, in this paradigm, largely irrelevant. Instead, 
Galligan determines four elements which make up the ‘constant’ part of justice. 
Ascribing to Finnis’ (1980) analysis of justice as a bifurcated relationship - between 
persons, and, what is due or owed by one to another - he also attests to Finnis’ 
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 The concept of ‘like cases being treated alike’, and consistency in decision-making, will 
be developed more fully later in this chapter 
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notion of ‘balance’ or ‘equilibrium’ between interested parties. Galligan develops 
this concept further by adding a fourth element: that ‘any course of action must 
comply with certain fundamental standards of right treatment.’ This is, to some 
extent a restatement of Galligan’s view that the context of individual treatment and 
any subsequent judgement of ‘fairness’ can never be justified without the presence 
of fair treatment. 
Galligan (ibid: 62) develops this line of argument further – and to great 
effect - when he compares the adversarial nature of proceedings at common law in 
England, with the more inquisitorial style of proceedings in Europe. He makes the 
observation that neither approach has been shown to be more effective in terms of 
‘fair treatment’ or with regard to reaching the ‘correct outcomes’. Instead, he 
explains that arguments about the two differing procedures are not subsequently 
centred on efficacy in the pursuit of truth, rather they are concerned with ‘what 
values are relevant’ (at p.63, emphasis added). 
As Galligan explains: 
 
‘[A]ny attempt to erect a strict division between outcomes and the 
procedures leading to those outcomes if fraught with difficulty. Clear cases 
can easily be found, but borderline cases are equally numerous…What is 
important is that the proper consideration of a person’s case is a value 
which ought to be respected in legal processes and for which suitable 
mechanisms should be available. Indeed…it is better to approach 
procedural issues, especially issues of procedural fairness, by asking, first, 
what are the values at stake and what standards do they generate in terms 
of fair treatment of a person, and then, secondly, what procedures are 
needed to ensure that the standards are upheld in practice.’ (ibid: 51, 
emphasis added) 
 
Thus, it is the process itself, which is of principle importance in determining whether 
procedural fairness has been achieved – and not the individual outcome of a given 
procedure. Walker et al. seminally distinguished between procedural justice as ‘the 
belief that the techniques used to resolve a dispute are fair and satisfying in 
themselves’ and alternatively, distributive justice, which concerns ‘the belief that the 
ultimate resolution of the dispute is fair’ (1979: 1402). Further, Walker et al. 
observe that procedure is not simply a tool for achieving distributive justice per se, 
but it is in fact ‘a means that profoundly affects the psychological meaning of that 
end’ (ibid: 1403). That is to say, a participant’s confidence in and perception of 
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whether he/she has been treated fairly (and consequently whether justice has been 
achieved) will be, to an extent, determined independently of the substantive 
outcome of a case. It will be determined in part by whether they believe that they 
have been treated fairly. Thus, with regard to participant’s perceptions: ‘“ends” 
(distributive justice) cannot justify “means” (procedural justice), but “means” can 
indeed justify “ends” to the extent that, for participants, the perception of procedural 
justice partially determines the perception of distributive justice.’ (ibid. 1416) Hence, 
the value is not in the procedures themselves but in their contribution to the right or 
best outcomes’ (1996a: 72). Let us now then consider procedure in ASBO 
applications in respect of the concept(s) of fair treatment, and procedural justice, 
set out above. 
 
Fairness in ASBO Procedural Decision-Making 
In previous chapters, we have observed the wide ranging discretion conferred upon 
enforcement agencies (local authorities, housing associations, registered social 
landlords, the police) by s.1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the 
renewed focus upon local level autonomy inherent in antisocial behaviour 
legislation, which, it has been argued, is at once diacritic from neo-liberalism, but 
also the historical limitations (and inflexibility) of local welfare bureaucracy. 
However, we must now examine this deliberate decentralisation of administrative 
authority and decision-making in the context of balancing ‘procedural fairness’, in 
the terms discussed above, with (achieving) policy objectives. As McCubbins et al. 
have argued: ‘legislators see the choice of administrative structures and processes 
as important in assuring agencies produce policy outcomes that legislators deem 
satisfactory’ (1989: 432). Drawing upon the empirical study findings, it will now be 
considered to what extent (if at all) procedural fairness in ASBO cases has featured 
secondary in the pursuit of policy objectives, and moreover, whether administrative 
and procedural decision-making in ASBO cases can, for the most part98, be said to 
embody a general principle of procedural fairness. 
 
Defending ASBO Applications 
From the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6, we are able to observe that while 
ASBO applications are rejected by the courts very rarely, judicial discretion can in 
fact play a pivotal role in determining (and, importantly, limiting) the scope of ASBO 
prohibitions. However, it is now argued in the context of our theoretical 
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consideration of fairness in ASBO proceedings, that there are two factors which 
have become significant for the purposes of this theoretical analysis - and that they 
subsequently require to be considered here in more detail. These two elements 
are, firstly, the nature of the civil procedure which has been used to achieve the 
high success rate of ASBO applications, and secondly, the legislative provision for 
an automatic right of appeal in ASBO cases. 
 The decision of the House of Lords in McCann99 - to classify ASBO 
proceedings as civil in nature - signified that the rule against using hearsay and 
professional witness evidence (which applies in criminal proceedings), would not 
apply to ASBO applications. As we have already seen, this judgement enables 
professional witness evidence and hearsay to be used in cases where witnesses 
are too intimidated or fearful of reprisals to give evidence themselves. In my view, 
the need to protect witnesses from retribution in ASBO cases legitimately 
necessitates the requirement of civil rules of evidence in such cases where 
reprisals and intimidation are (potential) features. Indeed, I believe that the 
protection of witnesses, who have suffered from persistent acts of antisocial 
behaviour, is one of the most vital aspects of the ASBO model. As the survey data 
returns demonstrated, over 90% of respondents in England and Wales had 
continued to experience difficulties in securing witnesses in ASBO cases as a 
result of ‘fear of reprisals’. However, while it is fair to say that hearsay and 
professional witness evidence was perhaps viewed by government policy makers 
as, if not a panacea, then certainly an elixir, for the problems associated with 
obtaining evidence from fearful or intimidated witnesses, the survey returns 
suggest that the use of hearsay and professional witness evidence has not 
extinguished these difficulties and, as a number of respondents in England and 
Wales detailed, witnesses in ASBO cases continue to suffer intimidation and 
retribution (before, during and after) the court process. 
 Consequently, it is not surprising that the survey data shows that interim 
ASBOs are almost always obtained on the basis of hearsay evidence, or, as interim 
order rules allow, on a prima facie basis, without the lodging of any witness 
statements or productions. However, it was perhaps surprising to discover that over 
twenty per cent of survey respondents in England and Wales had been able to 
obtain a full ASBO based only on hearsay evidence. While, in my view, there are 
certainly legitimate grounds for the imposition of an interim ASBO based only on 
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hearsay evidence100, the scope for error(s) in decision-making (bureaucratic and 
legal) are certainly increased when the courts are willing to endorse the use of full 
ASBOs – with a two year minimum duration in England in Wales – obtained only on 
the basis of hearsay evidence. When orders are applied for and granted in this 
way, the opportunity for ASBOs to be used as part of a neighbour(hood)/community 
vendetta is significantly increased. 
 Yet, in spite of this, I would not go as far as to say that full ASBOs should 
not be granted solely on the basis of hearsay or professional witness evidence. 
This would preclude the use of ASBOs, and the protection that they might 
provide101, for victims of antisocial behaviour. Rather, I would argue that, in view of 
the civil rules of evidence used in ASBO cases, and the high success rate of ASBO 
applications, in order to achieve fair treatment for defendants in ASBO applications, 
there must exist provisions which mitigate the conflict between the protection of 
individuals from antisocial behaviour, and the right of defendants to fair treatment. 
Within this paradigm, I would place the provision of adequate legal representation, 
and the right of appeal as being of fundamental importance.  
 While the Home Affairs Committee on Antisocial Behaviour (House of 
Commons, 2005a) noted the existence of the automatic right of appeal in ASBO 
cases, it also suggested that cases where an order had been issued 
‘inappropriately’, and the option of the right of appeal was not taken, highlighted the 
variable quality of legal representation available to defendants, rather than any 
difficulties with the legislative provisions for appeal. When asked if they agreed with 
the opinion of the Home Affairs Committee on the variation in the quality of defence 
counsel, over 50% of solicitors in England and Wales stated that they did agree. 
Almost a quarter of solicitors believed the quality of defence counsel available to 
ASBO defendants to be ‘highly variable’, although the majority of respondents (over 
60%) thought that, overall, the quality of defence counsel was of a good standard. 
However, with regard to the right of appeal specifically, respondents in all 
jurisdictions identified the ‘lack of legal aid’ as the primary reason for low numbers 
of appeal in ASBO cases. Let us now consider the quality of defence counsel 
available to ASBO defendants, and the current limits placed upon legal aid.  
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 Although not ideal, the opportunity for poor decision-making is somewhat mitigated by 
an opportunity for swift redress in a full hearing 
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 I have already discussed the lack of conclusive evidence of the ‘effectiveness’ of ASBOs 
(see Chapter 3). However, I acknowledge the findings of the National Audit Office’s study 
(2006) which suggests that ASBO interventions can be effective in reducing antisocial 
behaviour; I also acknowledge that there are anecdotal accounts of the effectiveness of the 
orders; and I further acknowledge that, in the course of my interviews with the judiciary in 
Scotland, several Sheriffs argued that ASBOs were ‘working’. 
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In an adversary system, the quality of legal representation available to 
defendants, may, it is fair to speculate, affect the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
substantive rights. Given that the quality of representation depends on the ability to 
pay, current civil procedure doctrine would seem to provide a systematic 
distribution of the risk of error in favour of those who have the greatest share of 
social resources. In a recent speech102 on barriers to access to justice, Mr Justice 
Lightman described the erosion of the protection of rights (‘human and otherwise’) 
by the ‘emasculation’ of civil legal aid, which has meant that ‘the cost of enforcing 
or defending such rights were beyond all but the very rich and the legally aided’. 
Justice Lightman argued that, in view of the Government’s unwillingness to fund 
‘access to justice’, ‘[t]he dilemma, then, is how to provide the protection of the law 
to citizens who cannot pay’, concluding that, ‘No thinking person can be but 
embarrassed by the lack of provision by the State of the means for access to the 
courts.’ 
Moreover, the importance of the standard of legal representation provided 
to a defendant should not be understated, given the range of functions that 
solicitors potentially can undertake. As Galligan observes: ‘Lawyers can provide 
advice on what must be done to gain benefits or to avoid burdens; they can help in 
collecting evidence and presenting the facts; they can advise on the law; and they 
can be especially effective in examining the facts and material upon which the 
deciding authority proposes to act. If the matter goes to appeal, then lawyers can 
provide invaluable help in assembling and presenting the case’ (1996a: 363). 
Indeed, the skills involved in legal representation should not be underestimated, 
since it is unlikely that defendants will be able to successfully represent 
themselves. Lightman, J. has warned: ‘Do not believe that justice can be readily 
achieved by litigants acting in person. Quite the reverse. They cannot generally 
distinguish what is and what is not arguable, what course serves their interest and 
what risks they run over costs’103.  
Walker et al.’s (1979) rudimentary work on procedural fairness in legal 
contexts found, contrary to the situation which presently predominates (where, the 
client, by virtue of their lesser position, both in terms of knowledge and in terms of 
their limited options, is lead by their solicitor) that, in fact: 
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‘[T]he attorney should facilitate participation by the client in the decision 
making process. The case ought to be regarded as belonging to the client, 
not to the lawyer, and the attorney should see himself as the agency 
through which the client exercises salutary control over the process. In this 
client-centred role, the attorney best functions as an officer of the court in 
the sense of serving the wider public interest’ (1979: 1417).  
 
However, it appears that, in the (minority of) cases where legal representation is of 
a poor standard (for example, where the solicitor is uninformed about legislative 
provisions or is disinterested in representing the client’s best interests), the 
defendant will have few alternative options. 
So, in the context that we have been discussing, there is certainly the scope 
for ASBOs to be issued inappropriately. In these instances, it appears that the 
standard of defence counsel constitutes one factor in this outcome. It has been 
suggested that the high success rates for ASBO applications means that applicant 
agencies are applying for the orders in the correct circumstances, and are 
providing the requisite evidence in support of their applications. However, interview 
data from the judiciary in Scotland, for example, demonstrates that ASBO 
applications are infrequently contested, even in circumstances where there may be 
legitimate reasons for doing so. The potential for ASBO applications to be issued 
inappropriately in these circumstances would therefore appear to make the 
legislative provision for the automatic right of appeal all the more necessary. Yet, 
as the survey data for England and Wales also demonstrates, the right of appeal is 
being taken in only a very small number of cases. Solicitor respondents to the 
survey questionnaire suggested that this was primarily a result of a ‘lack of Legal 
Aid’.  
The current restrictions on legal aid, it has been argued, are particularly 
stringent. For example, in Scotland in 2005/06, an application for legal aid was 
made in 81 out of 344 ASBO application cases. In 43 of these cases, the pursuer 
(applicant authority) objected to the application. The two main reasons cited for 
objection were where an application was deemed ‘not in the public interest’ and 
therefore ‘a waste of money’ and secondly, where there was ‘no defence to the 
action’. As a result, legal aid was granted in only a tenth of ASBO cases in 
2005/06104 (Scottish Executive, 2005b: s.4.4). Similarly, in England and Wales, the 
reforms to Legal Aid resulting from Lord Carter’s Review of Legal Aid Procurement 
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(House of Lords, 2006) have been unpopular with the legal profession, having been 
described as ‘rigid’ and ‘complex’. It has also been argued that the reforms have 
alienated some sections of society most in need of legal services. For example, a 
single parent working full-time on the minimum wage, and supporting a child, is not 
eligible for legal aid in criminal proceedings at the magistrates' court. 
But where do these wider issues about legal aid, legal representation, and 
access to justice, sit within our examination of procedural fairness in ASBO 
applications? Firstly, let us consider the way in which Galligan reconciles legal 
representation and fair treatment: 
 
‘In determining when legal representation is needed for fair treatment, the 
principal guideline should be that legal advice and representation are 
needed when, without them, the person affected would not be able properly 
to prepare and present his case…The principle of English law is that legal 
or other representation of a party in an administrative process is not a 
necessary requirement of procedural fairness. An authority must follow fair 
procedures, and whether representation is required as a fair procedure 
depends on the context’ (1996a: 365, emphasis added) 
 
Indeed, Adler (2003: 331) talks of ‘trade offs’ that are made between institutional 
actors in administrative processes, and, moreover, he recognises a plurality of 
competing normative positions on what it means to treat people fairly (Adler, 2006: 
637). While greater access to the courts in the form of legal aid would, in my view, 
be a step towards increased access to justice, it is also essential that the system 
aims at a balance between accuracy and its cost. Consider, for example, Richard 
Posner’s economic analysis of procedure (1992). He writes:  
 
‘The objective of a procedural system, viewed economically, is to minimize 
the sum of two types of cost. The first is the cost of erroneous judicial 
decisions. The second type of cost is the cost of operating the procedural 
system’ (p.312).  
 
Operating costs are borne by the public in the form of subsidies to the judicial 
system and by the parties in the form of court fees, solicitor’s fess, and litigation 
costs. However, cost is not the most relevant factor when considering the value of 
legal representation within the administrative process. Instead, the effects of 
increased legal provision, particularly with regard to appeal cases, on an over-
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burdened and lethargic summary justice system should be considered. Hence, the 
effect of increased legal provision on the summary justice system is certainly an 
important consideration in this context. While there is evidence to show a 
correlation between legal representation and delay, this is of course no reason to 
bypass procedural fairness for administrative expediency - indeed, delay may be a 
necessary factor for good decision-making (Genn and Genn, 1990). However, de 
facto practical considerations mean that procedural justice is only achieved through 
an exercise in counterbalance and proportionality. While the enfranchisement of all 
participants in court processes via, amongst other elements, access to legal 
representation of a certain standard, should be an aspirational ideal, current 
circumstances necessitate that such objectives are viewed within the wider sphere 
of an overburdened and lethargic summary justice system.   
Taking Scotland as an example, the current level of criminal prosecution is 
130,000 cases per year, of which 90,000 cases are heard in the Sheriff Court 
(Scottish Parliament, 2007). The increasing number of cases has resulted in undue 
delay and the summary justice system has become slow and progressively less 
efficient. Moreover, the costs related to bringing a case to court mean that 
prosecution is an extremely expensive option and hugely above the average fine105. 
As a result, jurists and legal professionals/practitioners have argued that fewer 
cases (relating to lower level criminality such as littering and nuisance behaviour) 
should be addressed by the courts (McInnes, 2005). It is thus highly unlikely that 
the summary justice system, in its current form, would be able to cope with a 
significant increase in its case load and it should also be remembered that wide 
and unfettered access to legal representation would likely give rise to an increase 
in the number of spurious and/or illegitimate cases. 
Nonetheless, I would certainly argue that current provisions for legal aid are 
unduly prescriptive, and without doubt, mean that access to the courts, and 
consequently to fair treatment, is fundamentally circumscribed for participants in 
ASBO cases, and civil trials more generally. However, one way of approaching this 
difficulty without ‘opening the floodgates’ to unrestricted legal representation is to 
attempt to ensure fairness from within the court process itself. Certainly, given the 
autonomy entrusted to local enforcement agencies, a rigorous approach to 
evidence gathering and case management should be ascribed the highest priority. 
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Yet, as we have seen, nearly half of solicitors surveyed in England and Wales cited 
the ‘urgent’ need for the introduction of case management powers for ASBO 
applications. A lack of interagency consultation and co-operation; inconsistent 
attitudes towards information sharing; the presence of inexperienced evidence 
gatherers; the defence rarely serving evidence before trial; vague hearing dates; 
and, a disjointed framework for the ASBO process with different procedures in 
different courts, were all contributing factors that respondents argued necessitated 
the creation of powers to enable the courts to apply rigorous case management to 
ASBO proceedings. An illustration of the importance of the requirement for rigorous 
case management is made by a recent ASBO case in Manchester. In July 2007, a 
lady in Manchester was awarded £2000 in compensation by her local authority 
after The Local Government Ombudsman said that Manchester City Council was 
guilty of an ‘abuse of power of nightmarish proportions’ in obtaining an ASBO 
against her based upon false and uncorroborated allegations from a neighbour. In 
this instance, the court granted an interim order against the lady a week after 
ASBO papers were served against her.  
This case appears similar in kind to examples cited by Halliday (2004) in his 
study of homelessness decision-making - where legal values were sometimes 
regarded as ‘unwelcome intruders’ by authority staff. He illustrates this with 
reference to the importance of ‘professional intuition’. In homelessness decision-
making, for example, experienced decision makers develop ‘confidence in their 
ability to gain an almost immediate sense of the truth underlying an applicant’s 
claim for housing so that they are able to “just know” what a case was about’. 
(p.54). Halliday identified a ‘strong internal culture which resists interference from 
legal values’ (p.59) so that, in trusting their intuition, decision makers react out of a 
siege mentality to reject the normative authority of the law (p.60). Given that 
Manchester city council has obtained the highest number of ASBOs in Britain, 
parallels could perhaps be drawn between these types of example, whereby 
because of the volume of decisions being made by local authority staff (and the 
autonomy conferred upon them) elements of the law are not necessarily paid the 
requisite attention. Subsequently, the potential benefits of statutory case 
management rules for ASBO proceedings will be considered more fully in the next 
chapter. 
 
Interim orders granted ex parte  
As previously discussed, the vast majority of interim orders in Britain are granted 
on the basis of hearsay evidence or, as the legislation permits, on a prima facie 
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basis without the hearing of any evidence or the lodging of any witness statements 
or productions. Moreover, in England and Wales, interim orders can be granted ex 
parte (without notice to the defendant). It follows, of course, that if an application is 
made on notice, then the defendant may choose to give evidence at the hearing. 
However, the study findings showed that evidence is rarely served at the interim 
application stage (in either Scotland, or in England and Wales), and as one Sheriff 
concluded: defence ‘solicitors take the attitude that there is so much that has 
happened before we get to the stage of an antisocial behaviour order that there is 
no point opposing the interim order’. Consequently, orders that are made ex parte 
necessarily mean that the defendant will have no opportunity to give evidence at 
this stage of the application process. In terms of the wider implications for 
procedural justice, we must now consider ex parte applications, and applications 
made on a prima facie basis in the context of the right to be heard – and whether 
such a right does or should exist in relation to ASBO action. 
 A hearing, in its simplest legal context, is a procedure through which 
evidence is imparted from both parties, and the process provides an opportunity for 
argument to be presented from more than one source. In this way, a hearing is 
important in providing fairness in procedure, and in achieving a balance between 
the competing interests of the parties. Moreover, good decision-making will most 
often necessarily require an investigation of an individual’s circumstances and a 
hearing will be an effective means of achieving this. Thus, the opportunity for an 
individual to be heard within a given legal process is fundamentally bound up with 
conceptions of fair treatment, impartiality and equity. However, while the principle 
of a hearing is certainly intrinsic to discussions about fairness and procedure – it is 
important to consider the boundaries and limits of such a principle, and how it is 
variously construed. So if we consider the hearing principle in ASBO applications 
within the wider context of procedural justice, we must first necessarily examine 
what values are at stake, and what standards they generate in terms of fair 
treatment of person(s) involved in the legal process.  
 The hearing process is fundamental to good decision-making and good 
outcomes, primarily because a hearing embodies the telos of the civil procedural 
system as a ‘search for truth’. A hearing also allows the opportunity for an 
individual to actively advance or to defend their interests, which is a relationship 
that ‘draws on the value of each person being actively engaged in his relationship 
with the state, rather than being the passive recipient of benefits or the victim of 
burdens’ and consequently, the hearing is ‘directly linked to fair treatment’ 
(Galligan, 1996a: 349). While the notion of an individual’s right to autonomy, self-
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determination and the preservation of rights in the context of legal process(es) is 
embodied within the hearing principle, Galligan simultaneously advances another, 
far less individualised explanation for the right to be heard. Acknowledging that, 
although one could argue in favour of the hearing principle on the basis of respect 
– after all, ‘respect for a person requires that he be heard’ (ibid.) – he is mindful of 
the fact that ‘there is, however, scarce support for this approach in judicial 
statements of principle’ (ibid.). Instead, he posits that: 
 
‘The hearing principle might be approached in another way, not in order to 
establish rights, but to show its value to society as a whole…There may 
also be social gains, perhaps less tangible, in having a citizenry which is 
active in protecting its own interests and in each being treated with respect 
by the whole.’ (p. 352) 
 
Indeed, a consideration of English case law on the hearing principle suggests that 
the right to be heard is a fundamental tenet of English law. For example, Lord 
Diplock considered the right to be heard one of the fundamental rights generated 
by the general duty on administrative officials to act fairly towards those affected by 
its decisions (O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 1 AC 237 at 279). The right to be heard 
meant in that case learning what is alleged against the person, and then having the 
chance to put forward an answer to it.  Similarly, in Scots law, the Scotland Act 
1998, and Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 safeguards the right to ‘a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’. Implicit in the requirement for a ‘fair hearing’ is the principle of 
equality of arms between litigants, and the opportunity to present a case. However, 
while Galligan observes the hearing principle as linked to societal good, and citizen 
participation, he also recognises that ‘the supposed principle that a person should 
be heard is much less secure as a general legal practice then judicial statements 
suggest’ (p.355). 
 In the context of the discussion of procedural fairness embodied within this 
Chapter, specifically in respect of antisocial behaviour orders granted ex parte in 
England and Wales, it is thus important to note the provision for defendants to 
make an early challenge to a decision to grant an application made in their 
absence is included within the relevant statutory provisions. The Justices’ Clerks’ 
Society Good Practice Guide to Antisocial Behaviour Orders states that: ‘ex-parte 
interim orders should be given as early a return date as practicable to allow the 
defendant an opportunity to be heard’ (2006: 6). Galligan goes as far as to say that, 
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although ‘ex parte applications by one party in the absence of the other are 
presumptively unfair…the unfairness can be removed by effective procedures for 
early challenge by the absent party’ (1996a: 391, emphasis added). While I would 
not go as far as Galligan in stating that an early return date necessarily removes 
inequity in procedure, the opportunity for a speedy challenge to an incorrect 
decision certainly provides redress for affected parties. Whether an individual who 
has had an ex parte order issued to them in error106 would necessarily view an 
early return date as negating any injustice in the original procedure remains to be 
seen. 
 The principle of a hearing  - the right to be heard – is thus not by any means 
absolute in law, and defendants should not necessarily expect to be afforded a 
hearing. Indeed, the discretionary power of the courts means that they will seek to 
establish if, given the type of case before them, fair procedure could only be 
achieved were the defendant given the opportunity to be heard. Galligan states that 
‘the courts often ask whether a hearing is necessary in the circumstances of the 
case to ensure fair treatment’ (1996a: 353). Thus, it is argued that interim orders 
granted ex parte do not presumptively infer unfair treatment, rather, the issuing of 
ex parte orders should be considered within the context of the balancing of parties’ 
competing interests. While I certainly agree with Galligan’s statement that ‘there is 
still a strong case for a presumption in administrative processes generally in favour 
of a hearing, not as a fundamental principle, but for a mixture of practical and 
value-based reasons’ (ibid: 355), it is also apparent that the principle of a hearing 
falls within the scope of the discretionary autonomy of the judiciary to decide the 
bounds of fair treatment through their interpretation of symmetry, proportionality 
and individual rights-based considerations in ASBO applications. Thus, let us now 
turn to an analysis of judicial discretion within the context of administrative and 
procedural justice in ASBO cases. 
 
Discretion and procedural justice 
Harlow and Rawlings claim (1997: 516) that, in recent years, there has been a 
measure of increased judicial activism and of greater flexibility of response in 
judicial decision-making. Indeed, Marchetti and Daly have observed that ‘there is a 
new breed of magistrates and judges in the criminal courts who are taking a more 
activist stance in criminal justice policy’ (2004: 2), while Douglas and Laster (1992) 
have discerned the considerable optimism among magistrates regarding the 
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 Perhaps, as suggested by the European Commissioner on Human Rights, as a result of 
a spiteful neighbour(hood)/community vendetta against them (Giles-Robles, 2005) 
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potential of the courts to assist the community. Moreover, my earlier discussion 
(Chapter 2) of existing empirical research evidence on judicial discretion (see, for 
example, Anleu and Mack, 2005; 2007; Baldwin, 1997; Cowan et al., 2006; Hood, 
1962; 1972; 1992; Hunter et al., Lawrence, 1995; Marchetti and Daly, 2004; 2005; 
Millie et al., 2007; Pawson et al, 2005) demonstrated the ‘multifaceted’ nature of 
judicial decision-making and the wide and diverse range of factors reported as 
being influential in how discretion is exercised. In this context, it is important to 
consider the implications of judicial discretion on administrative and procedural 
fairness in ASBO cases. 
 
Decision-making and the ‘public interest’ 
Socio-legal scholars have often noted the dangers inherent in discretionary 
decision-making (for example, Cowan et al., 2003; Hood, 1962; 1972; 1992; Lacey, 
1992; Macdonald, 2003). For instance, Macdonald cites ‘the possible use of 
illegitimate criteria, the risk of inconsistencies of outcome, and the potential for 
arrogant or careless decision-making’ (2003: 195). Yet, it is important to remind 
ourselves also that while the principle function of the judiciary is to support the 
pillars of government established under the law, to maintain law and order, and to 
protect the public interest, traditionally it is not their role to promote or to advocate 
change, nor is it primarily to protect individual freedoms. However, instances when 
the courts will move to defend and to protect individual rights are notably, when this 
is deemed to be in the ‘public interest’.   
Yet, the court’s validation (and potential endorsement) of the use of ASBOs 
against disadvantaged and/or marginalised groups (such as the mentally ill, 
homeless people and on-street sex workers), would seem to suggest a particularly 
narrow interpretation of this term (‘public interest’) by certain judges - and it is 
unconditionally the judges of both the higher and lower courts who decide the 
bounds of the public interest in ASBO applications. Hence, the inappropriate 
issuing of ASBOs is an area of concern, which raises questions about the value 
and status of civil liberties and human rights within antisocial behaviour legislation. 
While the Home Affairs Committee stated that ‘we do not consider the 
inappropriate issuing of ASBOs…[to be] a major problem’ (House of Commons, 
2005a: 73), the Committee also recommended that ‘the Home Office commissions 
wide-ranging research in this area’ (ibid).   
The interview study data demonstrated that, in many of the ASBO 
applications that came before the Sheriffs in Scotland, the defendants were likely to 
be affected by problems such as addiction, mental health problems, unemployment 
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and economic marginalization. Indeed, one Sheriff stated that ’something like 70% 
of the [total court] cases that come before us involve drug or alcohol dependency’. 
Similarly, critics of the ASBO have frequently identified that those who are made 
subject to the terms of the orders, are often those who have ‘extreme vulnerability’ 
as a result of their marginalized circumstances (for example, see Carr and Cowan 
(2006), Hunter et al. (2000)). As the interview data showed, the majority of Sheriffs 
interviewed, while acknowledging that addiction and mental health problems were 
common features of the ASBO cases that came before them, did not think that this 
necessarily presented a problem for ASBO applications per se – most saw 
addiction and mental health problems as ‘a fact of life in these type of cases’ which 
was to be ‘expected’. Alternatively, (a minority) of Sheriffs were very concerned 
about the use of the orders for people with (in particular) addiction problems. Their 
concern about this aspect of ASBO use appeared to have an impact on the 
outcome of such applications. However, it was evident that these factors would 
only have an impact on sentencers’ decision-making if the sentencers were (made) 
aware of the defendant’s circumstances, or if they had previous knowledge of the 
defendant. In light of the interview findings, we will now consider more fully what 
forms discretion might take in ASBO cases, and how the effects of those forms 
affect judgements about administrative justice and fair procedure.  
 
Consistency in decision-making 
A particularly important empirical finding from the research study concerns the 
consistency in judicial decision-making in ASBO cases. This research showed that 
there were different patterns of decisions both between courts and between 
individual Sheriffs in courts. A variety of (possible) explanations to account for the 
variations between the courts became apparent. These factors include (but are not 
necessarily limited to): the prevalence and type of antisocial behaviour in the local 
authority area; the quality of relationship between the sentencer and the applicant 
authority; the local authority’s willingness to use alternative interventions (ABCs, 
mediation et cetera); evidentiary requirements deemed necessary to obtain an 
interim/ASBO; and the attitudes of the solicitors/sentencers regarding 
interim/ASBO applications. 
Moreover, there was also considerable variation between individual 
sentencers’ decision-making on ASBO applications. The qualitative data obtained 
from the interviews with Sheriffs highlighted the contribution of the following key 
factors: whether the alleged antisocial behaviour perpetrator is already known to 
the sentencer; the presence of mitigating factors (for example, drug/alcohol 
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dependency and/or mental health problems); the sentencer’s understanding of the 
status of breach proceedings; the sentencer’s willingness to grant orders on 
conviction; the sentencer’s understanding and/or awareness of ASBO legislation 
and case law.  So far as sentencing for breach was concerned, decision-making 
was primarily influenced by the sentencer’s understanding of the status of breach 
proceedings – that is to say, whether sentencers viewed breach proceedings (for 
criminal acts) as possessing an identical, or an elevated, legal standing in 
proceedings. A sentencer’s view of the status of breach proceedings was 
underpinned by their belief about whether the purpose of the ASBO was to 
augment the available penalty for a criminal act. In this respect, there was 
considerable variation among sentencers’ decision-making in breach proceedings. 
As a result, different penalties applied in relation to breach proceedings for similar 
criminal acts - depending on the decision-making of the individual sentencer, and 
whether they viewed the role of the ASBO as providing an increment in sentencing. 
However, much greater consistency in approach and outcomes was observed in 
relation to decision-making for orders on conviction (CRASBOs). The majority of 
sentencers were very reluctant to grant this type of order because they were 
dissatisfied with court procedure for the issuing of orders on conviction (in respect 
of information being passed to the Sheriff). However, it should be noted that there 
are other court jurisdictions in Scotland (which were not studied in the course of 
this research investigation) where sentencers have made greater (although still 
limited) use of orders on conviction. A larger scale study of sentencers’ use of 
orders on conviction in Scotland would, it is suggested, be useful in further 
accounting for the differences in the approach of sentencers to the use of orders on 
conviction in other court jurisdictions. 
In the course of the interviews, sentencers often commented on the 
‘political’ nature of antisocial behaviour and the use of ASBOs. Some Sheriffs 
believed ASBOs were a ‘bad idea’ and a ‘means to bypass justice’, and that the 
recent focus upon the use of ASBOs was ‘politically driven’. Other Sheriffs 
commented that antisocial behaviour legislation (including other antisocial 
behaviour interventions such as Parenting Orders) is rarely used. While the number 
of sentencers in favour of the use of ASBOs and those against appeared to be 
fairly well balanced, those sentencers who were opposed to the use of the orders, 
or who felt that the legislation was ‘poorly constructed’, explicitly stated that this did 
not mean that they were not granting the orders. Nevertheless, from interviews 
conducted with the sentencers, and from observation of relevant case files, it was 
clear that a broad range of factors impacts on judicial discretion in ASBO 
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applications - which may or may not be influenced by whether or not the sentencer 
supports, or is opposed to, the use of the orders. For example, one Sheriff stated 
that the orders must be well drafted in order for an application to succeed. Of 
course ‘well drafted’ is a subjective term, which, from the interview data, evidently 
varies in its interpretation. Moreover, the sentencers’ attitudes as to what 
constitutes ‘antisocial behaviour’ are not uniform - but it is evident from the 
interviews that the local context, and the type and prevalence of antisocial 
behaviour in the local authority area, exerts some influence on the use of discretion 
in granting orders. Hence, a wide range of factors can be seen as being influential 
in how Sheriffs exercised their discretion in individual cases107. In this respect, 
ASBO proceedings108 are a lottery, depending both on court location and the 
individual sentencer. 
 Although it was concluded earlier in this chapter that the requirement for like 
cases to be treated alike, and different cases to be treated differently, was not 
absolute in terms of achieving fairness in legal administrative procedure(s) - as it is 
for the courts to decide best what procedures are necessary for fair treatment - one 
cannot avoid the inescapable, but wholly unsurprising, conclusion that judicial 
discretion has resulted in wide inconsistency in the administration of ASBOs. To 
what extent that inconsistency necessarily negates fairness in procedure is, at the 
very least, contentious. 
 Consider Pepinsky on discretion as a product of the law: 
 
‘There is no basis in our experience of the social world for believing that the 
meaning of written rules of conduct can be determined independently of the 
ambiguities of human interpretation….If sociologists are to be true to their 
disciplinary faith, they must reject pursuit of the issues of whether or not 
discretion under law exists in this or that setting, in favour of asking what 
forms discretion might take and how the effects of those forms might vary 
as changes are made in positive law.’ (1978: 53, emphasis added) 
 
Pepinsky’s socio-legal analysis of judicial discretion demonstrates that discretion is 
not only something which operates at a formal level of legal doctrine, but is also an 
element that percolates through the entirety of legal administrative proceedings. He 
posits, correctly in my view, that we should not centre socio-legal debates on 
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 There was no evidence of judges having regard to inappropriate factors, simply that they 
approached decision-making in the different ways set out above. 
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 With regard to the formation of prohibitions, and sentencing for breach in particular 
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judicial discretion around whether discretion does or does not exist, or should or 
should not exist, in any given legal context – rather, we should consider the 
affective dimensions of discretionary decision-making. That is to say that, in this 
context, we must consider inconsistency in outcomes within the wider context of 
fairness and justice. In a similar vein, Millie et al.’s (2007: 261) recent study of 
borderline sentencing – while recognising the potential for judicial discretion to 
result in wide variation ‘between sentencers, between courts [and] between social 
groups’ - is sympathetic towards the use of discretion in the sentencing process. 
They contend that the need for judicial discretion in the sentencing process should 
be considered alongside arguments that discretion furthers, rather than ‘erodes’ 
justice109. 
However, critics of the use of ASBOs – and the ‘postcode lottery’ that exists 
in their application – often cite the indeterminateness of the legal definition of 
antisocial behaviour as being responsible for the inconsistency in their use. 
Although Macdonald has noted in his account of judicial discretion in the ASBO 
process, that ‘[s]ome degree of vagueness is unavoidable when seeking to define 
an umbrella term like antisocial behaviour’ (2006: 206), Ashworth and Zedner 
(2008: 31) have argued that the flexible nature of the legal definition of antisocial 
behaviour – and the degree of discretion that it confers upon the courts - 
‘contravenes the rule-of-law principles of certainty and fair-warning’. In a related 
argument, proponents of the ‘extravagant version of the rule of law theory’110 (that 
is to say, those who seek to limit the use of discretion within the law) contend that, 
in order to ensure that like cases are treated alike, and different cases are treated 
differently, the law must be specific in what it expects of those bound by it, and 
legislation must be clear and unambiguous when it seeks to curtail specific 
behaviour(s)111. However, according to Pepinsky, such an assumption ‘overlooks 
the fact, well known to semantics, that language does not determine its own 
meaning. As the language of the law grows more detailed, the number of pretexts 
grows geometrically for honest differences in interpreting how the law should be 
applied to cases’ (Pepinsky, 1978: 30). Indeed, Pepinsky concludes that: ‘The 
assumption that spelling out terms of the law reduces discretion is too glib to 
accept on its face’ (ibid: 31).  
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 Although they do not go into detail, Millie et al. posit that a reduction in the weight 
attached to the offender’s characteristics, and then subsequently, corresponding weight 
attached to the offence – might offer some form of response to debates about the operation 
of discretion in current sentencing practices (2007: 261) 
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 See also Chapter 1 
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 See also Hart (1961: 155) 
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Similarly, my argument here, in considering these principles, is that de facto 
judicial discretion is not at fault. While I accept that there are legitimate discussions 
to be had concerning the legal definition of antisocial behaviour and its scope, 
inconsistency in decision-making remains inevitable for the reasons that I have 
stated above. However, I would argue that discretion can appear increasingly wide 
and unfettered, leading to public dissatisfaction with outcomes, when court 
procedures are themselves inept or lacking in some respect. As Pound112 has 
articulated, public dissatisfaction with the courts can indeed be reduced, by 
alterations in court procedures. Earlier in this chapter, it was observed that nearly 
half of solicitors surveyed in England and Wales cited the ‘urgent’ need for the 
introduction of case management powers for ASBO applications. In this respect, it 
is suggested that improved case management and/or the creation of statutory case 
management powers is a possible means to improve fairness in ASBO 
procedure(s) and outcome(s).   
Indeed, the benefits of case management for civil cases generally, have 
now been advocated for some considerable time. For example, in a 1995 Review 
of the Business of the Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland, Lord Cullen 
clearly saw case management as potentially a very important provision which could 
be of benefit to all civil cases, but which could be targeted to particular areas or 
cases if necessary. In his recommendations, he suggested that a case 
management hearing should be fixed in every civil case, ‘for the purpose of 
seeking, consistently with doing justice between the parties, the expeditious 
progress of the action and the avoidance of unnecessary expense’ (Stoddart, 1997: 
60). Moreover, Lord Woolf’s report on Access to Justice (1996), adopts as its 
starting point the premise that unacceptable delays in civil cases will not be 
eliminated unless a system of case management is adopted by the judiciary. Such 
a system enables the court to allocate a case to a different ‘track’, if is practicable 
and desirable to do so. Furthermore, the most recent research on ASBOs 
conducted by the National Audit Office (2006: 7) also suggested that ‘improved 
case management’ would encourage the most effective use of the orders. 
The main difficulty with the statutory implementation of case management in 
ASBO cases would appear, however, to be the allocation of judicial time for such a 
task. For example, although there are currently 154 courts in England and Wales 
specialising in antisocial behaviour applications, 46% of survey respondents in 
England and Wales detailed the continuing difficulties that they were encountering 
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with the speed at which the court deals with listing ASBO applications; and also 
with obtaining early court dates in urgent interim order cases. While it is ‘good 
[court] practice’ to list the first hearing of an application quickly so as to ascertain 
whether it can be contested, and if so, to identify the issues in the case (JSB, 
2007), 20% of respondents in England and Wales, and 33% of respondents in 
Scotland, stated that the approximate average length of time an ASBO case was 
taking to come before the court, from Summons to Final Hearing, was more than 
19 weeks113. Thus, it is suggested that a rigorous re-appraisal of court time-tabling 
is required in order that case management powers can be enacted for ASBO 
applications. Further, it is argued that statutory case management powers would 
help to ensure greater consistency, stringency and accuracy in approach to ASBO 
cases, and would also go some way to limiting unnecessary complexity. Hence, it 
is submitted that it that court procedures should be constructed rigorously to ensure 
that ASBOs are used proportionately, and with due consideration. It is my belief 
that removing discretion from the formal law is unlikely to alter the ways in which 
different courts, and different judges, operate court procedures. However, given the 
autonomy entrusted to local enforcement agencies, a rigorous approach to 
evidence gathering and case management should be ascribed the highest priority. 
In this context, the creation of case management powers in respect of all ASBO 
applications is recommended. 
 
ASBOs, law, and power 
In the final section of this chapter, let us now consider where the above discussion 
of the substantive research findings sits within the wider context of law as a site of 
power, and its potential to act as an instrument of domination. First, however, we 
must begin by briefly revisiting those areas which appear problematic for achieving 
‘fairness’ and equity before the law in ASBO action. As Ashworth and Zedner have 
observed, recent changes to the treatment of defendants under the law in Britain, in 
respect of new legal definitions of crime, and the modification and revision of 
procedure(s) and sanctions, has ‘profound normative implications for a liberal 
theory of…law’ which necessitates ‘its re-articulation and defence’ (2008: 21). 
Through, in particular, the increased use of hybrid civil/criminal remedies and an 
escalation in the use of summary trials, Ashworth and Zedner contend that the 
                                               
113
 Campbell (2002: 56) had found that the average length of time, from summons to final 
hearing, was 13 weeks, with some applicant agencies reporting up to 6 months. Fletcher 
(2002) found that more than half of ASBOs granted in Scotland (2001-02) took more than 
16 weeks to obtain (from the date of lodging the application in court).  
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traditional safeguards of due process are being eroded, resulting in the 
disintegration of our established concepts of procedural justice (see also Ashworth 
et al., 1998; Ashworth, 2006). 
 As we have seen from the discussion above, there are significant grounds 
for such a critique of the ASBO process. Indeed, basic procedural rights such as 
the need for proper notice of charge, adequate time for preparing a defence, state-
funded legal assistance, the right to confront witnesses et cetera have all been 
considered critically in the context of ASBO legal and court processes. Moreover, 
attention has been paid to the use of evidence in ASBO applications, where it has 
been observed that the primary source of evidence in interim cases is untested 
hearsay – which, it was found, has been used in some circumstances to form the 
sole basis to full ASBO applications. The wide discretion available to both applicant 
authorities and to judges also means that orders are used to proscribe forms of low 
level nuisance behaviour as well as more serious forms of criminal behaviour 
which, some sentencers argued, may be better dealt with under the general 
criminal law.  
 However, I am arguing that, within the ASBO process, law retains its status 
as a site of power – which is used not simply as a mechanism to circumvent the 
safeguards of due process, but which is being used as a means to protect and to 
guarantee liberties. It is certainly the case that the evidence presented within this 
thesis (specifically in the form of the survey data from England and Wales) 
illustrates the requirement for improved administrative courts procedures which, 
notably, I have suggested could be addressed through improved case 
management. However, I think that the evidence (specifically in the form of the 
interview data from the Scottish sentencers) also shows that the law – in its current 
form – is being used as a means to safeguard the interests of ASBO defendants. 
As one sentencer noted: 
 
‘…the law [on ASBOs] as it currently stands means, I think, that 
[sentencers] ought to think very carefully about…due process and should 
give proper regard to that…it’s important that justice is not bypassed’ [S3] 
 
The central question should be therefore – is the balance of interests between 
public protection and the procedural rights of the defendant correctly struck? We 
must, however, be careful here in distinguishing what is meant by the ‘balancing’ of 
rights in ASBO cases since the notion of ‘rebalancing’ could be interpreted as an 
explicit reflection of sectional interests. As Zedner (2005), amongst other 
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criminologists has argued, the experience of criminal justice is that ‘balancing’ is a 
politically dangerous metaphor - unless careful regard is given to what values are 
at stake.  
In this context, it is important to be mindful that it is not necessarily the 
circumvention of the safeguards of due process per se that are given primary 
consideration in many of the existing critiques of ASBOs (see, for example, Brown, 
2004; Scraton, 2004) – rather, it is the evidence that some social groups appear to 
be targeted disproportionately by the ASBO model. Notably, no statistical data is 
collected by the Home Office or the Scottish Executive on the numbers of ASBOs 
issued to people with disabilities (such as Tourettes Syndrome, Asperger 
Syndrome, Attention Deficit Disorder, Autism and other autistic spectrum disorders 
and mental health problems). Moreover, a recent report found that data on the 
ethnicity of ASBO recipients is not collected at central government level, is not 
adequately monitored at local level, and as a consequence, there is currently no 
way to investigate whether black and minority ethnic communities are 
disproportionately represented in the numbers served with an ASBO (Isal, 2006). 
However, as discussed earlier in this thesis, it is known that ASBOs are served 
disproportionately on social housing residents and that nearly half of all ASBOs are 
served on children and young people. While social control theory, and more 
explicitly, its links to social stratification and crime control, does not form the basis 
of this research investigation - since this study is concerned primarily with 
understanding and explaining procedural and administrative fairness in the ASBO 
process – the social-demographic characteristics of ASBO recipients is an area 
that evidently requires further empirical study, particularly in the context of 
(antisocial behaviour) policy and social structure. For example, Western (2004: 38) 
has argued that ‘crime control efforts have become so pervasive in poor urban 
communities that they have distinct effects on the social structure. Indeed, crime 
control…is constitutive of the social structure’. 
 However, where do we place Foucault’s notion of the ubiquity of power, and 
the relevance of expert knowledge that we considered in Chapter 2, within the 
context of this discussion of law as a site of power? In my view, the evidence 
presented within this thesis demonstrates both the power and the autonomy of law 
which is, as Smith rightly identifies: ‘impenetrable to the incursions of all those 
judges of normality to whom Foucault refers’ (2000: 295). However, Smith is, I 
think, only half correct when she advocates the primacy of law as a site of 
autonomous power. While I entirely agree that law establishes and protects its own 
rational, principled rules within the juridical field – and can choose to reject or to 
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appropriate the discretionary/normative assessments of expert knowledge as it 
sees fit - law is not its own legislator. Hence the creation of new legal provisions, or 
‘new law’, is of course contingent upon statute (or common law). In this respect, 
Ashworth and Zedner (2008) are correct to warn us about the ‘decline of the 
criminal law’ through the introduction of ‘hybrid’ orders like the ASBO. Sentencers, 
despite the existence of a significant degree of discretion, are constrained by the 
existing statutory provisions on ASBOs. So, returning to the question of ‘balance’, I 
would argue that despite the level of ‘protection’ offered by the judicial application 
of the law, there still remains a substantive requirement for improved administrative 
courts procedures. 
 It is important to note, however, that in opposition to Ashworth and Zedner’s 
contention that procedural justice is becoming progressively undermined, other 
criminologists have argued for a cost-based analysis of procedural rights. For 
example, Green posits that: 
 
‘[g]iven the high costs of ensuring that defendant’s rights are protected, and 
the limited resources available to cover such costs, it seems surprising that 
procedural protections are not allocated proportionally, so that, the more 
serious the offence charged, the more extensive the process due; the less 
serious the charge, the less due…In a world of limited resources and a 
diminished willingness to expend those resources on the rights of criminal 
defendants, the only practical alternative might be to engage in some form 
of rationing’ (2008: 53-57). 
 
In my view, the procedural protections that are afforded to defendants under the 
law goes to the heart of how we conceptualise the role of law in the constitution of 
modern society, and within this paradigm, law’s relationship to power and social 
structure. The concept of cost conservation as a basis for delimited procedural 
rights is not one that sits well with any advocate of procedural justice rights (see, 
for example Ashworth, 2006; von Hirsch, 1993). Such an approach to criminal 
procedure would undermine our model of law, and the basic principles which 
underpin it and would, moreover, potentially risk unreliable outcomes. Defence of 
the liberal model of law and trial posits that there must be a justifiable link between 
censure through conviction, accountability through punishment, and the 
requirement to uphold the rights of the defendant through procedural fairness 
(Ashworth and Zedner, 2008: 49). It is this last link which I have sought to examine 
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within the context of this discussion in order to provide knowledge upon which to 
further understandings about ASBO legal and administrative procedures. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout the body of this thesis, I have argued that established literature has, to 
an extent, been neglectful in its analyses of the socio-legal dimension(s) of ASBO 
use. Indeed, it is the central contention of this research study that ‘law’ (and legal 
procedure(s)), is an intrinsic, empirical component of the wider social structure on 
antisocial behaviour and the use of ASBOs in Britain. Moreover, it has been 
observed that much of the empirical research on ASBOs does not provide any 
account of the use of interim orders, or orders on conviction, nor does established 
literature adequately consider the role of administrative and legal procedure(s) in 
ASBO applications in deciding ASBO outcomes; or the position of the judiciary 
within ASBO cases (with regard to discretionary autonomy, and pivotal 
jurisprudential decisions). Subsequently, this research study has sought to 
investigate the extent to which legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion influence 
the management and outcomes of ASBO use in Britain.  
Hence, the research evidence discussed in this chapter has demonstrated 
that legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion and decision-making significantly 
influence the form of ASBO prohibitions and the type of behaviour made the 
subject of an order; the extent of the impact of mitigating factors; the evidentiary 
requirements necessary for an interim/ASBO application; the sentencing tariffs for 
breach; the frequency with which orders on conviction are issued; the frequency 
with which orders are granted to children and young people; and, the ability of 
alleged antisocial behaviour perpetrators to defend or to appeal action against 
them. Furthermore, the detailed exploration of ASBO application processes and 
decision-making found variation in the standard of evidence required to obtain an 
interim/ASBO, and differences in the quality of legal representation available to 
defendants in ASBO applications which can, it is fair to state, affect the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of substantive rights in ASBO cases, in respect of defence 
and appeal procedures. 
Building on existing theoretical frameworks on procedural justice, and 
moreover, on conceptual paradigms of ‘fairness’ and consistency in judicial 
decision-making developed in other empirical studies of procedure and judicial 
discretion in the lower courts (Anleu and Mack, 2007; Cowan et al., 2006 Hunter et 
al., 2005; Lawrence, 1995), this chapter has sought to understand the network of 
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(procedural and juridical) factors that influence the use of ASBOs in Britain. 
Moreover, the discussion embodied within this chapter has also attempted to 
reconcile identified procedural factors with substantive outcomes in the context of 
procedural justice in ASBO applications/cases. Subsequently, it has been argued 
that ‘fairness’ in ASBO proceedings should not be conceptualised simply in terms 
of their inconsistency in application; the disproportionate nature of their 
prohibitions; or their use against ‘marginalised groups’ such as young people and 
social housing tenants, but fairness must also be considered in terms of the design 
and implementation of legal rules, both substantive and procedural. In contrast to 
much of the existing literature on ASBOs, this research study has identified the 
primary influence of legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion on how, and against 
whom, ASBOs are presently being used. It is argued that in order to ensure greater 
consistency, stringency and accuracy in approach to ASBO cases – in essence, in 
order for there to be more ‘fairness’ in ASBO processes - there must be a greater 
socio-legal focus upon the influence of substantive practices and formal procedural 
rules. In the following final chapter, how far the empirical research conclusions 
contribute to, and build upon, existing socio-legal theoretical frameworks will be 
considered, and the study data’s overall contribution to the knowledge of the 
subject will be assessed. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
This last chapter consolidates the constituent elements from previous chapters, 
and in so doing, connects the evidence emerging from the thesis, to the original 
purpose of the research study in seeking to determine the influence of legal 
procedure(s) and judicial discretion on the use of ASBOs in Britain. Hence, the 
research findings are discussed in terms of a socio-legal analysis of the ways in 
which the dimensions of due process and legal primacy; and juridical power and 
discretion, intersect to shape the administration, management and outcomes of 
ASBO use in Britain. The chapter also considers the wider significance of the 
research findings for the empirical study of antisocial behaviour orders as a 
sociological phenomenon, and the specific contribution that the evidence embodied 
within this thesis makes to knowledge(s) of the administration, management and 
outcomes of ASBO use in Britain. The first section of the chapter begins with a 
short discussion of the established literature on ASBOs; and the specific aperture 
in knowledge(s) and understanding(s) that this study sought to address. The next 
sections summarise the research evidence emerging from the investigation; the 
implications of the data to the sociological study of ASBOs and the limitations of the 
findings; and the study data’s contribution to the knowledge of the subject. The final 
section provides some brief suggestions for further research and future work that is 
indicated by the thesis findings.  
 
Established literature 
Since antisocial behaviour orders came into force on the 1 April 1999, there has 
been a limited amount of scholarly research conducted into their administration, 
management and effectiveness. However, the laconic nature of the established 
literature on ASBOs is, of course, to be expected given that ASBOs (and, more 
widely, antisocial behaviour policy) are relatively recent additions to the sociological 
field of study. Indeed, given the slow initial uptake of the orders by applicant 
agencies (Burney, 2002; Campbell, 2002a), the value in conducting earlier studies 
on ASBO use would have been negligible, given the limited amount of empirical 
data that could have been obtained. By way of illustration, although Campbell’s 
work on ASBOs in England and Wales (2002) provided a range of very useful data 
on the administration and management of the orders, she was unable (because the 
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relevant legislation had not yet been enacted) to provide any evidence on the use 
of interim orders, or of orders on conviction. Similarly, in Scotland, the first study on 
the use of ASBOs, conducted by the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIHS, 2003), 
established that there were large variations in the incidence of ASBO usage 
between local authorities. However, the study was narrow in scope, exploring only 
the administration of ASBOs without an examination of the reasons for the 
geographical variations. Furthermore, the research did not provide an account of 
the use of interim orders, or the use of orders on conviction, nor any detailed 
exploration of ASBO application processes or outcomes.   
More recent sociological literature on ASBOs (for example, Burney, 2005) 
makes only fleeting reference to the use of orders on conviction and the recent 
difficulties associated with interim orders114, I would suggest, primarily because 
there exists very little empirical research evidence to draw upon. Current socio-
legal scholarship on ASBOs has used a discussion of case law and legal precedent 
to inform their analyses of the use of the orders (for example, see Macdonald, 
2003; 2006). While it is acknowledged that court decisions and court records on the 
use of ASBOs are very useful as a method of data production (indeed, I too 
examine court decisions and selected cases within the body of this thesis), it is also 
apparent that there is evidently a need for further empirical research in this area 
which focuses on, but is not limited to, administrative and legal process(es) in 
ASBO, interim order, and order on conviction applications, and the substantive 
outcomes of these processes. 
 Moreover, existing sociological research and scholarship on ASBOs has, as 
we have seen, been very much concerned with conceptualising antisocial 
behaviour orders, and antisocial behaviour policy more generally, as a ‘regime of 
signification’ (Lash 1988). For example, while Burney (2002) and Cowan, Pantazis 
and Gilroy (2001) have observed the social housing sectors’ increased use of and 
reliance upon procedures synonymous with crime control; Brown (2004) and 
Hester (2000) have suggested that the control of antisocial behaviour through the 
use of ASBOs has become a means for the social control of marginalised groups 
by local authorities. Indeed, Ravetz (2001; cited in Flint (2006: 21)), goes further in 
his analysis of control in social housing, and posits the existence of a (historically) 
bifurcated relationship - that has been fundamentally inherent in social housing - 
whereby the objective of council housing was, and remains, equally as much about 
                                               
114
 For example, there is currently a case before the Inner House in Court of Session in 
Scotland on the issue of the legitimacy of breach proceedings for interim orders (which 
have been obtained on a prima facie basis and without the hearing of evidence) 
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altering and moulding the behaviour(s) of the poor towards normalised – and 
orthodox middle class - standards of behaviour, as it has been about the provision 
of affordable housing. As Flint observes (2006: 24), housing governance as a form 
of policing has ‘many historical precedents’, but the difference now is manifested 
only in name, through the use of ‘antisocial behaviour’ as a ‘reconfiguration’ of old 
technique(s) of control. Policing has taken on the guise of housing management; 
however, the categories of people who are identified as ‘risk’ groups remain 
unchanged.  
Consequently, the use of ASBOs is now widely considered within 
sociological scholarship to be a restrictive and fundamentally reactionary process 
whereby professionals and practitioners attempt to sequestrate the behaviour(s) of 
historically ‘targeted populations’: lone parent mothers, those with addictions, 
mental health problems and learning difficulties, social housing tenants, prostitutes, 
and young people (Brown, 2004; Burney, 2002; 2005; Hester, 2000; Sagar, 2007; 
Scraton; 2004; Squires, 1990; 2006;). For example, in her incisive study of the use 
of ASBOs against sex workers, Tracey Sagar (2007: 156, 164) has identified both 
the ‘historic popularity’ of punitive and exclusionary measures to target on-street 
sex work, coupled with the reluctance of the police and other agencies to locate the 
social/welfare issue(s) of sex work above the traditional police ideology of sex work 
as, fundamentally, a ‘policing problem’. Moreover, it has been argued that the use 
of ASBOs against sex workers to exclude them from residential areas has been as 
much about the sanitising of public space for the ‘respectable’ (middle class), as it 
has been about tackling the derivative nuisance associated with on-street sex work 
(Hubbard, 2004, cited in Sagar, 2007: 156). 
Thus, dominant academic perspectives on antisocial behaviour policy and 
the use of ASBOs are largely concerned with locating the significance of the 
contribution of applicant authorities (and in particular, social housing agencies) on 
the administration and uptake of the orders. Acknowledging the importance of this 
existing scholarship, this thesis contends that the position of both legal 
procedure(s) and the court system in ASBO applications is also one of fundamental 
primacy, which has necessitated the further research and analysis embodied within 
this thesis. Specifically, this study has sought to investigate the primacy of legal 
procedure(s) and judicial discretion within ASBO cases in Britain. Established 
literature has, to an extent, been neglectful in its analyses of the socio-legal 
dimension(s) of ASBO use. Indeed, it is the central contention of this research 
study that ‘law’ (and legal procedure(s)), is an intrinsic, empirical component of the 
wider social structure on antisocial behaviour and the use of ASBOs in Britain. It 
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has been argued that existing research does not adequately consider the role of 
administrative and legal procedure(s) in ASBO applications in deciding ASBO 
outcomes; or moreover, the position of the judiciary within ASBO cases (with 
regard to discretionary autonomy, and pivotal jurisprudential decisions). Hence, the 
primary thesis that the preceding chapters were concerned to elaborate and to 
substantiate was that the study of the administration of antisocial behaviour orders 
in Britain requires that attention be paid to the social factors underpinning their use 
(as existing literature has done), but equally, the legal and court process(es) that 
intersect to shape practices and outcomes.  
 
Research findings and implications 
The research study sought to investigate, specifically, the influence of legal 
procedure(s) and judicial discretion within ASBO cases in Britain. The empirical 
research evidence found that legal procedure and judicial discretion fundamentally 
impact upon the administration of ASBOs, specifically in respect of prohibitions; 
interim orders; orders on conviction (CRASBOs); sentencing for breach; defending 
ASBO applications; and the use of ASBOs for young people and children. 
Moreover, the research findings have distinct implications in terms of practice, 
understanding, and theory, with regard to the use of ASBOs in Britain. Although it 
was clear that judicial discretion at times facilitated greater efficacy in the operation 
of the relevant legislation, in respect of complex decisions which could be made on 
a case-by case basis; the protection of rights; and the avoidance of undue rigidity in 
the operation of the rule of law; it was also evident that the treatment of ASBO 
defendants - particularly with regard to ASBO prohibitions and sentencing for 
breach – is a lottery, depending on court location and the individual sentencer 
presiding over the application115.  
The reasons for the differences in approach between sentencers in ASBO 
cases (as discussed in Chapter 7) were composite and complex. Indeed, 
explanations for the use of judicial discretion - in general - are themselves, 
composite and complex (see, for example, Hawkins, 1992; Baldwin, 1997; Davis et 
al., 1998). Cowan et al. correctly describe judicial discretion as ‘multi-faceted’ 
(2006: 570), in that individual judicial decision-making does not subsist in a 
vacuum. While discretionary decision-making will be influenced by the particular 
decision to be made in a particular case, many other elements also feature in the 
decision-making process - such as the wider circumstances of a case, and, 
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 C.f. the findings of Cowan et al. in their study of District Judges and possession 
proceedings (2006) 
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perhaps most importantly, perceptions of and beliefs about the nature and 
cause(es) of a particular ‘problem’. The ‘multi-faceted’ nature of judicial discretion 
was clearly evident in the earlier discussion (Chapter 7) of the differences in 
approach between sentencers in ASBO cases. However, I stopped short of 
constructing a typology of judicial discretionary decision-making for two reasons. 
Firstly, given the size of the interviewing sample, it was felt that a typology may 
lean towards the presentation of unnecessarily standardized and/or harmonized 
data findings and, at worst, deceptive results. And secondly, it was not evident that 
the construction of such a typology would necessarily have been advantageous or 
appropriate in elucidating the research study findings further, or in contributing to 
better understanding(s) of the data. Instead, the discussion of the reasons for the 
differences in approach of the sentencers in Chapter 7 provides a detailed and full 
analysis of the interview findings. 
In terms of the substantive differences in the research findings between 
England and Wales, and Scotland, there are four particular areas on ASBO 
procedure and judicial decision-making which display, for the purposes of this 
research study, the most salient differences: ASBO prohibitions, the use of orders 
on conviction (CRASBOs), breach proceedings, and the use of ASBOs for children 
and young people. Let us now briefly consider each in turn. The majority of Sheriffs 
interviewed stated that they were very uneasy about criminal behaviour forming the 
basis of ASBO prohibitions. In particular, Sheriffs noted the difficulties for local 
authorities where an expectation existed among residents in certain locales that the 
council should be the ‘primary agency’ involved in addressing community problems 
such as drug dealing and aggressive behaviour. Subsequently, the majority of 
Sheriffs interviewed stated that they believed that criminal behaviour should remain 
a matter for the police – and not the local/housing authority. Sheriffs were also of 
the view that any criminal behaviour that was violent in nature should not be a 
matter to be addressed by the council or housing authority. As previously 
discussed (in Chapter 6) this issue is specifically pertinent to Scotland, and the 
Scottish Courts, because in England and Wales the police are empowered under 
the 2003 Act (as amended) to act as a ‘relevant authority’ for the purposes of 
ASBO applications. Moreover, during the early stages of the research investigation, 
it became apparent that the police frequently act as the lead agency in ASBO 
cases in England and Wales. It is suggested that because ASBOs are often being 
used in Scotland to prevent behaviour that is, in any event, a criminal offence 
(particularly with regard to drug dealing and verbal/physical abuse), an amendment 
to the 2004 Act to enable the police to act as an applicant agency for ASBO 
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applications in Scotland (in the same way as legislation allows South of the border) 
would appear to be necessary. 
The use of orders on conviction (CRASBOs) also differed substantially 
between the jurisdictions of England and Wales, and Scotland. Although the 
reasons for this have been discussed in detail, it is evident that the primary 
explanation for the low numbers of CRASBOs in Scotland is as a result of the 
existing legal procedure for CRASBOs which has meant that Sheriffs are not 
imparted with the relevant information that they feel is necessary to make such an 
order. It is very unlikely that numbers of orders of conviction will rise substantially in 
Scotland in the near future, given the strong reluctance of Sheriffs to make use of 
the orders within the present system, and where no established protocol exists. 
Similarly, there was an equally strong distinction between the use of orders for 
children and young people in Scotland, and in England and Wales. While existing 
literature had shown there to be a strong numerical difference in ASBO use 
between the jurisdictions, the research study was able to contribute to 
knowledge(s) by showing a clear distinction in the dispositions of practitioners 
(solicitors) and the courts in Scotland, and in England and Wales, towards the use 
of the orders for children and young people. Again, it is suggested that, for the 
reasons that I have already discussed, the use of ASBOs for children and young 
people in Scotland is unlikely to increase substantially in the near future given the 
reluctance of both solicitors, and the courts to make use of the orders in this way – 
coupled with perceptions (in the Scottish legal system) that ASBOs for children are 
‘ineffective’, ‘irrelevant’, and ‘a sanction without punishment’. 
 While differences existed in the treatment of ASBO breaches between 
Scotland, and England and Wales, this was not (unlike the use of CRASBOs, or 
orders for persons under the age of 18) a result of separate and distinct 
jurisdictional philosophies and/or sensibilities towards this aspect of ASBO 
procedure. Rather, the differences in the treatment of breach occurred largely as a 
result of case law being further developed in England and Wales, than in Scotland. 
However, it was also apparent that inconsistency in sentencing for breach 
proceedings was prevalent in all jurisdictions, as a result of judicial discretionary 
decision-making, whereby individual sentencers set the tariff for breach in each 
case. Subsequently, it has been argued that recent cases demonstrate that judicial 
discretion has allowed for sentences to be given which continue to be 
disproportionate to the harm caused. 
Finally, let us now consider the ways in which the current research findings 
connect with existing theory on procedural justice, and judicial discretion. The study 
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findings show that the quality of legal procedure(s) and the outcome of ASBO 
cases (in particular, with regard to prohibitions and sentencing for breach) is very 
variable. The impact of the difference(s) in legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion 
has combined to produce an indigenous system in each court jurisdiction whereby 
the treatment of ASBO defendants is in many ways a lottery, depending on court 
location and the individual Judge presiding over the application. So, if we reflect 
upon the research findings within the wider paradigm of procedural fairness and 
access to justice in ASBO cases, several observations are immediately worthy of 
note.  
With regard to procedural fairness, the key notion (as previously discussed 
at length in Chapter 7) is that it is the process itself - and not the outcome that 
defines procedural justice. Hence, it is important here to consider whether either 
party to an ASBO application (the defendant or the applicant authority) enjoys an 
advantage in legal proceedings. On balance, and taking account of interim ex parte 
applications, it is argued that legal procedure(s) in ASBO applications are unduly 
weighted in favour of the applicant authority. Moreover, variation in the quality of 
legal representation available to defendants in ASBO applications does, it is fair to 
state, affect the risk of erroneous deprivation of substantive rights in ASBO cases. 
The central aim of providing access to justice should be to ensure that every citizen 
receives implementation of his/her legal rights at the lowest overall cost, not just to 
litigants, or the courts’ budget, but to society as a whole, and it has been argued 
that the current system is failing ASBO defendants (and parties to civil proceedings 
more generally) in this regard. The conclusion that we might draw is that in the 
absence of rigorous and standardised legal procedure(s) in ASBO cases, the 
courts have an important role to play in developing standards of procedural 
fairness. Consequently, I have argued (Chapter 7) in favour of an improved 
approach to evidence gathering and case management should be ascribed the 
highest priority.  
But how far do the empirical research conclusions contribute to, and build 
upon, existing socio-legal theoretical frameworks? First, let us consider law/power 
in the socio-legal context of the research findings. This thesis has sought to 
understand the power of law in ASBO processes: that is to say, this study has paid 
attention to the structure and organisation of law, its substantive consequences, 
and the way(s) individuals and organisations seek to employ it, have varying 
degrees of access to it, or find themselves differentially affected by it. However, as 
we have seen, ‘law has a role not only as a primary technique of governance but 
also as a significant constituent of social forms, and practices’ (Cotterrel, 2002: 
 232 
643). Moreover, Sommerlad (2004: 347) has observed that law is analogous with 
other formally organised cultural structures – such as language – in the respect that 
the inter-relationship between law and the social is fundamentally ambiguous: 
justice in law is derived from the unbiased employment of legal rules in order to 
affect rights and duties (‘procedural justice’), but – at the same time - Sommerlad 
observes law’s disinterest in ‘social justice’, which is ‘fundamental to law’s central 
role in the reproduction of the existing socio-economic order and general 
legitimisation of inequality’ (2004: 347). In a similar vein, (as discussed in Chapter 
7) it was also discerned that the principle function of the judiciary is to support the 
pillars of government established under the law, to maintain law and order, and to 
protect the public interest. Traditionally, however, it is not their role to promote or to 
advocate change, nor is it primarily to protect individual freedoms.   
Hence, the empirical research study findings on the role of legal 
procedure(s) and judicial discretion connect with existing theory on concepts of 
‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ in legal processes, in the respect that justice in law has been 
considered (in the course of this thesis) as being achieved through de facto legal 
procedures, as opposed to outcomes (‘procedural justice’). However, the research 
conclusions also diverge from existing, ‘formal’ conceptions of justice, and how it is 
to be achieved in law. Formal justice is traditionally obtained through the 
deployment of legal procedure(s) and pro forma juridical process(es). In contrast, 
substantive justice (outcomes) is dependent upon discretion in decision-making 
(with deference to ‘external’ elements, such as, for example, social and policy 
factors). In the context of the empirical research findings embodied within this 
thesis however, there is, necessarily, a blurring of the boundaries between ‘formal’ 
and ‘substantive’ justice.  
By way of illustration, we have observed the structure and organisation of 
law governing the use of ASBOs, and the formal role of legal procedure(s) in 
determining processes and substantive outcomes. However, the influence of 
judicial discretion in both promoting the collective, social values of law, but also in 
protecting the individual from the over-extending autonomy of the state, is 
apparent. While the limits of discretion in protecting individual freedoms and in 
contributing to positive ‘social change’ has already been observed (see Chapter 6), 
it is also evident that it is necessarily within the scope of the discretionary 
autonomy of the judiciary in ASBO cases to decide (and to some extent, to correct) 
the bounds of fair treatment through their interpretation of symmetry, proportionality 
and individual rights-based considerations in ASBO applications. Thus, the 
research conclusions agree with theoretical positions that advocate the need for 
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improved pro forma legal procedure(s) in order to negate inequality in the formal 
administration of law, but the findings also serve to highlight that, in considering, 
and in coming to understand, socially embedded concepts of ‘justice’, substantive 
outcomes can also be shaped by informal practices, and that subsequently any 
socio-legal examination of ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ in the mechanism of law, should 
ensure that practices that impinge on substantive justice outcomes, should be 
afforded equal analytic weight. Hence, the thesis conclusions have found that both 
formal legal procedure(s), and substantive judicial discretionary decision-making 
fundamentally impact upon the administration, management and outcomes of 
ASBO use in Britain, but they also impact upon the law’s approach to rights’ claims, 
and its overarching concern with justice. 
 
Limitations of the research 
The research study was compromised from the outset by my inability to gain 
access to the courts in England and Wales. Moreover, the small sample size for the 
online survey in Scotland further reduced the scope and value of the research. This 
in turn had consequences for the ways in which the research findings could be 
discussed and applied (see Chapter 7). However, I think that the study has 
produced some useful results which will be of interest to those other researchers in 
this field – although the data produced is more limited in scope than was originally 
intended at the outset of this study. In wider terms, we can also see that the 
research is also conscribed by virtue of its context. For example, the significant 
work of Anleu and Mack (2007), while demonstrating the importance of empirical 
socio-legal research on the decision-making of the judiciary, also serves (in the 
same way as this study does, I think) to illustrate the contextual limitations of this 
type of research. Indeed, they note without hesitation that: 
 
‘Law itself is not necessarily the most important factor in understanding how 
society changes; it cannot resolve such problems as inequality – which 
have their origins elsewhere in market conditions, politics, or ideology – it 
can only manage disputes or remedy specific injustices that emerge from 
these problems, which, nonetheless, resurface in other guises and 
situations.’ (Anleu and Mack, 2007: 190) 
 
Hence, this study sought to examine, primarily, legal elements of ASBO use within 
a sociological sphere of analysis. As Anleu and Mack observe, these factors (legal 
process(es) and judicial decision-making) can impact on social change at a local or 
 234 
micro level, but any wider understanding of the ‘problem’ of antisocial behaviour 
requires a detailed study of economic, social and cultural factors which are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
Recommendations for future work 
Much more needs to be known about ASBO procedure(s) and outcomes. In 
particular, an empirical evaluation of their (in)effectiveness in reducing and/or 
preventing antisocial behaviour is, it is submitted, urgently required. Given the 
range and number of antisocial behaviour interventions that have been created in 
recent years (for example, Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs), Parenting 
Orders (POs), Parenting Contracts (PCs), Closure Orders, Dispersal Orders), an 
evaluation of which interventions work best (if at all) is also essential. 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have argued for an approach to the research process which begins 
with an empirical investigation of decision-making and moves on to consider the 
influence of legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion on the processes of social 
construction which comprise the administrative and legal processes in ASBO 
cases. It is hoped that the research study findings embodied within this thesis will 
prompt new and renewed debate about ways of improving ASBO procedures to 
ensure fairness for all interested parties. By largely focussing upon the rights of the 
defendant in ASBO applications, the intention of this research has not been to 
ignore the rights of the victim in ASBO cases – rather, this study has sought to 
consider the influence of legal procedure(s) and judicial discretion in ensuring that 
the victims of antisocial behaviour are protected, but not at the expense of injustice 
to others. Indeed, if the positive function of law as a ‘vital regulatory mechanism’ as 
well as ‘a source of individual empowerment’ (Sommerlad, 2004: 350) is to be 
discharged, it is necessary that identified problems in the current system are 
understood and addressed. If ASBOs are to be continued to be used as a 
preventative (and protective) order in the future, and not repealed or replaced by 
future governments, then their use must be legitimate, and it must be seen to be 
legitimate. A procedure that creates civil orders that are illegitimate and ineffective 
will no doubt be replaced or removed - and so ASBOs must evolve, they must 
become fairer in their application, their quantifiable effectiveness must be 
demonstrated by future empirical research, and the conflict between protecting 
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individuals from antisocial behaviour versus the rights of defendants must be more 
adequately addressed.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Ethical approval (University of Stirling) application 
 
 
RESEARCH PROPOSAL FOR ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
 
JANE DONOGHUE 
ID: 1318592 
 
 
Aims of research project 
 
The subject of the main study is an investigation that seeks to understand the 
contribution and influence of the court system and judiciary in deciding ASBO 
applications in both Scotland, and in England & Wales. 
 
From analysis of existing research (Campbell, 2002; Burney, 2002; CIHS, 2003; 
Scottish Executive, 2004; 2005; Brown, 2004), specific gaps in the knowledge and 
understanding of ASBO use in Britain has been identified. What has been 
overlooked in current research on the use of ASBOs in Britain, is a deeper insight 
into the fundamental contribution and situs of the court system and legal process in 
determining the manifold functions of the ASBO, and, their statutory limitations 
within the law on antisocial behaviour. 
 
Although research on behalf of the Scottish Executive, for example, notes that a 
significant factor in ‘influencing regional variations…was the varying attitude of the 
courts’ (2005: 2.27), more detailed and extensive research into the use of ASBOs 
requires an analysis of legislation, court files, stated cases, legal precedents/case 
law, and interviews conducted with judges and solicitors to be correlated. It is the 
objective of this research to correlate these aspects of the legal and court 
processes to provide more comprehensive and developed research on ASBO 
applications in Britain. 
 
There are also no comparative studies in existence that analyse the 
differences/similarities between the ASBO application procedure in Scotland, and 
South of the border. Hence, it is also the purpose of this research project to provide 
a comparative analysis of court procedure in Scotland, and in England & Wales, in 
ASBO applications. It is hoped that clearly identifying the successes and 
encountered difficulties in the application process within the separate jurisdictions, 
will be a relevant, and hopefully useful, contribution to research in this area. 
 
Methodology 
 
Online survey questionnaire 
 
The research fieldwork is to be conducted in two stages. The first stage consists of 
an online survey questionnaire to be answered by local authority solicitors involved 
in ASBO applications in both Scotland, and in England & Wales. 
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The online survey questionnaire is interested in local authority solicitors’ 
experiences of ASBO cases and their opinions on court procedure, legislation and 
case law, evidentiary requirements, and any difficulties that they may have 
encountered with ASBO proceedings in court. 
 
It is proposed that an email will be sent to individual local authority antisocial 
behaviour co-ordinators or community safety officers. [Part 1 of the Antisocial 
Behaviour Etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 places a statutory duty on each local authority 
and relevant chief constable in Scotland to prepare a strategy for dealing with 
antisocial behaviour in the authority's area. Moreover, The Crime & Disorder Act 
1998 also places a statutory duty on chief police officers and local authorities in 
England & Wales to work together to develop and implement a strategy for 
reducing crime and disorder, hence individual authorities in both Scotland, and in 
England & Wales, possess antisocial behaviour co-ordinators, or community safety 
officers, for the purposes of their statutory duties in respect of reducing antisocial 
behaviour, crime, and disorder.] 
 
Contact details for antisocial behaviour co-ordinators/community safety officers are 
available on local authority web sites and also on the Home Office’s ‘Together’ 
website (www.together.gov.uk). It is proposed that the antisocial behaviour co-
ordinators/community safety officers of each local authority will be contacted 
directly, giving details about my institution and the research project that I am 
conducting. I will then ask if they will then consider forwarding their solicitor(s) an 
email from me, detailing the nature of the research project and providing the link to 
the online survey questionnaire (please see appendix 1). 
 
In Scotland, there are 32 local authorities and I will contact the antisocial behaviour 
co-ordinator/community safety officer for each authority as detailed above. In 
England & Wales, there are 410 local authorities and I will contact the antisocial 
behaviour co-ordinator/community safety officer for each local authority. However, 
unlike in Scotland, where it is only the local authority or Registered Social Landlord 
(RSL) which acts as the relevant agency for the purposes of ASBO applications (s. 
2 of the Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scot) Act 2004), in England & Wales, a relevant 
authority can be a local authority, registered social landlord (RSL) or the police (s.2 
of the Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003).  
 
Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) are also empowered under the relevant 
legislation (Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003; Antisocial Behaviour Etc. (Scotland) Act 
2004) to make ASBO applications. However, research has shown that the number 
of ASBOs originating directly from RSLs is small. For example, in Scotland, 13% of 
full ASBOs were found to originate from RSLs/housing associations/co-ops, 
(Scottish Executive, 2005: 4.1). Due to the high number of RSLs in existence in 
Scotland (296), and in England & Wales (over 1,800 in England alone), it is 
proposed that it would not be prudent or expeditious for the purposes of this 
research study to contact RSLs to try to contact solicitors involved in ASBO 
applications that they may be pursuing. 
 
Care will be taken when initiating contacting procedures so that the individual 
solicitors’ privacy is respected. As detailed above, local authority antisocial 
behaviour co-ordinators will be approached first to ask if they will consider 
approaching their solicitor(s) regarding their possible participation in the research. 
Email solicitations can be considered ‘spamming’ (Madge, 2006) so it is necessary 
to obtain permission from the antisocial behaviour co-ordinators/community safety 
officers to contact their affiliated solicitor(s) at the outset. Antisocial behaviour co-
ordinators/community safety officers act as gatekeepers to the solicitors, and 
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access to the solicitors will be entirely dependent upon whether or not the antisocial 
behaviour co-ordinator/community safety officer is willing to contact the solicitor(s) 
themselves to forward details of the research survey on to them.  
 
Each email will be sent directly to a single recipient and more than one address will 
never be listed in the ‘to’ or ‘cc’ field. This will ensure that the recipient’s anonymity 
and privacy is respected. My own valid email address will be listed in the ‘from’ field 
and the ‘subject’ field will be listed as ‘ASBO Research’. The email will not possess 
any attachments, so recipients will hopefully be less concerned about virus threats. 
The email message will be kept as short as possible, but will still contain all the 
relevant information which will include: the aims of the study, research procedure, 
researcher’s details, institutional affiliation et cetera. The URL for the survey 
questionnaire will be included which will take potential respondents directly to the 
online survey questionnaire.  
 
Hence, once the solicitors have received details of the survey questionnaire, they 
will then be able to obtain any further details about the research by asking 
questions and/or providing comments about the research, by contacting either the 
researcher (myself), or by contacting the research supervisors, or they can simply 
follow the URL provided, which will take them directly to the online questionnaire 
(please see appendix 2). 
 
If they choose to follow the URL, the first page of the survey questionnaire that they 
will be able to view will give more details about the research project, and will also 
ensure that informed consent is obtained before they choose to continue to the 
next page and begin the survey questionnaire. In both the email message, and the 
first page of the survey questionnaire, the anonymity of respondents is guaranteed. 
It will also be explained that participation is entirely voluntary and that they need 
not answer every (or any of the) survey questions.  
 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
It is hoped that the second stage of the research fieldwork will consist of semi-
structured interviews with sheriffs in Scotland, and district judges and lay 
magistrates in England & Wales. The interviews will be conducted to gain an in-
depth understanding of unique and common issues and concerns related to ASBO 
applications.  
 
It is proposed that a series of (ideally) 10 semi-structured interviews in sheriff 
courts across Scotland will be conducted within the next 4 months. Interview 
schedules will be provided in advance to participants.  
 
In accordance with the Scottish Executive’s access protocol for the courts and the 
judiciary, all interviews will be anonymous. The anonymity of interview participants 
will be protected using the following methods: (a) all identifying information will be 
stripped from the transcribed interview after validation, (b) quotations used for 
publication will be framed in such a way that the individual’s identify is masked, and 
(c) coding (e.g. S1, S2) will be used where necessary. 
 
The transcripts of interviews will be provided to interviewees (should they wish) for 
validation. Transcripts will then be analysed for common and emergent themes 
using a constant comparison method, and sorted into major themes using a 
combination of categories derived from prior research (Campbell, 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2004; 2005). 
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In accordance with the Scottish Executive’s access protocol for the courts and 
judiciary, the Lord President and Sheriff(s) Principal have been contacted (please 
see appendix 3) following the relevant procedure(s). 
 
It is also proposed that a series of (ideally) 10 semi-structured interviews in district 
and magistrates courts in England & Wales will also be conducted within the next 4 
months. The ethical procedures followed in conducting the interviews will be the 
same as above, except that it is Her Majesty’s Court Data Approval Panel that is to 
be contacted in order to request access to the judiciary.. 
 
 
Hence, I would like to apply for ethical approval from the Department of 
Applied Social Science, Stirling University, to conduct the above detailed 
fieldwork as part of the above detailed research project on Antisocial 
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) & The Court System. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Letter to local authority/CDRP antisocial behaviour unit managers 
 
 
Dear X, 
  
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING RESEARCH PROJECT: ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
ORDERS (ASBOs) & THE COURT SYSTEM 
  
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Stirling conducting research on the 
use of Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) in Britain.  
  
In particular, this research is interested in solicitors’ experiences of ASBO cases 
and their opinions on court procedure, legislation and case law, evidentiary 
requirements, and any difficulties that they may have encountered with ASBO 
proceedings in court. 
  
As part of this research, I am conducting an online survey questionnaire with 
police, CDRP and local authority affiliated solicitors involved in ASBO cases. 
Hence, I would be extremely grateful indeed if you were able to pass on the 
attached web link for the questionnaire to your internal/external solicitor(s) in the 
hope that he/she might consider participating in this study please? In light of their 
experience, their view(s) would add invaluable insight into this research project.  
  
All responses to this survey are anonymous. Further details about the research are 
available by following the web link or by contacting the principal investigator, Jane 
Donoghue (my email address) or the research supervisor (supervisor’s email 
address). 
  
The link for the survey questionnaire is: 
  
-----------------------------------------------------  
 
Clicking on the link will take you directly to the survey. I very much hope that you 
will be able to pass on the survey web link, and I am most grateful for your time and 
consideration in this matter. 
  
Yours faithfully, 
  
Jane Donoghue 
  
 
[Researcher’s contact details] 
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Appendix 3 
 
Online Survey Questionnaire Template 
 
 
Thank you very much for your interest in this research. 
 
This survey questionnaire is part of a research project of the Department of Applied 
Social Science at Stirling University, UK.  
 
The research is concerned with Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and the court 
system. In particular, this study is interested in local authority solicitors’ 
experiences of ASBO cases and their opinions on court procedure, legislation and 
case law, evidentiary requirements, and any difficulties that they may have 
encountered with ASBO proceedings in court. 
 
All responses to this survey are anonymous. If you have any questions about or 
comments on this project, or if you have specific concerns about your rights as a 
participant, please contact the principal investigator, Jane Donoghue [my email 
address] or the research supervisors, [supervisors’ email addresses]. 
 
• As most of the questions are multiple-choice, completion will take 
approximately 15-20 minutes. 
• Your participation is entirely voluntary and you need not answer every 
question – any information that you provide, no matter how small, will be 
valuable. 
• The information provided by you will be held anonymously and you 
will not be identified in any presentation or publication of this 
research. It will be impossible to trace your data back to you 
individually. In accordance with the UK Data Protection Act, this 
information may be retained indefinitely. 
• At the end of the study you will be provided with additional information and 
feedback on this research should you wish to receive it 
• Your participation is very much appreciated and will provide invaluable 
insight to this project. 
 
 
                                  
Principal Investigator:                                               Principal Supervisor:  
[contact details]     [contact details] 
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SECTION 1: The Consultation Process. This first part of the questionnaire 
asks you about your involvement in the consultation process in ASBO 
applications. Please only tick ONE box throughout the questionnaire unless 
otherwise specified. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. When potential ASBO applications are being considered by your local 
authority, is the internal solicitor:  
 
 Usually involved at the earliest stages (either asked to be present at the 
ASBO application problem-solving meetings or consulted beforehand so 
their advice can be discussed at meetings)?  
 
 Usually only consulted once it has already been agreed by the local 
authority and council staff that an ASBO action should be pursued?  
 
 Usually only consulted when evidence has already been gathered and files 
are then passed to the in-house solicitor?  
 
 
 
2. Who most frequently presents an ASBO application in court? 
 
 Internal Solicitor? 
 
 External Counsel? 
 
 
 
3. Who makes the decision not to proceed with an ASBO application? (you 
may select more than one option) 
 
 Internal Solicitor? 
 
 Decision of other professionals within the applicant agency? 
 
 Collective decision of all agencies involved? 
 
 Other? Please state: 
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4. What factors may determine the decision not to proceed with an ASBO 
application? (you may select more than one option) 
 
 Lack of evidence? 
 
 Lack of witnesses? 
 
 Overburdened caseload? 
 
 Use of alternative methods, ABCs, mediation etc? 
 
 Other? Please state: 
 
 
 
5. Do you think that internal solicitors should have more control in the 
decision-making    process on whether to proceed with an ASBO application?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
6. If yes, in what way? 
 
 
 
7. From your own experience, are targets being set relating to the number of 
ASBOs to be obtained by a local authority?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
8a. If yes, who sets the targets? 
 
 
 
8b. And are these targets being met?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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9. If targets are not being met, why do you think this is? (you may select 
more than one option) 
 
 
 Overburdened workload/time constraints of local authority staff? 
 
 ASBO applications frequently unsuccessful in court? 
 
 Local authority pursues alternative remedies instead; ABCs, 
mediation etc? 
 
 Other? Please state: 
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SECTION 2: Type of Evidence. In this section you will be asked about the 
various types of evidence used in ASBO applications, their frequency of use, 
any associated problems and their contribution towards a successful 
application.  
 
 
Please rate how frequently each type of evidence is used in both interim 
ASBO and ASBO cases. 
 
1a. In interim ASBO cases:  
 
Hearsay: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Video Evidence: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Photographs: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
PNC & Intelligence Printouts: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Incident diaries: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Non-Professional Witness Evidence: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
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Professional Witness Evidence: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
1b. In ASBO cases: 
 
Hearsay: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Video Evidence: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Photographs: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
PNC & Intelligence Printouts: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
Incident diaries: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
Non-Professional Witness Evidence: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
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Professional Witness Evidence: 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
 
 
2. On average, how many (non-professional) witnesses are used per interim 
ASBO case?  
 
 0 
 
 1-6 
 
 7-15 
 
 16+ 
 
 
 
3. On average, how many professional witnesses are used per interim ASBO 
case? 
 
 
 0 
 
 1-6 
 
 7-15 
 
 16+ 
 
 
4. On average, how many (non-professional) witnesses are used per ASBO 
case? 
 
 0 
 
 1-6 
 
 7-15 
 
 16+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. On average, how many professional witnesses are used per ASBO case?  
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 0 
 
 1-6 
 
 7-15 
 
 16+ 
 
 
 
6a. Have you ever experienced difficulties in securing witnesses for ASBO 
cases?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
6b. If you have experienced difficulties securing witnesses, with what 
proportion of cases?  
 
 
All cases 
 
The majority of 
cases 
About half of 
all cases 
 
 
Less than half 
of all cases 
A very small 
proportion of 
cases 
 
 
 
 
 
6c. If you have experienced difficulties securing witnesses, was this a result 
of: (You may select more than one option) 
 
 
 Witness intimidation/fear of reprisals? 
 
 Witness reluctance? 
 
 Unreliable witness? 
 
 Witness Memory Decay? 
 
 Witness Unobtainable? 
 
 Other? Please state: 
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7. On average, how many witness statements are used per interim ASBO 
case? 
 
 0 
 
 1-10 
 
 11-30 
 
 31-50 
 
 51+ 
 
 
8. On average, how many witness statements are used per ASBO case? 
 
 0 
 
 1-10 
 
 11-30 
 
 31-50 
 
 51 + 
 
 
 
9. How often are you successful in obtaining an Interim ASBO based only on 
hearsay evidence? (please tick) 
 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
 
10. Have you ever successfully obtained a full ASBO based only on hearsay 
evidence?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
11. If yes, approximately how many times? 
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12. Out of the total number of ASBOs obtained by your local authority, how 
many of these ASBOs have been made following a conviction?  
 
 
All of them 
 
The majority of 
cases 
In about half 
of all cases 
 
 
In less than 
half of all 
cases 
In a very small 
proportion of 
cases 
 
 
 
 
13. How easy do you find it to obtain an ASBO made on conviction?  
 
 
Much easier 
than an 
ASBO on 
application 
 
 
Easier than 
an ASBO 
on 
application 
Same as an 
ASBO on 
application 
More 
difficult than 
an ASBO 
on 
application  
Much more 
difficult than 
an ASBO 
on 
application 
 
 
 
14. Have you ever attempted to obtain an ASBO following a criminal 
conviction at a hearing where the criminal offence was not related to the 
antisocial behaviour problem?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
15. If yes, were you successful? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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16. If you have previously obtained an ASBO following a criminal conviction 
at a hearing where the criminal offence was not related to the antisocial 
behaviour problem, how frequently have you been successful in obtaining an 
ASBO in this way?  
 
 
 Every time I have attempted to obtain an ASBO in this way? 
 
 The majority of attempts have been successful? 
 
 About half of attempts have been successful? 
 
 Less than half of attempts have been successful? 
 
 In only a very small number of cases? 
  
 
 
17. Do you think that it is appropriate for ASBOs to be granted at criminal 
trials where the criminal behaviour is unrelated to the antisocial behaviour 
problem?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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SECTION 3: Court Procedure. In this section you will be asked about the 
duration of ASBO cases, how frequently applications are contested and how 
often successful applications are appealed. 
 
 
 
 
1. What is the approximate average length of time an ASBO case takes to 
come before the court, from Summons to Final Hearing? 
 
 1-6 weeks 
 
 7-12 weeks 
 
 13-18 weeks 
 
 19 + weeks 
 
 
2. From your own experience, how frequently are ASBO applications 
contested at the initial hearing in both interim and full ASBO cases? 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
In more 
than half of 
cases 
In about 
half of 
cases 
In less than 
half of 
cases 
Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
 
 
     
 
 
 
3. From your own experience, how frequently are ASBO applications 
contested at the final hearing in both interim and full ASBO cases? 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
In more 
than half of 
cases 
In about 
half of 
cases 
In less than 
half of 
cases 
Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 277 
4. From your own experience, how frequently are orders successfully 
contested in both interim and full ASBO cases? 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
In more 
than half of 
cases 
In about 
half of 
cases 
In less than 
half of 
cases 
Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
 
 
     
 
 
 
5. From your own experience, on what basis are cases most commonly 
contested? 
 
 
 
6. From your own experience, how frequently are cases appealed? 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
In more 
than half of 
cases 
In about 
half of 
cases 
In less than 
half of 
cases 
Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
 
 
     
 
 
From your own experience, how frequently are cases successfully appealed? 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
In more 
than half of 
cases 
In about 
half of 
cases 
In less than 
half of 
cases 
Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
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SECTION 4: Defence Counsel. This section asks you questions about your 
experiences of defence council in ASBO cases, including any problems that 
you may have encountered. 
 
 
 
1. Have you encountered ASBO cases whereby you believe that Defence 
Counsel has acted unfairly/unprofessionally in terms of how they have 
presented their case in court?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
2. If yes, did this relate to: (you may select more than one option) 
 
 The adversarial nature of their counsel?  
 
 The cross-examination of witnesses?  
 
 A set period of notice being required for the use of hearsay 
evidence? 
 
 Defence counsel arguing every prohibition? 
 
 Ability of defence counsel to appeal by way of rehearing without 
needing to state reasons? 
 
 Attempts to draw out the application/court process? 
 
 Other? Please state: 
 
 
3. From your own experience, how often are problems of this nature 
encountered during ASBO and interim ASBO cases? 
 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
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4. In a recent report (2005), The Home Affairs Committee stated that ASBO 
cases in which the right of appeal is not being taken, highlights ‘the variable 
quality of legal representation rather than any difficulties with the current 
provisions for variation and appeal’. Would you agree with this statement?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
5. In your own opinion, how varied is the quality of legal representation 
available to defendants in ASBO cases?  
 
Highly 
Variable 
 
Varied but 
generally of 
good quality 
Not 
particularly 
varied, of 
about an 
average 
standard 
 
 
Consistent 
poor 
standard 
Consistent 
good 
standard 
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SECTION 5: District Judges/Lay Magistrates. This section asks you about 
your experience of Judges and Magistrates in ASBO cases, including any 
problems that you may have encountered. 
 
 
 
1. In your own experience, have ASBO applications been most frequently 
heard by: 
 
 District judges? 
 
 The Lay Benches? 
 
2. Have you ever encountered problems with Judges/Magistrates during 
ASBO cases?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
3. If yes, what is the most common difficulty that you have encountered? 
 
 
 
 
4. How often are problems encountered during ASBO and interim ASBO 
cases? 
 
 
 
 
Always 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
Interim 
ASBO 
 
     
ASBO 
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SECTION 6: Antisocial Behaviour Legislation. This section asks you for your 
opinions about current antisocial behaviour legislation, its effectiveness and 
any associated problems that you have encountered with it. 
 
 
 
1. Do you think that the legal definition of antisocial behaviour as behaviour 
that causes, or is likely to cause ’harassment, alarm or distress’ is too wide?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
2. As far as you are aware, has the flexibility of the definition resulted in 
inconsistency in administration across different local authorities?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
3. If yes, do you think that this is problematic?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
 
4. If yes, in what way? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. From your own experience, how often does the antisocial behaviour 
referred to in ASBO applications relate in part (but not necessarily 
exclusively) to non-criminal behaviour? 
 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
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6. Have you ever been involved in pursuing ASBO applications where you 
believed that an ASBO was an inappropriate response to the behaviour in 
question?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
7. If yes, how often? 
 
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
 
8a. Do you think that the definition of antisocial behaviour should be 
restricted to criminal acts already proscribed by legislation?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
8b. Please state why: 
 
 
 
9. As the antisocial behaviour definition includes behaviour that is already a 
criminal offence, do you think that this can lead to a twin-track approach to 
identical criminal acts?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
10. As statutory guidance states that it is not necessary to prove intention on 
the part of a defendant to cause harassment, alarm or distress, does this 
result in potential mitigating factors then being missed in court?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
11. From your own experience, would you agree that an ASBO is purely a 
preventative order?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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12. From your own experience, have you found ASBOs to also have punitive 
consequences?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
13. If yes, what are they? (you may tick more than one option) 
 
 Access to social housing? 
 
 Employment opportunities? 
 
 Stigmatisation? 
 
 Other? Please state: 
 
 
 
14. Do you think that it is problematic that civil rules of evidence are used in 
ASBO cases when [the equivalent of] a criminal standard of proof applies?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
15. Please state why: 
 
 
16. Given that a zero tolerance approach to antisocial behaviour would be 
impossible to sustain in practical terms, and given that the courts can only 
deal with some of the less serious infringements of the law, what type of 
behaviour do you think that the courts should primarily be addressing in 
ASBO cases?  
 
 
17. From your own experience, have you ever found that the conditions of 
some ASBOs have necessarily invited breach?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
18. If yes, how frequently has this been the case?  
 
Always 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
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SECTION 7: Naming & Shaming. This section asks you about the practice of 
using publicity to inform the public of those with ASBOs. 
 
 
 
1. Do you agree with the ‘naming and shaming’ of children and young 
persons (under 18) who have ASBOs? 
 
 
Yes, Always 
 
Yes, but 
where 
appropriate 
exceptions 
are made 
 
 
 
 
 
Sometimes, 
but only 
when it 
seems 
essential 
Rarely, I 
don’t 
generally 
agree with 
the practice 
Never, I 
disagree 
with the 
practice 
 
 
2. In your experience, how often are children and young people who are 
granted ASBOs also granted protection in court from being publicly 
identified? 
 
Always 
 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
3. In your experience, how often are children and young people who breach 
ASBOs also granted protection in court from being publicly identified? 
 
Always 
 
 
 
Frequently Sometimes Rarely  Never 
 
 
4. Do you think that there should be a presumption against publicising 
details [of children and young people with ASBOs] unless the 
magistrate/judge specifically adjudicates that it is in the public interest to do 
so?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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5. From your own experience of ASBO cases, do you agree that the prospect 
of being named in court is a powerful deterrent to antisocial behaviour in 
adults?  
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
6. From your own experience of ASBO cases, do you agree that the prospect 
of being named in court is a powerful deterrent to antisocial behaviour in 
children? 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
7. From your own experience, do you think that the use of ASBOs risks 
young children needlessly being brought into the criminal justice system?  
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
8. From your own experience, do ASBOs appear to be leading to an increase 
in custody for young offenders?  
 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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SECTION 8: Possible Improvements to Current System. This final section 
asks you about any changes that you think could/should be made to the 
application process or court system. 
 
 
 
1. What areas (if any) are most problematic for you when pursuing an ASBO 
application? 
 
 
2. What changes would you like to see made to improve the ASBO 
application process and the nature of ASBO proceedings in court? 
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Thank you very much for your help in this research. 
 
The data that has been collected as a result of your participation will be held 
anonymously. 
 
If you choose to supply your email address for further contact, this will be 
stored separately from your data. It will only be used to contact you for this 
particular purpose and will not be shared with any third party. 
 
In case you have any comments on this study, I would be grateful if you 
would share them with me by adding them on the following page or by 
contacting me by email: [my email address] 
 
Once again, thank you very much for supporting this research. 
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If you wish to receive feedback on the outcome of this research, please 
provide your email address below and you will be contacted with further 
details in due course.  
 
Email address: 
 
 
Comments: 
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Appendix 4 
 
Access request to Lord President 
 
 
 
Lord President 
Court of Session 
Parliament House 
Parliament Square 
Edinburgh 
EH1 1RQ 
 
Dear Lord President, 
 
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING RESEARCH PROJECT: ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
ORDERS (ASBOs) & THE COURT SYSTEM 
 
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Stirling conducting research on the 
use of Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) in Britain.  
 
The subject of the main study is an investigation that seeks to understand the 
contribution and influence of the court system and judiciary in deciding ASBO 
applications in both Scotland, and in England & Wales. 
 
Aims of research project 
 
From analysis of existing research (Campbell, 2002; Burney, 2002; CIHS, 2003; 
Scottish Executive, 2004; 2005; Brown, 2004), specific gaps in the knowledge and 
understanding of ASBO use in Britain has been identified. What has been 
overlooked in current research on the use of ASBOs in Britain, is a deeper insight 
into the fundamental contribution and situs of the court system and legal process in 
determining the manifold functions of the ASBO, and, their statutory limitations 
within the law on antisocial behaviour. 
 
Although research on behalf of the Scottish Executive, for example, notes that a 
significant factor in ‘influencing regional variations…was the varying attitude of the 
courts’ (2005: 2.27), more detailed and extensive research into the use of ASBOs 
requires an analysis of legislation, court records, stated cases, legal 
precedents/case law, and interviews conducted with sheriffs, district judges, lay 
magistrates, and solicitors to be correlated. It is the objective of this research to 
correlate these aspects of the legal and court processes to provide more 
comprehensive and developed research on ASBO applications in Britain. 
 
There are also no comparative studies in existence that analyse the 
differences/similarities between the ASBO application procedure in Scotland, and 
South of the border. Hence, it is also the purpose of this research project to provide 
a comparative analysis of court procedure in Scotland, and in England & Wales, in 
ASBO applications. It is hoped that clearly identifying the successes and 
encountered difficulties in the application process within the separate jurisdictions, 
will be a relevant, and hopefully useful, contribution to research in this area. 
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Methodology 
 
The research fieldwork is to be conducted in two stages. The first stage has been 
completed and consisted of an online survey questionnaire which was answered by 
local authority solicitors involved in ASBO applications in both Scotland, and in 
England & Wales. 
 
The online survey questionnaire was interested in local authority solicitors’ 
experiences of ASBO cases and their opinions on court procedure, legislation and 
case law, evidentiary requirements, and any difficulties that they may have 
encountered with ASBO proceedings in court. 
 
It is hoped that the second stage of the research fieldwork will consist of semi-
structured interviews with sheriffs in Scotland, and district judges and lay 
magistrates in England & Wales. The interviews will be conducted to gain an in-
depth understanding of unique and common issues and concerns related to ASBO 
applications.  
 
It is proposed that a series of (ideally) 10 semi-structured interviews in sheriff 
courts across Scotland (please see below) would be conducted within the next 4 
months. Interview schedules would be provided in advance to participants.  
 
In accordance with the Scottish Executive’s access protocol for the courts and the 
judiciary, all interviews would be anonymous. The anonymity of interview 
participants would be protected using the following methods: (a) all identifying 
information would be stripped from the transcribed interview after validation, (b) 
quotations used for publication would be framed in such a way that the individual’s 
identify is masked, and (c) pseudonyms would be used where necessary. 
 
The transcripts of interviews would be provided to interviewees (should they wish) 
for validation. Transcripts will then be analysed for common and emergent themes 
using a constant comparison method, and sorted into major themes using a 
combination of categories derived from prior research (Campbell, 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2004; 2005). 
 
 
Access Request 
 
Hence, I would like to request permission to seek the participation of sheriffs in 
Scotland to participate in the above research project please.  
 
I am most grateful indeed for your consideration in this matter and I await your 
response in due course. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Jane Donoghue 
 
[my contact details] 
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Appendix 5 
 
Access request letter template (Sheriffs Principal) 
 
 
 
Dear Sheriff Principal X, 
 
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING RESEARCH PROJECT: ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
ORDERS (ASBOs) & THE COURT SYSTEM 
 
Access Request 
 
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Stirling and I would like to request 
permission to seek the participation of sheriffs in Scotland in research on the use of 
Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) in Britain.   
 
I would like to interview A sheriffs in B Sheriff Court, C sheriffs in D Sheriff Court, 
and E sheriffs in F Sheriff Court. I am writing to the Lord President, and Sheriffs 
Principal U, V, W, Y and Z in similar terms.  
 
Aims of research project 
 
The subject of the main study is an investigation that seeks to understand the 
contribution and influence of the court system and judiciary in deciding ASBO 
applications in both Scotland, and in England & Wales. 
 
From analysis of existing research (Campbell, 2002; Burney, 2002; CIHS, 2003; 
Scottish Executive, 2004; 2005; Brown, 2004), specific gaps in the knowledge and 
understanding of ASBO use in Britain has been identified. What has been 
overlooked in current research on the use of ASBOs in Britain, is a deeper insight 
into the fundamental contribution and situs of the court system and legal process in 
determining the manifold functions of the ASBO, and, their statutory limitations 
within the law on antisocial behaviour. 
 
Although research on behalf of the Scottish Executive, for example, notes that a 
significant factor in ‘influencing regional variations…was the varying attitude of the 
courts’ (2005: 2.27), more detailed and extensive research into the use of ASBOs 
requires an analysis of legislation, court records, stated cases, legal 
precedents/case law, and interviews conducted with sheriffs, district judges, lay 
magistrates, and solicitors to be correlated. It is the objective of this research to 
correlate these aspects of the legal and court processes to provide more 
comprehensive and developed research on ASBO applications in Britain. 
 
There are also no comparative studies in existence that analyse the 
differences/similarities between the ASBO application procedure in Scotland, and 
South of the border. Hence, it is also the purpose of this research project to provide 
a comparative analysis of court procedure in Scotland, and in England & Wales, in 
ASBO applications. It is hoped that clearly identifying the successes and 
encountered difficulties in the application process within the separate jurisdictions, 
will be a relevant, and hopefully useful, contribution to research in this area. 
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Methodology 
 
The research fieldwork is to be conducted in two stages. The first stage has been 
completed and consisted of an online survey questionnaire which was answered by 
local authority solicitors involved in ASBO applications in both Scotland, and in 
England & Wales. 
 
The online survey questionnaire was interested in local authority solicitors’ 
experiences of ASBO applications and their opinions on court procedure, 
legislation and case law, evidentiary requirements, and any difficulties that they 
may have encountered with ASBO proceedings in court. 
 
It is hoped that the second stage of the research fieldwork will consist of semi-
structured interviews with sheriffs in Scotland, and district judges and lay 
magistrates in England & Wales. The interviews will be conducted to gain an in-
depth understanding of unique and common issues and concerns related to ASBO 
applications.  
 
It is proposed that a series of (ideally) 10 semi-structured interviews in sheriff 
courts across Scotland would be conducted within the next 4 months. Interview 
schedules would be provided in advance to participants.  
 
In accordance with the Scottish Executive’s access protocol for the courts and the 
judiciary, all interviews would be anonymous. The anonymity of interview 
participants would be protected using the following methods: (a) all identifying 
information would be stripped from the transcribed interview after validation, (b) 
quotations used for publication would be framed in such a way that the individual’s 
identify is masked, and (c) coding (e.g. S1, S2) would be used where necessary. 
 
The transcripts of interviews would be provided to interviewees (should they wish) 
for validation. Transcripts will then be analysed for common and emergent themes 
using a constant comparison method, and sorted into major themes using a 
combination of categories derived from prior research (Campbell, 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2004; 2005). 
 
I am most grateful indeed for your consideration in this matter and I await your 
response in due course. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
Jane Donoghue 
 
[my contact details] 
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Appendix 6 
 
Interview consent form 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) & The Court System Research Study 
 
 
Aims & Scope  
 
The subject of the main study is an investigation that seeks to understand the 
contribution and influence of the court system and judiciary in deciding ASBO 
applications in both Scotland, and in England & Wales. 
 
Methodology 
 
The research fieldwork is to be conducted in two stages. The first stage has been 
completed and consisted of an online survey questionnaire which was answered by 
local authority solicitors involved in ASBO applications in both Scotland, and in 
England & Wales. The second stage of the research fieldwork (this stage) consists 
of semi-structured interviews with sheriffs in Scotland. The interviews will be 
conducted to gain an in-depth understanding of unique and common issues and 
concerns related to ASBO applications.  
 
Semi-structured interview schedules will be provided in advance to participants.  
 
In accordance with the Scottish Executive’s access protocol for the courts and the 
judiciary, all interviews will be anonymous. The anonymity of interview participants 
will be protected using the following methods: (a) all identifying information will be 
stripped from the transcribed interview after validation, (b) quotations used for 
publication will be framed in such a way that the individual’s identify is masked, and 
(c) coding (e.g. S1, S2) will be used where necessary. 
 
The transcripts of interviews will be provided to interviewees (should they wish) for 
validation. Transcripts will then be analysed for common and emergent themes 
using a constant comparison method, and sorted into major themes using a 
combination of categories derived from prior research (Campbell, 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2005a; 2005b). 
 
Please provide written consent that you agree to the following interview being 
conducted, in accordance with the above stipulated conditions, for the purposes of 
the aforementioned research study: 
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…………………………..                                       ……………………. 
 
(name of interviewee)                                                    (date) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
………………………….. 
 
(signature) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…………………………..                                       ……………………. 
 
(name of researcher)                                                    (date) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
………………………….. 
 
(signature) 
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Appendix 7 
 
Semi-structured interview schema 
 
 
 
1. Standard of proof 
 
From the survey questionnaire that was completed by solicitors in Scotland, it was 
apparent that the standard of proof in ASBO and interim ASBO cases was an area 
of law that a considerable amount of respondents found quite confusing. And they 
cited a lack of case law in this area, coupled with the existence of conflicting cases 
suggesting different standards of proof. 
 
• From your experience, have you encountered difficulties arising from a 
solicitor’s or applicant authority’s uncertainty relating to the standard of 
proof required for interim/ASBO applications? 
 
 
• And in terms of full ASBOs, are they generally judged to quasi-criminal 
standard, rather than on the balance of probabilities? 
 
 
2. Interim orders  
 
• Because there is no requirement that evidence should be led at the interim 
stage, does this mean that interim orders are most often granted on a prima 
facie basis without the hearing of any evidence or lodging of any witness 
statements or productions? 
 
• As there is no explicit provision for any representations to be made by or on 
behalf of the respondent before an interim ASBO is granted, it has been 
argued that interim orders should perhaps not carry criminal sanctions in 
the event that they are breached. I’m aware that there is a case pending in 
the inner house on this issue but what would be your view as regards 
criminal sanctions for interim orders? 
 
• Is there an issue with regard to persons who are the subject of an order 
being so chaotically organised that they don’t organise opposition, they 
don’t defend it? 
 
• Do you think that the court should have the power to initiate inquiry before 
granting interim orders? For example, a social inquiry report of the kind 
produced for sentencing community based orders? 
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3. Prohibitions in and duration of the order 
 
• In your experience, to what extent have you found the prohibitions proposed 
by applicant authorities to be generally proportional to the antisocial 
behaviour in question? 
 
• How often, in your experience, are amendments made (by the judiciary) to 
the prohibitions of ASBO applications? 
 
• How often are amendments made (by the judiciary) to the duration of ASBO 
conditions specified in the prohibitions?  
 
• Do you find that ASBO prohibitions more often relate to behaviour that 
could be preparatory to the commission of an offence? And in that way 
could be described as more of an anticipatory type of order? Or do 
prohibitions more often relate to behaviour that is essentially criminal?  
 
 
4. ASBO breach 
 
In terms of the research study that I am currently conducting, the area that I am 
most interested in relating to breach is with regard to the corollary of breaches 
which have occurred as the result of criminal behaviour. 
 
• If the conditions of an ASBO prohibit conduct which already constitutes a 
criminal offence, to what extent does the court have regard to the maximum 
sentence for that offence in sentencing for the breach? 
 
• Do you agree with the approach adopted in England and Wales, that the 
court’s power should not be limited to the statutory maximum for the 
criminal offence?  
 
• Because the statutory definition of antisocial behaviour includes behaviour 
that is already criminally sanctioned, following the breach of an order, could 
this lead to a twin-track approach to identical criminal acts? And if so, do 
you foresee this as being problematic (in terms of public confidence, the 
effectiveness of the relevant legislation, et cetera)? 
 
• On a related issue - What would be your view in terms of how behaviour 
that is criminal or, behaviour that is likely to escalate to the criminal level, 
should be dealt with? Do you think that this type of behaviour should be 
dealt with by local authorities and/or housing associations? 
 
 
5. Antisocial Behaviour Legislation 
 
• Existing research carried out on the use of ASBOs in Scotland, found that 
addiction, mental health problems and learning difficulties are common 
features of ASBO cases. As statutory guidance states that it is not 
necessary to prove intention on the part of a defendant to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress, could this result in potential mitigating factors 
then being missed in court? 
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6. Orders on conviction 
 
• The main reason cited by solicitors for the low use of ASBOs on conviction 
in Scotland was that because fiscals, and the crown prosecution, are not 
involved in the sentencing process in criminal trials, fiscals are generally 
disinclined to suggest orders on conviction as a sentencing option to 
sheriffs. What would be your view in terms of the role of fiscals in this 
instance? And do you, in any circumstances, consider it appropriate for the 
fiscal to suggest an order on conviction to a sheriff? 
 
• Have you ever experienced applicant authorities attempting to obtain orders 
on conviction to extend the penalty for a criminal offence? 
 
 
7. ASBOs and children 
 
• Do you believe that the statutory requirement for inter-agency consultation 
(and a ‘level of agreement’ among interested parties to be reached) inhibits 
the use of ASBOs against children? 
 
• Some local authority practitioners have expressed the view that ‘an ASBO 
should be seen as a warning [to children and young people], not a last 
resort’. Are you of the view that it would be appropriate to use orders in this 
way?  
 
• In view of the existence of statutory measures which prevent children from 
being detained for breaching the prohibitions of their order, it has been 
argued that the extension of the use of ASBOs to children and young 
people in Scotland, was little more than a ‘paper exercise’ with limited 
value. Would you agree? 
 
 
8. Use of publicity 
 
• It has been proposed by the current administration that new powers should 
be created to enable local authorities to publicise the names of under 16s 
who have been given ASBOs. Are you of the opinion that applicant 
authorities should be given statutory powers to enable them to publicly 
identify persons under 16 in certain ASBO cases, or are you of the view that 
this should remain a matter for the sheriff in such a case? 
 
• Are you aware of any cases in which the automatic reporting restrictions 
have been lifted in interim/ASBO cases involving children? 
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